FISA Accountability and Extension Act of 2026
- Sponsor
- Sen. Grassley, Chuck [R-IA]
- Committees
- Judiciary Committee (primary)
- Last action
- Jan 27, 2026
Bottom line
The bill aims to enhance congressional oversight and accountability for FISA, particularly Section 702, through increased access and influence, while simultaneously extending these controversial surveillance authorities for a significant period.
What it actually does
This bill amends the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act to grant Members of Congress and designated staff unrestricted access to Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) and Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review (FISCR) proceedings. It also expands penalties for unauthorized disclosure of Section 702 information, modifies the process for designating amicus curiae to include congressional input, clarifies whistleblower protections, and extends key Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) authorities, including Section 702, for eight years.
Proponents argue
Supporters argue that the bill is a critical step towards increasing transparency and accountability within the FISA framework, ensuring robust congressional oversight of intelligence activities and protecting civil liberties. They contend that the reforms, coupled with the extension of vital national security authorities, strike a necessary balance to safeguard both national security and constitutional rights.
Opponents contend
Critics may argue that while some reforms are welcome, the eight-year extension of Section 702 without more fundamental changes is problematic, potentially perpetuating past abuses. Concerns could also be raised that unrestricted congressional access might compromise sensitive intelligence operations or politicize judicial processes, and that expanded penalties could chill legitimate whistleblower disclosures.
The bill is short and relatively accessible, allowing for a quick review of its provisions.
Section 2
Enhanced Congressional Access to FISA Courts
This section amends the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act to allow Members of Congress and designated staff to attend Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) and Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review (FISCR) proceedings without restrictions beyond those applied to the Department of Justice. It explicitly voids previous Attorney General procedures for congressional attendance and mandates full visual and audio access if physical space prevents in-person attendance.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue this provision ensures proper congressional oversight of sensitive intelligence activities, preventing potential abuses and increasing transparency within the FISA process, which is crucial for public trust and accountability.
Critics contend
Critics might argue that direct, unrestricted congressional access could compromise the secrecy and sensitive nature of intelligence proceedings, potentially revealing classified information or politicizing judicial processes, thereby hindering intelligence operations.
Tradeoffs
This provision balances the need for robust congressional oversight of intelligence activities with concerns about maintaining the operational security and judicial independence of the FISA courts.
Section 3
Expanded Penalties for Unauthorized Disclosure of Section 702 Information
This section amends the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 to explicitly include information acquired under Section 702 as 'information acquired from an electronic surveillance pursuant to title I' for purposes of criminal offenses and civil actions. It expands civil liability to those who knowingly aided or abetted violations and establishes a 5-year statute of limitations for civil actions related to unlawful surveillance.
Section 4
Congressional Role in Designating FISA Court Amicus Curiae
This section amends FISA to require the Senate Majority Leader and House Speaker (in consultation with relevant intelligence and judiciary committee leaders) to submit lists of at least 6 individuals each for consideration as amicus curiae to the FISA courts. The presiding judges must then designate not fewer than 8 individuals from these lists. It also mandates a transition, removing all current amici upon the first submission of these congressional lists.
Section 6
Eight-Year Extension of FISA Amendments Act Authorities
This section amends Section 403(b) of the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 to extend the sunset provisions from two years to eight years. This effectively extends the authorization for certain Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act authorities, including Section 702, for an additional six years beyond their current sunset, providing a long-term reauthorization.
Expands civil liability under FISA to include those who 'knowingly aided or abetted' violations of Section 109 (criminal offenses related to electronic surveillance) or Section 308 (civil liability for physical searches).
Section 3(b)(4)(B) and Section 3(c)
Why it matters:This is standard legislative practice for amending existing statutes by inserting new language into established legal texts.
Case for: Supporters argue this closes a loophole, ensuring that all parties involved in unlawful surveillance activities, not just the direct perpetrators, can be held accountable, thereby strengthening deterrence and justice.
Case against: Critics might argue that 'aiding and abetting' can be broadly interpreted, potentially ensnaring individuals or entities with tangential involvement, or creating a chilling effect on cooperation with intelligence requests due to heightened legal risk.
Estimated impact: Potentially increases the number of individuals or entities that could face civil action for FISA violations, broadening the scope of accountability.
Adds a rule of construction to 5 U.S.C. 416(e) stating that nothing in that subsection may be construed to revoke or diminish any right of an individual to make a protected disclosure to any congressional committee under 5 U.S.C. 2303 or 7211.
Section 5
Why it matters:This is standard legislative practice for clarifying statutory intent and ensuring that new or related provisions do not inadvertently undermine established legal protections.
Case for: Proponents argue this explicitly protects whistleblowers who report to Congress, ensuring that other provisions, including potentially expanded penalties in Section 3, do not inadvertently undermine these existing and crucial rights.
Case against: No direct opposition is typically raised against explicit whistleblower protections, though some might argue it could create ambiguities if not carefully balanced with national security concerns regarding classified information.
Estimated impact: Clarifies and reinforces existing whistleblower protections for disclosures made to Congress, providing greater legal certainty for individuals considering such actions.