Forever Chemical Regulation and Accountability Act of 2026
- Sponsor
- Sen. Durbin, Richard J. [D-IL]
- Committees
- Environment and Public Works Committee (primary)
- Last action
- Mar 19, 2026
Bottom line
The bill mandates a broad phaseout of nonessential PFAS uses and releases, backed by new reporting requirements, enforcement powers, and research initiatives, while also modifying liability and bankruptcy provisions related to hazardous substances.
What it actually does
This bill establishes a comprehensive framework to phase out the production and use of nonessential perfluoroalkyl and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS), also known as 'forever chemicals,' and to prohibit their environmental release above detection thresholds. It mandates annual reporting from manufacturers and users, sets a 10-year general phaseout for nonessential uses, and accelerates phaseouts for specific consumer products. The bill also amends existing environmental laws and establishes Centers of Excellence for PFAS research and remediation.
Proponents argue
Proponents argue this bill is a critical step to protect public health and the environment from the pervasive and harmful effects of PFAS. They emphasize the need for a systematic approach to eliminate these persistent chemicals, promote safer alternatives, and ensure accountability from manufacturers. The establishment of research centers and the strengthening of legal recourse for affected communities are highlighted as essential components to address the long-term challenges posed by PFAS contamination.
Opponents contend
Opponents might argue that the bill's aggressive phaseout timelines and broad definition of PFAS could impose significant economic burdens on industries that rely on these substances for essential functions, potentially disrupting supply chains and increasing costs for consumers. Concerns could also be raised about the feasibility of developing safer alternatives within the mandated timeframe for all uses, and the potential for unintended consequences on critical sectors like national defense or advanced manufacturing.
The bill is moderately complex, requiring a careful read to understand the interlocking timelines, definitions, and enforcement mechanisms. The estimated reading time is appropriate for a thorough review.
Sec. 101
Agreement with National Academies for Essential Use Review
This section requires the Administrator of the EPA to enter into a 10-year agreement with the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. The National Academies will review scientific evidence to identify essential uses of PFAS, establish criteria for such designations, and recommend nonessential uses for prioritized phaseout. This review will guide the EPA's regulatory decisions on PFAS uses.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue that relying on an independent scientific body like the National Academies ensures that essential use designations are based on the best available science, rather than political pressure. This approach provides a credible and transparent foundation for the complex phaseout process, building public trust and ensuring effective regulation.
Critics contend
Critics might express concern that delegating such significant definitional authority to an external body, even a scientific one, could lead to designations that do not adequately consider real-world economic impacts or the pace of technological innovation for alternatives. They might also argue that the process could be slow, delaying necessary regulatory action.
Tradeoffs
The provision balances the need for scientific rigor and independence in defining 'essential uses' against the desire for timely regulatory action and industry certainty. It aims to prevent arbitrary designations but introduces a multi-year scientific review process before full regulatory implementation.
Sec. 102(a)
Annual PFAS Manufacturer and User Monitoring and Reporting
This section requires all manufacturers and users of PFAS to submit annual reports to the EPA. These reports must detail essential and nonessential uses, volumes and concentrations, chemical identities, environmental releases, safer alternatives, byproducts, health effects information, and employee exposure data. The EPA will publish these reports for public comment and conduct data quality reviews.
Sec. 102(b)
General PFAS Production and Consumption Phaseout Program
This section mandates a full phaseout of nonessential uses of PFAS by manufacturers and users within 10 years of the bill's enactment. It requires each manufacturer and user to submit a detailed plan and schedule for this phaseout within 3 years. The EPA Administrator has the authority to accelerate this schedule after public comment, and individuals can petition for more stringent timelines.
Sec. 102(b)(4)
Accelerated Phaseout for Specific Consumer Products
This section establishes accelerated phaseout timelines for specific consumer products containing PFAS. Within 1 year, carpets, rugs, fabric treatments, food packaging, juvenile products, and oil/gas products are prohibited from sale or distribution. Within 2 years, cosmetics, indoor textiles/upholstered furniture, accessories/handbags, and most indoor/outdoor apparel are phased out. Outdoor textile furnishings and upholstered furniture are phased out within 4 years, and outdoor apparel for severe wet conditions within 5 years. Exceptions exist for the resale of used products.
Sec. 102(c)
Designations of Nonessential and Essential Uses
Starting 10 years after enactment, all PFAS uses are prohibited unless designated as 'essential' by the EPA. The bill outlines a petition process for individuals to request essential or nonessential use designations, with the burden of proof on the petitioner. The EPA can also initiate its own rulemaking to designate uses. All decisions must be based on the best available science and National Academies' recommendations, with public review and comment periods.
Sec. 103(a)
United States Perfluoroalkyl or Polyfluoroalkyl Substance Policy
This section establishes the official U.S. policy regarding PFAS. It states that, to the maximum extent practicable, PFAS contamination should be remediated to safe levels, destruction and disposal of PFAS should be prioritized as the most essential elimination strategy, PFAS use in consumer products should be eliminated, and essential PFAS uses should be replaced by safer alternatives when available.
Sec. 104
Perfluoroalkyl or Polyfluoroalkyl Substance Release Phaseout
This section makes it unlawful for any manufacturer or user to release any detectable quantity of PFAS into the environment starting 10 years after the bill's enactment. The EPA is required to finalize a rule within 7 years to establish a schedule for this phaseout and define applicable detection methods and thresholds. The EPA can also establish earlier phaseouts for specific PFAS substances or mixtures.
Sec. 107
Enforcement Mechanisms
This section grants the EPA Administrator broad enforcement powers, including issuing compliance orders, assessing civil penalties (to remove economic benefit from violations), and commencing civil actions for injunctions. Penalties consider factors like violation seriousness, compliance history, business size, economic impact, and cumulative impacts on communities. Reckless violations of material conditions can lead to criminal penalties, including fines and up to 5 years imprisonment.
Sec. 108
Citizen Suits
This section authorizes private citizens to bring civil actions against manufacturers or users violating the bill's requirements or causing imminent and substantial endangerment from PFAS. Citizens can also sue the EPA Administrator for failing to perform non-discretionary duties. Such suits require prior notice to the EPA and the alleged violator, and courts can award litigation costs, including attorney and expert witness fees, to prevailing parties.
Sec. 110
Application of Federal, State, and Local Law to Federal Agencies
This section mandates that all federal departments, agencies, and instrumentalities (covered agencies) comply with all federal, state, interstate, and local laws regulating PFAS, including substantive and procedural requirements and payment of reasonable service charges. The U.S. waives immunity for injunctive relief, administrative orders, and civil/administrative penalties. The President can grant national security exemptions for up to one year, renewable, but not for lack of appropriations. Exemptions must be publicly noticed unless waived for national security.
Sec. 201
Centers of Excellence for PFAS Research and Remediation
This section mandates the establishment of two Centers of Excellence: one at an eligible research university partnered with a National Laboratory, and another at an eligible rural university. These Centers will focus on advancing PFAS detection and remediation science, research, and technologies. Their duties include developing capabilities for measuring PFAS in water and other media, evaluating removal/destruction technologies, and making these resources available to researchers, municipalities, and individuals.
Sec. 202
Amendments to CERCLA Regarding Statutes of Limitations and Repose
This section amends the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA) to extend the 'federally required commencement date' for state law actions related to hazardous substance exposure. It specifically adds an exception for state statutes of repose, ensuring that the clock for personal injury or property damage claims caused by hazardous substances (including newly designated ones like PFAS) starts when the plaintiff knew or reasonably should have known of the harm, rather than an earlier date specified by state law.
Sec. 203
Bankruptcy Provision for Persistent, Bioaccumulative, and Toxic Chemicals Defendants and Debtors
This section amends CERCLA to add a special provision for Persistent, Bioaccumulative, and Toxic (PBT) chemical defendants and debtors in bankruptcy. It specifies that the filing of a bankruptcy petition does not automatically stay (halt) judicial, administrative, or other actions or proceedings against a 'nondebtor entity' (an entity not in bankruptcy) for PBT claims, even if those claims are related to the debtor or the debtor's estate. This includes claims related to PFAS and other chemicals meeting PBT criteria.
Exclusion of certain entities from the definition of 'manufacturer' and 'user' of PFAS.
Sec. 2(4)(C) and Sec. 2(11)(C)
Why it matters:This is standard legislative practice to clarify the scope of regulated entities, ensuring that passive receivers of PFAS (like waste facilities or water systems) are not inadvertently subjected to the same manufacturing/use obligations as active producers or processors.
Case for: Excluding entities like solid waste facilities, composting facilities, public water systems, and treatment works from the definition of 'manufacturer' or 'user' prevents them from being held liable for PFAS they receive in the normal course of their operations. This ensures that the regulatory burden falls on the entities actively producing or using PFAS, rather than those managing its downstream effects.
Case against: No strong case against this specific exclusion, as it clarifies intent and avoids unintended regulatory burdens on entities that are not the primary source of PFAS. However, some might argue that these entities still play a role in PFAS management and could have reporting obligations, even if not as 'manufacturers' or 'users'.
Estimated impact: Significantly reduces the scope of entities subject to the core manufacturing and use phaseout requirements, potentially saving numerous public utilities and waste management companies from extensive compliance costs.
Definition of 'safer alternative' for PFAS uses.
Sec. 2(9)
Why it matters:Standard practice for defining key terms that will be used throughout the bill, but its specificity makes it impactful.
Case for: A robust definition of 'safer alternative' is crucial to prevent the replacement of PFAS with other harmful chemicals. By requiring alternatives to demonstrate adequate performance, pose no unreasonable chronic or acute risk, and minimize harm from persistence, bioaccumulation, and toxicity, the bill aims to ensure genuine environmental and health improvements.
Case against: Some industry stakeholders might argue that the definition is overly stringent or vague, making it difficult to identify and certify alternatives quickly. The requirement to consider 'cumulative impacts' and 'other risk characteristics' could introduce subjective elements and delays in approving new substances.
Estimated impact: Shapes the entire innovation landscape for PFAS replacements, influencing R&D and market entry for new chemicals and materials.
Administrator's discretion to prioritize phaseout and designation efforts.
Sec. 102(d)
Why it matters:This is a common legislative technique to provide administrative flexibility within a prescriptive framework, allowing the agency to adapt to evolving scientific understanding and resource constraints.
Case for: Granting the Administrator discretion to prioritize based on the National PFAS Testing Strategy or other science-based methods allows the EPA to focus resources on the most harmful PFAS or highest-risk uses first. This ensures an efficient and impactful regulatory approach, rather than a rigid, one-size-fits-all mandate.
Case against: Critics might argue that such broad discretion could lead to inconsistent enforcement or allow for political influence in prioritization decisions, potentially delaying action on certain PFAS. They might prefer a more prescriptive prioritization scheme to ensure all harmful substances are addressed systematically.
Estimated impact: Influences the sequence and focus of EPA's regulatory actions, potentially accelerating action on some PFAS while delaying others.
Waiver of public notice requirement for national security exemptions.
Sec. 110(d)(3)(B)
Why it matters:This provision addresses a sensitive national security concern, and its placement reflects an attempt to balance transparency with the need to protect classified information or operations.
Case for: Allowing the President to waive public notice for national security exemptions is critical for protecting classified operations or sensitive defense capabilities. In certain circumstances, public disclosure of a PFAS exemption could reveal information that adversaries could exploit, directly harming national security.
Case against: Environmental advocates might argue that waiving public notice, even for national security, reduces transparency and public oversight, potentially allowing federal agencies to avoid accountability for PFAS contamination without sufficient justification. They might contend that a more robust, albeit classified, oversight mechanism should be in place.
Estimated impact: Could allow certain federal PFAS uses to continue without public disclosure, potentially impacting local communities near federal facilities without their knowledge.
Mandatory minimum fees if EPA fails to finalize fee rulemaking.
Sec. 113(b)(2)(D)(ii)
Why it matters:This is a legislative 'hammer' provision, designed to incentivize timely agency action. It's common to place such defaults in funding or administrative sections.
Case for: This provision ensures that the EPA will have funding to carry out its duties, even if it fails to complete the fee rulemaking on time. The high default fee acts as a strong incentive for the agency to finalize a more tailored fee structure, preventing delays in critical PFAS regulation due to lack of funds or administrative inaction.
Case against: Industry groups might argue that the default fees of $100,000 are excessively high and punitive, especially for small manufacturers, if the EPA misses its deadline. This could create significant financial strain without a proper workload assessment, potentially forcing some businesses to cease operations or incur disproportionate costs.
Estimated impact: If triggered, would impose significant, potentially arbitrary, costs on PFAS manufacturers and users, while ensuring EPA funding. Acts as a strong incentive for EPA to meet its rulemaking deadline.
Definition of 'federally required commencement date' for newly designated hazardous substances.
Sec. 202(b)(5)(B)(ii)
Why it matters:This is a forward-looking clarification for a complex legal term, placed within the technical amendments to existing law.
Case for: This ensures that for any substance newly designated as hazardous after August 1, 2022, the statute of limitations for claims begins when the plaintiff *knew or reasonably should have known* of the harm, or the date of designation, whichever is later. This prevents victims from being barred from legal action for harms from substances that were not previously recognized as hazardous.
Case against: Industry might argue that this creates open-ended liability for substances that were not considered hazardous at the time of their release, making it difficult to assess and manage long-term risk. They might prefer a more definitive cutoff date for liability, even for newly designated substances.
Estimated impact: Significantly expands the potential for legal claims related to newly identified hazardous substances, including future PFAS designations, by extending the window for victims to seek damages.
Exception to the automatic stay in bankruptcy for PBT claims against nondebtor entities.
Sec. 203(b)
Why it matters:This is a highly technical legal amendment that modifies the interaction between environmental liability and bankruptcy law. Its placement and phrasing are typical for such complex statutory changes.
Case for: This provision prevents companies from using bankruptcy filings of one entity (e.g., a subsidiary) to shield related, solvent entities (e.g., parent companies, insurers) from liability for PBT claims. It ensures that victims of persistent toxic chemicals can continue to pursue justice against all responsible parties, even if one declares bankruptcy, preventing a loophole for accountability.
Case against: Critics from the corporate and bankruptcy legal sectors would argue that this significantly complicates bankruptcy proceedings, potentially making it harder for companies with PBT liabilities to reorganize or liquidate. It could increase litigation against nondebtor affiliates, making it more difficult to achieve a comprehensive resolution in bankruptcy and potentially discouraging investment in industries with PBT exposure.
Estimated impact: Significantly alters the landscape of environmental liability in bankruptcy, making it harder for corporate groups to use bankruptcy as a shield against PBT claims and potentially increasing the financial burden on nondebtor affiliates.