A complete substitute amendment. v2 fundamentally restructures the bill, replacing several sections, modifying key policy statements, and altering the scope and mechanisms for promoting internet freedom and human rights in Iran. The new version introduces additional safeguards for sensitive information and clarifies funding derivation, while removing specific mandates for a working group and reducing authorized appropriations for certain programs.
Iran Human Rights, Internet Freedom, and Accountability Act of 2026
- Sponsor
- Sen. McCormick, David [R-PA]
- Committees
- Foreign Relations Committee (primary)
- Last action
- Jul 27, 2026
Bottom line
This bill seeks to strengthen U.S. policy and capabilities to counter Iranian regime repression and censorship by empowering Iranian citizens with tools for communication, information access, and human rights support.
What it actually does
This bill aims to promote human rights and internet freedom in Iran by enhancing U.S. efforts to expand uncensored internet access, support civil society, and enforce sanctions against human rights violators. It designates the Secretary of State as the lead official for these efforts, mandates updates to strategies for internet circumvention, and establishes programs for cybersecurity training and digital safety tools for Iranian civil society. The bill also extends authorization for the Iran Internet Freedom Grant Program.
Proponents argue
Proponents argue that the bill is a critical step to support the Iranian people's struggle for human rights and self-determination against a repressive regime. They emphasize the importance of open internet access and secure communication for dissidents and civil society, highlighting past U.S.-funded efforts as effective. They believe it will enhance accountability for human rights abuses and align U.S. policy with the aspirations of the Iranian populace.
Opponents contend
No specific opposition arguments are articulated in the provided bill text or immediately apparent for a bill focused on human rights and internet freedom in Iran. Potential implicit criticisms might focus on the effectiveness or potential unintended consequences of such interventions, or the cost, but these are not articulated as direct opposition to the bill's core aims.
The bill is moderately complex and requires about 40 minutes to read, which is a reasonable time investment for understanding its provisions.
Sec. 2
Congressional Findings and Statement of Policy
This section lays out Congress's understanding of the situation in Iran, noting the regime's repression, the people's protests, and the importance of internet freedom. It then establishes the U.S. policy to support Iranian self-determination, expand internet access, uphold human rights, enforce sanctions, and deter regime violence.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue these findings accurately reflect the brutal reality faced by the Iranian people and provide a strong moral and strategic basis for the bill's actions, aligning U.S. policy with universal human rights.
Critics contend
No specific opposition is typically raised against congressional findings and statements of policy that condemn human rights abuses, as they are largely declarative and reflect widely held humanitarian concerns.
Tradeoffs
While broadly supported, some might argue about the specific framing or the extent to which such statements translate into effective action.
Sec. 3(a)
Secretary of State as Primary Official for Internet Freedom
This provision designates the Secretary of State as the lead Federal official responsible for promoting widespread internet freedom and expanding open access to independent and impartial information in Iran. It tasks the Secretary with coordinating all related Federal efforts and updating the comprehensive strategy required by existing law (NDAA FY25, 22 U.S.C. 8754a).
Sec. 3(b)
Updates to Comprehensive Strategy for Internet Freedom
This section amends existing law (NDAA FY25 and Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012) to require updates to the comprehensive strategy for promoting internet freedom in Iran. The updates must include evaluations of VPNs, peer-to-peer technologies, and other circumvention tools, strategies for increasing access to effective tools, assessments of U.S. government efforts to cultivate alternatives, and an analysis of Iran's ability to cut off global internet access. It also mandates ensuring sanctions enforcement does not hinder providing internet access technology to Iranian civilians.
Sec. 4(a)
Internet Freedom Report Updates
This section requires the Secretary of State, in consultation with the FCC and Treasury, to submit a report updating and supplementing a previous report from the FY25 NDAA. The update must assess the feasibility of direct-to-cell wireless communications for Iran, analyze the impact of drone-based platforms and signal-jamming on such technologies, and survey terrestrial and non-terrestrial telecom providers in Iran, including their ownership and control.
Sec. 4(b)
Extension of Iran Internet Freedom Grant Program Authorization
This provision amends existing law to extend the authorization for the Iran Internet Freedom Grant Program. It changes the authorization period from 'each of fiscal years 2025 and 2026' to 'each fiscal year through fiscal year 2030' for the existing authorized amount of $15,000,000 per fiscal year.
Sec. 4(c)
Development of Internet Access Technologies
This section authorizes the Department of State, in coordination with the Department of Defense and other agencies, to utilize existing interagency coordination mechanisms to support the development of low-cost, scalable, and rapidly deployable technologies to counter internet shutdowns in Iran. Objectives include identifying and supporting technologies like mesh networking and portable communication systems, expanding VPN access and effectiveness, and evaluating off-the-shelf technologies. It also mandates assessing user safety, detectability, cybersecurity, data protection, supply-chain risks, and sanctions compliance for any supported technology.
Sec. 5(a)
Strategy for Human Rights and Media Assistance
This section requires the Secretary of State to submit a strategy to expand and enhance U.S. programs supporting human rights in Iran. This includes efforts to assist in documenting abuses, ensure reliable access to uncensored news (via digital tools, shortwave radio, emerging tech), support independent Iranian journalists and civil society (grants, training, secure platforms), coordinate with international partners, and establish performance metrics and a multi-year budget.
Sec. 5(b)
GAO Report on Near East Regional Democracy (NERD) Expenditures
This section requires the Comptroller General of the United States (GAO) to submit a report examining Federal expenditures under the Near East Regional Democracy (NERD) account for fiscal years 2024 and 2025. The report must detail Iran-related funds, assess grant allocation processes, contractor oversight, vetting, and program outcomes, and evaluate effectiveness in advancing U.S. policy objectives. It also includes a protection clause for sensitive information.
Sec. 6(a)
Cybersecurity Training and Tools for Iranian Civil Society
This section directs the Secretary of State to establish programs within 180 days to deliver cybersecurity training to journalists, human rights defenders, and civil society actors in Iran. It also requires furnishing vetted open-source or commercial digital-safety tools, prioritizing VPNs and software-based solutions that minimize physical detection risks, and providing multilingual educational materials warning about regime-controlled applications and phishing.
Sec. 8
Sanctions and Export Control Savings Clause
This clause clarifies that nothing in the Act authorizes transactions prohibited by existing sanctions and export control laws (like IEEPA, ITSR, ECRA, EAR), unless specifically authorized by a general or specific license or other regulatory authorization from the relevant agency.
This provision amends the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (22 U.S.C. 8754) to add a new paragraph (11) requiring relevant Federal departments and agencies to 'ensure enforcement of sanctions does not impede companies providing to Iranian civilians the technology and other tools necessary to access the open internet.'
Sec. 3(b)(3)
Why it matters:This is standard legislative practice for amending existing statutes. It's not necessarily evasive but requires familiarity with U.S. code.
Case for: Supporters argue this is a crucial clarification to prevent 'over-compliance' with sanctions that could inadvertently block legitimate efforts to provide internet access tools to Iranian civilians, aligning sanctions policy with human rights goals.
Case against: Some might argue that any relaxation or clarification of sanctions, even for humanitarian purposes, could create loopholes that the Iranian regime might exploit, or complicate enforcement efforts.
Estimated impact: Potentially significant for U.S. tech companies and Iranian users, by clarifying the legal pathway for providing internet freedom tools.
This subsection mandates that any technology supported under the development of internet access technologies must be assessed for user safety, detectability by hostile governments, cybersecurity vulnerabilities, data protection, supply-chain risks, sanctions and export-control compliance, and risk of diversion to the Government of Iran, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, or sanctioned persons or entities.
Sec. 4(c)(2)(D)
Why it matters:This is a crucial safeguard, often placed in technical sections to ensure due diligence. It's standard practice to detail such requirements.
Case for: Proponents argue this is absolutely essential to ensure that U.S.-supported technologies are secure, effective, and do not inadvertently put Iranian users at risk or fall into the hands of the regime, which would undermine the bill's intent.
Case against: Some might argue that such rigorous assessment criteria could slow down the rapid deployment of needed technologies, or that perfect security is an unattainable ideal in a hostile environment, potentially hindering agile responses.
Estimated impact: High, as it directly impacts the safety and efficacy of all internet circumvention tools developed or supported under the bill.
This clause requires the Comptroller General to ensure that the GAO report on NERD expenditures does not publicly disclose personally identifiable information, implementing-partner identities, sub-grantee identities, operational details, cybersecurity methods, secure communications channels, or other information that could endanger individuals, compromise programs, or undermine national security. Such information may be provided in a classified annex.
Sec. 5(b)(3)
Why it matters:This is a critical protection for high-risk human rights work, ensuring that transparency doesn't inadvertently expose vulnerable individuals or operations. It's standard and responsible legislative practice.
Case for: Supporters argue this is vital for protecting the safety of individuals and the integrity of sensitive programs operating in a hostile environment, ensuring that accountability measures do not create unintended security risks.
Case against: Critics might argue that such clauses, if broadly interpreted, could reduce the transparency and public accountability of federal expenditures, making it harder for the public to scrutinize how funds are used.
Estimated impact: High, as it directly affects the safety and operational security of human rights and democracy programs in Iran.