Humanoid ROBOT Act of 2025
- Sponsor
- Sen. Cassidy, Bill [R-LA]
- Committees
- Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs Committee (primary)
- Last action
- Nov 20, 2025
Bottom line
The Humanoid ROBOT Act of 2025 aims to safeguard U.S. national security by restricting federal procurement of humanoid robots from adversarial nations and enhancing scrutiny of foreign investments in the domestic humanoid robotics sector.
What it actually does
This bill prohibits executive agencies from procuring or using humanoid robots designed, tested, developed, or manufactured by "covered entities," which include governments and related entities of "countries of concern." It also expands the jurisdiction of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) to mandatorily review certain non-controlling investments by entities from "covered nations" in U.S. businesses involved in humanoid robot technology. Additionally, it mandates a report from the Secretary of Defense on national security threats posed by humanoid robots from countries of concern.
Proponents argue
Proponents argue that the bill is a critical step to protect U.S. national security from the growing threat posed by advanced robotics, particularly humanoid robots, developed by adversarial foreign governments. They contend that these robots could be used for espionage, data exfiltration, or military applications, and that restricting their procurement by federal agencies and scrutinizing foreign investment will prevent potential vulnerabilities and safeguard sensitive information and technological leadership.
Opponents contend
Opponents might argue that the bill's broad definitions of "humanoid robot" and "covered entity" could stifle innovation, create unnecessary bureaucratic hurdles, and potentially limit access to advanced technologies, even from allied nations or legitimate commercial enterprises. They might also contend that the prohibitions could increase costs for federal agencies by limiting competition and that the CFIUS expansion could deter beneficial foreign investment in a nascent but critical industry.
The bill is concise and can be read quickly, but understanding its full implications requires familiarity with referenced statutes like the Defense Production Act and the National Artificial Intelligence Initiative Act.
Section 1
Short Title
This section establishes the official short title of the Act as the "Humanoid Robotics Oversight and Blocking of Obtainment from Totalitarians Act of 2025" or the "Humanoid ROBOT Act of 2025." This title provides a concise and memorable name for the legislation, immediately signaling its focus on humanoid robots and national security concerns.
Supporters argue
A clear and descriptive short title helps in public discourse and legislative tracking, immediately signaling the bill's focus on humanoid robots and national security.
Critics contend
No specific opposition is typically raised against short titles, though the acronym "ROBOT Act" could be seen as overly dramatic or alarmist by some.
Tradeoffs
None apparent for the short title itself.
Section 2
Key Definitions
This section defines critical terms used throughout the Act, including "artificial intelligence," "country of concern," "covered entity," "executive agency," and "humanoid robot." These definitions are crucial for determining the scope of the bill's prohibitions and review mechanisms, particularly the specific characteristics that qualify a machine as a "humanoid robot" and the types of foreign entities subject to restrictions, often by referencing existing statutes.
Section 3
Ban on Federal Procurement and Use of Humanoid Robots from Covered Entities
This section prohibits executive agencies from entering into or renewing contracts to procure or obtain humanoid robots designed, tested, developed, or manufactured by "covered entities." It also prevents contractors working for executive agencies from using such robots to fulfill their contracts. A waiver is available from the Secretary of Defense for national security or research purposes. The prohibitions take effect 180 days after enactment, with the Federal Acquisition Regulatory Council tasked to implement regulations.
Section 4
Expansion of CFIUS Jurisdiction for Humanoid Robot Investments
This section amends the Defense Production Act of 1950 to expand the jurisdiction of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS). It mandates CFIUS review of certain non-controlling investments by entities from "covered nations" (as defined in 10 U.S.C. 4872) in U.S. businesses that design, test, develop, or manufacture humanoid robots. This means even minority investments that do not result in control of a U.S. business will be subject to mandatory declaration and review if the investor is from a covered nation and the U.S. business is in the humanoid robot sector.
Section 5
DoD Report on Humanoid Robot National Security Threats
This section requires the Secretary of Defense to submit a detailed report to specified congressional committees within one year of the Act's enactment. The report must analyze national security threats posed by the development and use of humanoid robots in countries of concern, including their economic infrastructure, military-civil fusion efforts, circumvention of export controls, intellectual property theft, and privacy/data security threats related to data obtained through these robots. It also requires recommendations to improve export controls and address identified risks.
The bill defines "country of concern" by referencing "covered nation" in 10 U.S.C. 4872, and "foreign entity of concern" by referencing section 9901 of the William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (15 U.S.C. 4651).
Section 2(2) and 2(3)(C)
Why it matters:This is standard legislative practice to maintain consistency across federal law and avoid redundant definitions. It ensures that the scope of "countries of concern" and "foreign entities of concern" aligns with existing national security frameworks.
Case for: Using existing, established definitions ensures consistency in national security policy and leverages prior legislative intent regarding adversarial nations and entities.
Case against: It increases the cognitive load for readers, making it harder to immediately grasp the full scope of the bill without external research, potentially obscuring the specific targets from a casual review.
Estimated impact: Defines the universe of adversarial governments and entities subject to the bill's prohibitions and CFIUS review, significantly shaping its practical effect.
This subsection amends 50 U.S.C. 4565(b)(1)(C)(v)(IV)(bb) to explicitly require parties to a covered transaction described in subsection (a)(4)(B)(vi) (i.e., non-controlling investments by covered nations in U.S. humanoid robot businesses) to submit a declaration to CFIUS.
Section 4(b)
Why it matters:It's an incremental change to an existing regulatory framework, which is typical for legislative updates. The technical nature of CFIUS amendments often places them deep within statutory language.
Case for: Proponents argue that making these filings mandatory closes a potential loophole, ensuring that CFIUS is aware of and can review all relevant investments, even those that don't confer outright control, given the sensitive nature of humanoid robot technology.
Case against: Critics might argue that mandatory filings for non-controlling investments could create an excessive burden on investors and U.S. businesses, potentially discouraging foreign investment in a critical emerging technology sector.
Estimated impact: Significantly expands CFIUS's oversight, potentially increasing the number of reviews and adding compliance burdens for investors and U.S. robotics companies.