What changed between these versions
A substantive revision, v2 updates the short title year from 2025 to 2026 and introduces several key changes to the bill's operative provisions. Notably, it narrows the definition of the 'Russian shadow fleet,' extends the timeline for initial sanctions imposition, and adds emergency exceptions for providing services to sanctioned vessels. Additionally, v2 shifts lead agency responsibilities for price cap enforcement, makes certain presidential determinations discretionary, and introduces a 10-year sunset clause for sanctions authorities.
Overview
Extensive changes are present throughout the bill, affecting definitions, sanctioning criteria, reporting requirements, and general provisions. · v2 refines and in some instances narrows the scope of certain sanctionable activities, makes some presidential authorities discretionary rather than mandatory, and adds specific exceptions and a termination clause for sanctions authorities, while also clarifying and expanding certain definitions and reporting requirements.
The most significant changes in v2 include a revised definition of the 'Russian shadow fleet' to focus specifically on petroleum products, an extension of the initial sanctions imposition timeline from 90 to 180 days, and the introduction of emergency exceptions for providing essential services or port access to sanctioned vessels. Furthermore, v2 deletes the requirement for a public database of illicit vessels and reports on Russian oil export income, while also making the President's determination on Russian military actions discretionary. A new 10-year sunset clause for sanctions authorities is also added. Many other sections are renumbered or have minor textual adjustments.
Major additions
This new subsection grants the President discretionary authority to impose sanctions on any vessel that is subject to sanctions by the United Kingdom, the European Union, the Group of 7, or a member of the Five Eyes intelligence alliance, or is owned or operated by a person subject to such sanctions, on or after the date of enactment.
This addition provides a new, explicit pathway for the President to align U.S. sanctions with those of key international partners, potentially streamlining the process for designating vessels involved in the Russian shadow fleet. It broadens the criteria for sanctionable entities by leveraging existing international designations.
This new section establishes a termination date for the requirements and authorities to impose sanctions under subtitles A, B, and C of Title I. These sanctions will terminate on the date that is 10 years after the date of the enactment of this Act.
This addition introduces a sunset clause for the core sanctions authorities related to the Russian shadow fleet, energy products, and defense industrial base. This means the sanctions are not permanent and will expire after a decade, which could impact long-term enforcement strategies and provide a future point for re-evaluation by Congress.
Deletions
Section 123 in v1 required the Secretary of State, in coordination with relevant Federal agencies, to establish and maintain a public database of foreign vessels suspected of being involved in sabotage activities or other illicit activities in support of the Russian shadow fleet.
The deletion of this section removes a key transparency and information-sharing mechanism. Without a public database, it may be more challenging for the public, private entities, and potentially even international partners to track and identify vessels involved in illicit activities, potentially hindering broader efforts to counter the Russian shadow fleet.
These paragraphs in v1 required the report on the crude oil price cap to include an assessment of income derived by the Russian Federation from oil sales in excess of the price cap, an estimate of future income, and an assessment of financial benefits from compliant oil sales.
The removal of these reporting requirements means that future reports will no longer provide detailed financial analysis of the Russian Federation's income from oil exports, both compliant and non-compliant with the price cap. This reduces the transparency and specific economic intelligence available to Congress and the public regarding the financial impact of the price cap and the Russian Federation's revenue generation from oil.
Section 163 in v1 mandated an annual report on exports of Russian-origin petroleum products, including analysis of revenue, export volumes to China and other countries, average prices, labeling practices, and descriptions of entities, vessels, and ports involved.
The deletion of this section removes a comprehensive annual reporting requirement on Russian-origin petroleum product exports. This significantly reduces the mandated transparency and detailed analysis of Russia's oil trade, particularly concerning its relationship with China, which could make it harder to monitor and assess the effectiveness of sanctions and counter evasion efforts.
Modifications
This modification tightens the standards for what constitutes 'adequate maritime insurance,' making it more difficult for vessels to claim compliance if they lack comprehensive coverage or if their insurers have ties to sanctioned entities without specific waivers. This could increase operational costs or reduce available insurance options for vessels involved in Russian oil transport, thereby strengthening sanctions enforcement.
Before
v1 defined 'adequate maritime insurance' as verified documentation evidencing protection and indemnity insurance with audited financial statements, excluding insurance from Russian Federation insurers or those covering sanctioned vessels.
After
v2 expands the definition to include verified documentation for protection and indemnity, cargo, and hull and machinery insurance, along with records of compliance and a commitment to provide evidence for regulatory satisfaction. It also clarifies the exclusion criteria for insurers.
This change provides a more precise legal definition for 'foreign vessel' by aligning it with an established statutory definition. This reduces ambiguity and ensures consistent application of the term across U.S. maritime law, affecting which vessels are subject to the bill's provisions.
Before
v1 defined 'foreign vessel' as a vessel not owned or operated by a United States person.
After
v2 defines 'foreign vessel' as a vessel that is not a vessel of the United States (as defined in section 116 of title 46, United States Code).
This modification significantly narrows the focus of the 'Russian shadow fleet' definition to specifically target the transport of 'Russian-origin petroleum products' and explicitly links circumvention to sanctions imposed by the U.S., UK, EU, or other countries. This means vessels transporting 'arms, and other goods' (other than petroleum products) are no longer explicitly covered under this definition, potentially reducing the scope of vessels subject to sanctions under this specific term.
Before
v1 defined 'Russian shadow fleet' as any foreign vessel or vessels used or directed by the Russian Federation to move oil, arms, and other goods for the purpose of circumventing international sanctions.
After
v2 defines 'Russian shadow fleet' as any foreign vessel or vessels used or directed by or on behalf of the Russian Federation to transport Russian-origin petroleum products in circumvention of sanctions imposed with respect to the Russian Federation by the United States, the United Kingdom, the European Union, or other countries.
The extension of the implementation timeline from 90 to 180 days provides the administration more time to prepare for and implement these sanctions. The narrowing of the scope from 'crude oil, arms, or other goods' to solely 'Russian-origin petroleum products' aligns with the revised definition of the 'Russian shadow fleet,' potentially reducing the types of illicit activities covered. The clarification regarding underwriting services means that sanctions apply if services are provided *after* a vessel is sanctioned, providing a clearer enforcement trigger for financial institutions.
Before
v1 mandated sanctions within 90 days on Russian shadow fleet vessels transporting crude oil, arms, or other goods to circumvent sanctions, including vessels exhibiting unsafe behavior, lacking adequate insurance, or evading the crude oil price cap.
After
v2 mandates sanctions within 180 days on Russian shadow fleet vessels transporting Russian-origin petroleum products in circumvention of sanctions, maintaining criteria for unsafe behavior, inadequate insurance, or price cap evasion. It also clarifies that sanctions apply to foreign persons providing underwriting services *after* sanctions are imposed on a vessel.
This modification reduces the frequency of reporting to Congress from quarterly to semi-annually, and extends the initial reporting deadline. This provides the executive branch with more time between reports but reduces the oversight frequency for Congress regarding sanctions imposed under this section.
Before
v1 required a report on sanctions imposed under this section within 120 days of enactment, and every 90 days thereafter.
After
v2 requires a report on sanctions imposed under this section within 180 days of enactment, and every 180 days thereafter.
This modification introduces critical humanitarian and safety exceptions. It allows foreign persons to provide essential goods, services, or port access to sanctioned Russian shadow fleet vessels if an emergency necessitates it, mitigating potential humanitarian crises for crews or environmental disasters from unmaintained vessels. This balances sanctions enforcement with international maritime safety and humanitarian principles.
Before
v1 prohibited the provision of significant goods or services or allowing port access to Russian shadow fleet vessels known to be subject to U.S. sanctions.
After
v2 prohibits these actions but adds an explicit exception: 'unless such goods or services are provided to respond to an emergency' for services, and 'unless that vessel needs to port or receive services as a result of an emergency' for port access.
This modification adds a condition that the justification from the EU or UK for designating a vessel only needs to be included in the report if it is publicly available. This could reduce the amount of information provided to Congress if partner nations' justifications are classified or not released publicly, potentially limiting the transparency of the alignment strategy.
Before
v1 required the report to include the justification provided by the EU or UK for designating a vessel, and a brief justification of the reason provided by them.
After
v2 requires the report to include the justification provided by the EU or UK for designating a vessel '(if that justification is available to the public)' and a brief justification of the reason provided by them.
The reversal of lead agencies from State to Treasury suggests a shift towards a more financially focused enforcement strategy for the price cap, leveraging Treasury's expertise in financial sanctions. The added conditionality for monitoring compliance introduces flexibility, allowing the U.S. to scale back monitoring if the price cap becomes less effective or relevant, potentially impacting the consistency of enforcement efforts over time.
Before
v1 assigned the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of the Treasury, to lead international efforts to enforce the crude oil price cap and related activities.
After
v2 assigns the Secretary of the Treasury, in coordination with the Secretary of State, to lead these international efforts. It also adds a condition to monitoring compliance: 'to the extent such a price cap remains active and relevant to efforts of the United States and allies of the United States to constrain exports of Russian-origin petroleum products'.
Shifting the lead agency to Treasury aligns with the change in Section 141. Making the report classified means that the information will not be publicly accessible, reducing transparency for the public and potentially limiting broader academic or journalistic analysis of the price cap's effectiveness. The removal of Russian income assessments further reduces the public's insight into the financial impact of sanctions on Russia.
Before
v1 required the Secretary of State, in coordination with Treasury, Commerce, and Energy, to submit an unclassified report every two years on the crude oil price cap, including determinations on U.S. imports, executive branch efforts, State Department engagement, and assessments of Russian income from oil sales.
After
v2 requires the Secretary of the Treasury, in coordination with State, Commerce, and Energy, to submit a *classified* report every two years. It retains determinations on U.S. imports, executive branch efforts, and State Department engagement, but removes the requirements for assessing and estimating Russian income from oil sales.
This modification broadens the scope of activities targeted by the strategy beyond just illicit 'smuggling' to include any 'transportation' of Russian-origin petroleum products. This could allow for a wider range of activities to be monitored, identified, and subject to sanctions enforcement, even if they do not strictly meet the definition of smuggling, potentially increasing the reach of U.S. efforts to counter China's role in Russian energy trade.
Before
v1 referred to 'smuggling of Russian-origin petroleum products' in various parts of the strategy related to monitoring, identifying, and assessing vessels and entities.
After
v2 changes these references to 'transportation of Russian-origin petroleum products' or 'transporting Russian-origin petroleum products'.
This modification significantly expands the humanitarian and safety exceptions. It allows for services related to the safe decommissioning or destruction of unsafe sanctioned vessels, preventing potential environmental disasters or hazards at sea that could arise from vessels that are no longer properly maintained due to sanctions. This provides a pathway to address the 'dark fleet' issue of aging, unsafe vessels without undermining the core sanctions regime.
Before
v1 provided an exception for persons providing provisions to a sanctioned vessel if intended for the safety and care of the crew, protection of human life, or maintenance of the vessel to avoid environmental damage.
After
v2 retains the existing exception and expands it to include services provided to a sanctioned vessel if the vessel fails to meet international maritime safety standards and the services are necessary to ensure its safe decommissioning or destruction.
This modification grants the President more flexibility by making the determination discretionary ('may determine' instead of 'shall determine'). It also narrows the scope of the determination by removing the assessment of whether Russian military actions aim to undermine sanctions enforcement. This reduces the mandatory reporting burden and provides the executive branch with greater latitude in assessing and reporting on Russian military activities related to the shadow fleet, potentially reducing the political pressure associated with such determinations.
Before
v1 mandated that the President 'shall determine' whether the Russian Federation is escalating military measures and if that escalation aims to undermine sanctions enforcement or increases incident risk.
After
v2 changes this to the President 'may determine' whether the Russian Federation is escalating military measures and if that escalation increases the risk of an incident at sea. It removes the requirement to determine if the escalation 'has the aim or effect of undermining sanctions enforcement'.
Scope
Meaningful expansion or narrowing — Changes are scattered throughout the bill, affecting definitions, sanctioning criteria, reporting mandates, and general provisions, indicating a comprehensive review. — v2 represents a refinement and, in some areas, a slight narrowing or making discretionary of policy direction, particularly concerning the scope of sanctionable activities and the mandatory nature of certain presidential actions and reports. The addition of a sunset clause also introduces a new policy direction regarding the duration of sanctions. — The changes to definitions (e.g., 'Russian shadow fleet,' 'adequate maritime insurance') interact with and modify the interpretation and application of multiple sanctioning provisions throughout Subtitle A. The renumbering of general provisions also necessitates updates to cross-references within the bill.
Impact analysis
Vessels involved in transporting 'arms and other goods' (not petroleum products) for Russia
Gain, as they are excluded from a specific sanctioning category.
These vessels are no longer explicitly covered under the definition of 'Russian shadow fleet' in v2.
Foreign persons providing essential goods, services, or port access to sanctioned Russian shadow fleet vessels in emergencies
Gain, as they are protected from sanctions under specific emergency conditions.
v2 explicitly allows for these actions without incurring sanctions if an emergency necessitates them.
Insurers providing coverage for vessels involved in Russian oil transport
Procedural change, requiring more stringent adherence to compliance standards and clearer triggers for sanctions.
v2's expanded definition of 'adequate maritime insurance' imposes stricter requirements for coverage and clarifies exclusions, and specifies that providing underwriting services *after* a vessel is sanctioned is a sanctionable act.
The U.S. Executive Branch (President, State Dept., Treasury Dept.)
Procedural change, gaining flexibility and administrative efficiency in some areas, while shifting inter-agency leadership in others.
v2 extends initial sanctioning timelines, shifts lead agency for price cap enforcement from State to Treasury, makes certain presidential determinations discretionary, and reduces reporting frequency for some mandates.
The U.S. Congress and the public
Loss, as access to public information and oversight mechanisms is reduced.
v2 removes the requirement for a public database of illicit vessels and makes the report on the crude oil price cap classified, while also deleting reports on Russian oil export income.
Unsafe sanctioned vessels and the maritime environment
Procedural change, allowing for the safe removal of hazardous vessels without sanctions.
v2 adds an exception for services necessary for the safe decommissioning or destruction of unsafe sanctioned vessels.
All entities subject to sanctions under Subtitles A, B, and C of Title I
Gain, as the sanctions are not permanent.
v2 introduces a 10-year sunset clause for these sanctions authorities.