Government Surveillance Reform Act of 2026
- Sponsor
- Sen. Wyden, Ron [D-OR]
- Committees
- Judiciary Committee (primary)
- Last action
- Mar 12, 2026
Bottom line
This comprehensive bill aims to enhance privacy and civil liberties protections for U.S. persons against government surveillance, both under FISA and other authorities, by requiring warrants for sensitive data access and increasing transparency and accountability.
What it actually does
This bill significantly reforms foreign intelligence surveillance authorities, particularly Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), by imposing warrant requirements for querying U.S. person data, prohibiting reverse targeting, and setting data retention limits. It also includes the "Fourth Amendment Is Not For Sale Act" to ban federal law enforcement from purchasing personal data from data brokers, reforms the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) to require warrants for location, web browsing, and search query records, and establishes new protections for car data.
Proponents argue
Supporters argue the bill is a critical step to restore Fourth Amendment rights, prevent government overreach in surveillance, and close loopholes that allow warrantless access to sensitive data of U.S. persons. They contend it introduces much-needed transparency and accountability mechanisms for intelligence agencies and law enforcement, ensuring that surveillance powers are used strictly for foreign intelligence purposes and with judicial oversight.
Opponents contend
Opponents might argue that the bill's stringent warrant requirements and limitations on data acquisition could severely hamper intelligence agencies' ability to effectively monitor foreign adversaries and prevent national security threats. They may contend that the reforms could create intelligence gaps, slow down critical investigations, and make it more difficult to protect the nation from terrorism and cyberattacks, especially given the evolving nature of global threats.
The bill is extensive and highly technical, requiring significant time for a thorough review, likely more than typically afforded for legislative consideration.
Sec. 101
Warrantless Query Prohibition for U.S. Person Data under FISA Section 702
This section prohibits federal officers from accessing "covered information" (communications content and data requiring a probable cause warrant for law enforcement) returned from a "covered query" (using a U.S. person's identifier or for the significant purpose of retrieving U.S. person information) under FISA Section 702, unless a warrant, emergency authorization, or consent is obtained. It also mandates documentation for all queries and access.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue this provision directly addresses a major civil liberties concern by closing the "backdoor search" loophole, ensuring that the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement applies to U.S. person data even when incidentally collected under foreign intelligence authorities.
Critics contend
Critics may contend that this requirement will unduly burden intelligence analysts, delay critical threat assessments, and potentially compromise national security by making it harder to quickly identify and respond to threats involving U.S. persons.
Tradeoffs
Balances national security interests in rapid intelligence analysis against the privacy rights of U.S. persons and the constitutional requirement for warrants.
Sec. 103
Prohibition on Reverse Targeting under FISA Section 702
This section explicitly prohibits intentionally targeting a person believed to be outside the U.S. if a "significant purpose" of that acquisition is to gather information on one or more particular, known U.S. persons. Exceptions are made for emergencies involving imminent threats or with the U.S. person's consent.
Sec. 201
Fourth Amendment Is Not For Sale Act
This title prohibits federal law enforcement agencies from obtaining "covered personal data" (personal data linked to U.S. persons or devices in the U.S.) from data brokers in exchange for anything of value. It includes exceptions for lawfully obtained public data (excluding biometric and location info), whistleblower disclosures, cost reimbursement under legal process, and employment/background check uses. It also limits sharing between agencies and establishes minimization procedures.
Sec. 301
Warrant Requirement for Targeting U.S. Persons for Foreign Intelligence
This section repeals existing FISA sections 703, 704, and 705 and replaces them with a new Section 703, which mandates a warrant or emergency authorization under FISA (or a criminal warrant) for intentionally targeting a U.S. person to acquire communications content, location, web browsing, or search history for foreign intelligence purposes, or any information where a reasonable expectation of privacy exists. This applies regardless of the acquisition's location.
Sec. 404
Prohibition on Intelligence Community Acquisition of U.S. Person Data from Non-FISA Sources
This section broadly prohibits elements of the intelligence community from acquiring datasets that include "covered data" (personal data linked to U.S. persons or devices) from sources other than FISA-authorized collections. It includes exceptions for FISA/criminal warrants, employment purposes, compliance, life/safety emergencies, consent, non-segregable data (with minimization), and data obtainable via National Security Letters (NSLs) if the holder is abroad and compelled production is not feasible.
Sec. 601
Warrant Requirement for Sensitive Digital Records under ECPA
Amends 18 U.S.C. 2703 (ECPA) to require a warrant for governmental entities to obtain historical "location information," "web browsing records," and "search query records." It also amends 18 U.S.C. 3117 to require a warrant for installing or activating tracking devices (including phones, wearables, connected vehicles) and for prospective disclosure of web browsing and location records.
Sec. 701
Protection of Car Data from Federal Warrantless Searches
This title creates a new Chapter 124 in Title 18, prohibiting federal investigative or law enforcement officers from accessing "covered vehicle data" (onboard and telematics data from noncommercial vehicles, including diagnostic, navigation, sensor data, and event data recorders) without a warrant. Exceptions include prior, explicit consent from the vehicle operator (or owner/lessee if operator cannot be found), and emergencies involving immediate danger of death or serious physical injury (with a subsequent warrant application).
Sec. 802
Enhanced Transparency in DNI Annual Reports
Amends FISA Section 603 to require more granular reporting from the Director of National Intelligence (DNI). New requirements include a description of the subject matter of each Section 702(h) certification, statistics on the number of persons and identifiers targeted under Section 702(a) disaggregated by certification, and the total number of directives issued under Section 702(i)(1) disaggregated by provider type. It also mandates reporting on disseminated intelligence reports containing U.S. person identities (both openly included and masked) from Section 702 and non-FISA collections, and the number of criminal proceedings using non-FISA foreign intelligence data.
Expands the definition of "covered person" to include "a person known or believed to be located in the United States" at the time of query or acquisition, in addition to "United States person."
Sec. 2(a)(2), amending FISA Sec. 701(b)
Why it matters:Standard legislative practice to define terms upfront, but the expansion of this definition has significant implications for the scope of protections throughout the bill.
Case for: Proponents argue this ensures that privacy protections apply not just to U.S. citizens and permanent residents, but also to anyone physically present in the U.S., aligning with Fourth Amendment principles regardless of citizenship status.
Case against: Critics might argue that this broadens the scope of protected individuals in a way that could complicate foreign intelligence operations, as agencies would need to ascertain location more rigorously for non-U.S. persons.
Estimated impact: Broadens the scope of individuals protected by the warrant requirements and other safeguards throughout the bill.
Repeals subparagraph (E) of FISA Section 701(b)(4) and Section 801(6), which had expanded the definition of "electronic communication service provider" to include "any other service provider who has access to equipment that is being or may be used to transmit or store wire or electronic communications." This effectively narrows the scope of entities that can be compelled to provide technical assistance under FISA Section 702.
Sec. 109
Why it matters:Technical correction to a previously controversial expansion, often placed in less prominent sections.
Case for: Proponents argue this rectifies an overreach that could have compelled a vast array of entities (e.g., landlords, office building owners) to assist in surveillance, ensuring that only traditional communication service providers are subject to such directives.
Case against: Opponents might argue that narrowing the definition could create loopholes for sophisticated adversaries who might use non-traditional communication infrastructure, making it harder for intelligence agencies to obtain necessary technical assistance.
Estimated impact: Limits the universe of entities that can be compelled to assist in FISA Section 702 surveillance, reducing potential burdens on non-traditional providers.
Amends the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005 to sunset Title V of FISA (which includes Section 215, the "business records" provision) as it existed on March 14, 2020, 180 days after the enactment of this Act. This means the version of Section 215 that allowed bulk collection of telephone metadata (which was later reformed by the USA Freedom Act) will cease to have effect.
Sec. 305
Why it matters:Technical amendment to a sunset clause, often placed in a less conspicuous manner.
Case for: Proponents argue this ensures that any lingering authority for bulk collection under the pre-USA Freedom Act version of Section 215 is definitively terminated, reinforcing privacy protections.
Case against: No strong public case against sunsetting a provision that has already been significantly reformed and whose bulk collection authority has largely ceased.
Estimated impact: Formally closes any potential lingering authority for bulk collection under the original Section 215, reinforcing the current, more restrictive framework.