Deceptive Practices and Voter Intimidation Prevention Act of 2025
- Sponsor
- Sen. Alsobrooks, Angela D. [D-MD]
- Committees
- Judiciary Committee (primary)
- Last action
- Sep 18, 2025
Bottom line
The bill aims to strengthen federal protections against voter suppression through misinformation and intimidation, particularly by addressing the use of artificial intelligence and expanding enforcement mechanisms.
What it actually does
This bill amends federal law to prohibit deceptive communications and voter intimidation in federal elections, specifically targeting the dissemination of false information about voting procedures or eligibility, and the use of generative artificial intelligence to produce such false information. It establishes a private right of action for aggrieved persons and election officials, increases criminal penalties for deceptive acts, and authorizes the Attorney General to take corrective action to counter false information.
Proponents argue
Supporters argue the bill is essential to safeguard the fundamental right to vote, especially for racial, ethnic, and language minority groups historically targeted by deceptive practices. They emphasize the increasing threat posed by social media and generative AI in spreading misinformation, and highlight the need for updated legal tools and federal intervention to preserve election integrity and hold perpetrators accountable, citing past instances of voter suppression and the recent *Mackey* court decision.
Opponents contend
Potential opponents might argue that the bill could infringe on free speech rights, particularly concerning the regulation of political speech, even if false. Concerns could be raised about the scope of "materially false information" and the potential for federal overreach into election administration, which traditionally involves state and local authorities, potentially leading to partisan enforcement or chilling legitimate speech.
The bill is relatively short and clearly structured, making it accessible for an informed reader to understand its core provisions within a reasonable timeframe.
Section 2
Congressional Findings on Deceptive Practices and Voter Intimidation
This section outlines Congress's rationale for the bill, asserting that the right to vote is fundamental and threatened by deceptive practices. It details a history of voter suppression, including specific instances of misinformation targeting minority voters, and highlights the role of social media and generative AI in amplifying these threats. The findings also cite the *Shelby County v. Holder* decision and the *Mackey* case as demonstrating the need for strengthened federal protections against voter suppression.
Supporters argue
Proponents argue these findings are crucial for establishing the compelling governmental interest in regulating deceptive practices, grounding the bill in constitutional authority, and demonstrating the urgent need for federal action to protect vulnerable voters from modern forms of suppression.
Critics contend
Some opponents might argue that while the historical context is valid, the findings could be interpreted as overly broad or as justifying federal overreach into areas traditionally managed by states, potentially setting a precedent for expansive federal election intervention.
Tradeoffs
The findings navigate the tension between states' traditional role in election administration and the federal government's constitutional power to protect voting rights, particularly in light of documented historical and contemporary challenges.
Section 3(a) (amending 52 U.S.C. 10101(b))
Prohibition on Deceptive Communications and AI Use in Federal Elections
This provision creates new federal prohibitions against communicating materially false information about the time, place, or manner of federal elections, or voter eligibility, within 60 days of an election, if done knowingly and with intent to impede voting. It specifically extends this prohibition to the use of artificial intelligence systems, including generative AI, to produce such false information with the same intent. Additionally, it prohibits intentionally hindering or preventing voting or registration, including by operating fake polling places.
Section 3(b) (amending 52 U.S.C. 10101(c))
Private Right of Action for Deceptive Practices
This section establishes a private right of action, allowing any person aggrieved by a violation of the deceptive practices prohibitions to file a civil lawsuit in a U.S. district court. This enables individuals to seek preventive relief, such as permanent or temporary injunctions or restraining orders, to stop deceptive practices. The court may also award reasonable attorney's fees to the prevailing party.
Section 3(c) (amending 18 U.S.C. 594 and 52 U.S.C. 10307)
Enhanced Criminal Penalties for Deceptive Acts and Payments for Not Voting
This section amends Title 18, U.S. Code, to make knowingly communicating materially false election information with intent to impede voting a federal crime, punishable by up to 1 year imprisonment and/or a fine. It also criminalizes corruptly hindering or preventing voting or registration. Furthermore, it amends the Voting Rights Act of 1965 to explicitly prohibit offering payments not only for voting or registering to vote, but also for *refraining from voting*, closing a potential loophole.
Section 4
Attorney General's Corrective Action Authority
This section authorizes the Attorney General (AG) to take corrective action by communicating accurate information to the public if the AG receives a credible report of materially false information being spread to impede voting, and if state and local election officials have not adequately addressed it. The AG must develop written procedures and standards for this action within 180 days, ensuring communications are accurate, objective, and designed solely to correct false information, without favoring any candidate or party.
Section 7 (amending 52 U.S.C. 20511)
Criminalizing Intimidation of Ballot Tabulation and Certification
This section amends the National Voter Registration Act to explicitly include the intimidation of individuals involved in processing or scanning ballots, or tabulating, canvassing, or certifying voting results, as a federal crime. This expands existing protections against intimidation at polling places to cover the post-election processes that are critical to finalizing election outcomes.
This provision amends the Voting Rights Act of 1965 to explicitly prohibit offering or accepting payment not only for registering to vote or for voting, but also for 'not voting'.
Section 3(c)(3) (amending 52 U.S.C. 10307(c))
Why it matters:This is standard legislative practice for making targeted updates to existing law, rather than creating entirely new sections. It's a technical amendment to close a specific loophole.
Case for: Proponents argue this closes a critical loophole, ensuring that all forms of financially induced voter manipulation, including paying individuals to abstain from voting, are explicitly illegal and subject to federal penalties. This strengthens the integrity of the electoral process.
Case against: No specific opposition is typically raised against this provision, as preventing financial inducements for not voting is generally seen as a non-controversial measure to protect election integrity.
Estimated impact: This provision clarifies and strengthens existing prohibitions against voter bribery, potentially deterring a specific form of voter manipulation.
This provision clarifies that an officer responsible for maintaining order and preventing intimidation at a polling place is considered an 'aggrieved person' who can institute a civil action against voter intimidation. It also authorizes the Attorney General to communicate the unlawfulness of intimidation if state/local officials have not taken adequate steps.
Section 6 (amending 52 U.S.C. 10101(b))
Why it matters:This is a technical clarification to empower specific officials to act, rather than a new substantive prohibition. It's a standard way to refine enforcement mechanisms.
Case for: Proponents argue this empowers election officials on the ground to take direct legal action against intimidation, providing a crucial tool for maintaining order and protecting voters. The AG's backstop ensures federal support when local efforts are insufficient.
Case against: Some might argue that expanding who can sue could lead to an increase in litigation, potentially politicizing the role of election officials or creating confusion about their authority.
Estimated impact: This provision strengthens the enforcement capabilities against voter intimidation by explicitly empowering election officials and providing a federal corrective action option.
This subsection defines 'artificial intelligence' by referencing section 5002 of the National Artificial Intelligence Initiative Act of 2020 (15 U.S.C. 9401) and defines 'generative artificial intelligence' as a class of AI models that emulate input data to generate derived synthetic content (images, videos, audio, text, etc.).
Section 3(a)(5) (amending 52 U.S.C. 10101(b))
Why it matters:This is standard legislative practice to provide precise definitions for key terms used in the bill, ensuring clarity and legal specificity for enforcement.
Case for: Proponents argue that clear definitions for AI and generative AI are essential to ensure the bill's prohibitions are enforceable and target the specific technological threats intended, without ambiguity.
Case against: No specific opposition is typically raised against these definitions themselves, though the broader implications of regulating AI-generated content in elections may be debated.
Estimated impact: These definitions provide the legal framework for applying the bill's prohibitions to modern AI technologies, significantly impacting the scope of the new law.