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3 versions
CosmeticWhat changed in ENGROSSED IN SENATEcompared with REPORTED TO SENATE (Jul 9, 2025)

Technical corrections only. The changes between v2 and v3 reflect the bill's progression from being reported in the Senate to being engrossed after passing the Senate, updating legislative status and associated metadata. No substantive policy changes were made to the bill's text.

S. 259·119th Congress·Introduced Jan 27, 2025

Foreign Adversary Communications Transparency Act

Passed SenateScience, Technology, CommunicationsMajor
View bill text
Sponsor
Sen. Fischer, Deb [R-NE]
Committees
Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee (primary)
Last action
Oct 24, 2025

Bottom line

This bill enhances national security by requiring the FCC to publicly disclose foreign adversary ownership and control in U.S. communications infrastructure.

What it actually does

This Act directs the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to publish and annually update a public list of entities holding FCC licenses or authorizations that are owned or controlled by a 'covered entity' (i.e., a foreign adversary government or related entity). It mandates an initial list within 120 days for specific license types and requires the FCC to conduct a rulemaking to expand coverage to all other authorizations.

Proponents argue

Proponents argue that this bill is a critical step to enhance national security by providing essential transparency into potential foreign adversary influence over vital U.S. communications networks. They contend that publicizing this information will enable better oversight, risk assessment, and informed decision-making by government agencies and the public, safeguarding critical infrastructure from malicious actors.

Opponents contend

Opponents might argue that while the intent is valid, the bill could create significant administrative burdens for the FCC and potentially stigmatize legitimate foreign investment, even from allied nations, if the definition of 'covered country' is broad or its application is overzealous. Concerns could also be raised about the potential for overreach or chilling effects on foreign capital essential for infrastructure development.

The bill is very concise and can be read and understood quickly, making it highly accessible for public and stakeholder review.

Section 1

Short Title

prominently featuredstraightforward

This section establishes the official short title of the Act as the 'Foreign Adversary Communications Transparency Act.' This title is the common name used to refer to and cite the legislation, providing a clear and concise identifier for the public and legal professionals.

GroupImpactMechanismScale
GroupGeneral PublicImpactProvides a clear and memorable name for the legislation.MechanismScale
GroupLegal ProfessionalsImpactFacilitates easy referencing and citation of the Act.MechanismScale

Supporters argue

Supporters argue that a clear and concise short title helps in easily identifying and referencing the legislation, improving public discourse and legal clarity regarding its purpose.

Critics contend

No specific opposition is typically raised against the short title of a bill, as it is a standard legislative practice for identification purposes.

Tradeoffs

None.

Section 2(a)

Key Definitions

prominently featuredmoderately complex

This section defines critical terms used throughout the Act, including 'appropriate national security agency' (referencing 47 U.S.C. 1608), 'Commission' (Federal Communications Commission), 'covered country' (referencing 10 U.S.C. 4872(f)(2)), and 'covered entity' (a government of a covered country, an entity organized under its laws, or a subsidiary thereof). These definitions are fundamental for understanding the scope and application of the bill's requirements.

Section 2(b)

Initial Publication of Foreign-Owned Entities List

prominently featuredmoderately complex

Within 120 days of the Act's enactment, the FCC is mandated to publish a list on its internet website. This list will include entities holding specific FCC licenses (spectrum licenses under 47 U.S.C. 309(j) or Cable Landing Licensing Act licenses) where a 'covered entity' holds a reportable equity or voting interest, or where an appropriate national security agency has determined that a covered entity exerts control, regardless of ownership interest.

Section 2(c)

Rulemaking for Comprehensive List Expansion

prominently featuredmoderately complex

Within 18 months of enactment, the FCC is required to issue rules to obtain information necessary to identify entities holding *any* other FCC authorization, license, or grant of authority (beyond those specified in subsection (b)(1)) that have reportable foreign ownership by a 'covered entity.' One year after these rules are issued, these newly identified entities must be added to the public list published under subsection (b).

Section 2(d)

Paperwork Reduction Act Exemption

mentioned in summarystraightforward

This section explicitly exempts any collection of information conducted or sponsored by the FCC to implement this Act from the requirements of the Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA). The PRA typically requires federal agencies to minimize the burden of information collection on the public and obtain approval from the Office of Management and Budget (OMB).

Section 2(e)

Annual List Updates

prominently featuredstraightforward

The FCC is required to update the published list of foreign-owned entities not less frequently than annually. This provision ensures that the information remains current and reflects any changes in ownership or control by covered entities, including those added after the comprehensive rulemaking process.

FOUND

Defines 'covered country' by reference to section 4872(f)(2) of title 10, United States Code. This external reference determines which specific countries are considered 'foreign adversaries' for the purpose of this Act, thereby defining the scope of foreign ownership that triggers the FCC's listing requirement.

Section 2(a)(3)

Why it matters:This is standard legislative practice to avoid redundancy and ensure consistency with existing definitions across federal law, particularly for national security matters. It allows the list of covered countries to be updated in one place (10 U.S.C. 4872) and automatically apply to this Act.

Case for: Supporters argue that referencing an existing, established definition for 'covered country' ensures consistency across U.S. national security policy and avoids the need to repeatedly legislate the same list of countries. It also allows for dynamic updates to the list of adversaries without amending this specific Act.

Case against: Critics might argue that this method makes the bill less transparent to the average reader, who must consult an external legal source to understand a core component of the bill's scope. This could obscure the full implications of the legislation.

Estimated impact: Directly determines the scope of foreign governments and entities whose ownership interests will trigger FCC listing requirements, thus defining the national security focus of the Act.

FOUND

Defines 'appropriate national security agency' by reference to section 9 of the Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act of 2019 (47 U.S.C. 1608). These agencies are empowered to determine if a covered entity exerts control over an FCC licensee, even without an equity or voting interest, which then triggers inclusion on the public list.

Section 2(a)(1)

Why it matters:This is standard legislative practice to maintain consistency and avoid redundancy with existing statutory definitions. It leverages established expertise and authority within the national security community for such determinations.

Case for: Proponents argue that using an existing definition for national security agencies ensures that the most relevant and expert government bodies are involved in assessing foreign control, leveraging their established roles and intelligence capabilities to protect U.S. infrastructure.

Case against: Critics might suggest that relying on an external definition could make it less clear to the public which specific agencies are making these critical determinations of control, potentially reducing accountability or transparency of the decision-making process.

Estimated impact: Grants specific national security agencies the authority to trigger the listing of entities based on their determination of control, significantly influencing the scope and accuracy of the FCC's transparency list.

About this analysis. AI-Generated from the official bill text and available committee reports. Gaps in available data are noted explicitly. Verify important details with the official Congress.gov record.

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