Six Assurances to Taiwan Act
- Sponsor
- Sen. Curtis, John R. [R-UT]
- Committees
- Foreign Relations Committee (primary)
- Last action
- Nov 19, 2025
Bottom line
The bill aims to legally enshrine and provide congressional oversight over the United States' long-standing 'Six Assurances' policy towards Taiwan, thereby strengthening Taiwan's security against coercion from the People's Republic of China and asserting congressional authority in foreign policy.
What it actually does
This bill codifies the United States' long-standing 'Six Assurances' policy to Taiwan, formally stating that the U.S. will not set a date for ending arms sales, consult with the PRC on arms sales, mediate between Taiwan and the PRC, revise the Taiwan Relations Act, alter its position on Taiwan's sovereignty, or pressure Taiwan into negotiations with the PRC. Crucially, it establishes a robust congressional review process, requiring the President to notify Congress before taking any action that would alter these assurances and prohibiting such actions without congressional approval or after congressional disapproval.
Proponents argue
Supporters argue the bill reinforces a critical pillar of U.S.-Taiwan relations, enhances congressional authority over foreign policy, and sends a strong signal of commitment to Taiwan amidst increasing aggression from the PRC. They believe it prevents any future administration from unilaterally altering a foundational policy without legislative input, ensuring stability and predictability in a vital geopolitical region.
Opponents contend
Potential opponents might argue that codifying these assurances could reduce executive flexibility in foreign policy, complicate delicate diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China, and potentially escalate tensions in the region by appearing to shift the 'One-China Policy' without sufficient strategic ambiguity. Some may also contend that the existing policy framework, guided by executive discretion, is sufficient and more adaptable.
The bill is relatively short and clearly structured, making it accessible for a quick but thorough review by interested parties within a reasonable timeframe.
Section 4
Codification of United States Policy Regarding Six Assurances to Taiwan
This section formally states that it is U.S. policy to reaffirm the Six Assurances. These assurances include not agreeing to set a date for ending arms sales to Taiwan, not agreeing to consult with the PRC on arms sales, not agreeing to play any mediation role between Taipei and Beijing, not agreeing to seek to revise the Taiwan Relations Act, not taking any position regarding sovereignty over Taiwan, and not exerting pressure on Taiwan to enter into negotiations with the People's Republic of China.
Supporters argue
Proponents argue this codification strengthens the U.S. commitment to Taiwan, providing clarity and stability in a volatile region and deterring PRC aggression by removing any ambiguity about U.S. intentions regarding these foundational assurances.
Critics contend
Opponents might argue that formally codifying these assurances could be seen by the PRC as a provocative move, potentially undermining the delicate balance of strategic ambiguity and increasing the risk of miscalculation in cross-strait relations.
Tradeoffs
This provision balances the desire to reassure Taiwan and deter the PRC with the risk of provoking a stronger reaction from Beijing and potentially limiting executive branch flexibility in future diplomatic engagements.
Section 5(a)
Requirement for Presidential Notification to Congress of Proposed Actions Affecting Six Assurances
This section mandates that the President must notify specific congressional committees and leadership before taking any action that would pause or terminate arms sales to Taiwan, negotiate with the PRC on arms sales, mediate on Taiwan's sovereignty, change the U.S. position on Taiwan's sovereignty, or pressure Taiwan into negotiations with the PRC. The notification must describe the proposed action, its reasons, and whether it is intended to significantly alter U.S. foreign policy with respect to Taiwan or the PRC.
Section 5(b)
Congressional Review Period and Limitations on Executive Action Without Approval
This section establishes a 30-calendar-day (or 60-calendar-day during summer months) congressional review period for proposed actions affecting the Six Assurances. During this period, the President is prohibited from taking the proposed action or expending funds for it unless a joint resolution of approval is enacted. Further limitations are imposed if a joint resolution of disapproval passes both houses (prohibiting action for 12 days) or is vetoed by the President (prohibiting action for 10 days). If a joint resolution of disapproval is ultimately enacted, the action is permanently prohibited.
Section 5(c)
Expedited Congressional Procedures for Joint Resolutions on Six Assurances Actions
This section defines the specific format for joint resolutions of approval or disapproval related to presidential actions on the Six Assurances and establishes expedited procedures for their introduction and consideration in both the House and Senate. These procedures include automatic discharge from committee after a set number of legislative or calendar days (10 days in Senate, 5 in House) and limitations on debate, designed to ensure a timely vote within the prescribed review periods.
Establishes specific, expedited legislative procedures for joint resolutions of approval or disapproval related to presidential actions on the Six Assurances, including automatic committee discharge and limits on debate, to ensure timely congressional action.
Section 5(c)
Why it matters:This is standard legislative practice for creating fast-track review processes for specific executive actions, ensuring that Congress can meet statutory deadlines and overcome potential procedural roadblocks. It's not necessarily evasive but requires familiarity with legislative rules to fully grasp its implications.
Case for: Supporters argue these rules are essential to make the congressional review process effective, preventing procedural delays from undermining Congress's ability to approve or disapprove executive actions within the specified timeframe on critical foreign policy matters.
Case against: Opponents of such expedited procedures often contend that they limit robust debate, amendment opportunities, and thorough committee review, potentially leading to less deliberated decisions on critical foreign policy matters and reducing the quality of legislative output.
Estimated impact: Significantly alters the legislative process for a specific class of foreign policy decisions, potentially increasing the likelihood of congressional action (approval or disapproval) on executive proposals by streamlining the path to a vote.