A substantive modification. v2 removes the authorization of appropriations section, adds a new directive for the Blue UAS working group to incorporate lessons from the war in Ukraine, and explicitly includes the One China Policy and Six Assurances within the rules of construction.
Blue Skies for Taiwan Act of 2026
- Sponsor
- Sen. Merkley, Jeff [D-OR]
- Committees
- Foreign Relations Committee (primary)
- Last action
- Jul 27, 2026
Bottom line
This bill seeks to strengthen Taiwan's defense and US supply chain security by fostering the co-development and co-production of secure, non-PRC Unmanned Aerial Systems with Taiwan and regional allies through new working groups, frameworks, and expedited certification processes.
What it actually does
This bill mandates the establishment of a Blue UAS working group and a cooperative framework involving the United States, Taiwan, and regional allies to promote secure, PRC-independent Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) supply chains. It also directs the creation of a fast-track certification process for Taiwanese Blue UAS companies. The legislation aims to enhance US national security and bolster Taiwan's defense capabilities by integrating Taiwan into secure drone development and production networks.
Proponents argue
Supporters argue the bill is crucial for strengthening Taiwan's asymmetric defense posture against increasing People's Republic of China (PRC) gray-zone tactics, while simultaneously reducing US reliance on PRC-sourced components for critical UAS technology. They emphasize the strategic importance of Taiwan as a democratic partner and the urgent need for secure, diversified supply chains to counter geopolitical risks.
Opponents contend
While direct opposition is not explicitly stated in the provided text, potential critics might raise concerns about the complexity of integrating foreign manufacturers into sensitive defense supply chains, the potential for technology transfer risks, or the financial implications of establishing new cooperative frameworks and certification processes without clear cost estimates. Some might also argue that such initiatives could be perceived by the PRC as escalatory, further complicating cross-strait relations.
The bill is concise and its provisions are generally clear, making it accessible for an informed reader to understand its core objectives and mechanisms within a short timeframe.
Section 4(a)
Establishment of Blue UAS Working Group
This provision mandates the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, to establish a Blue UAS working group within 180 days. This group, comprising government, industry, and academic experts, will assess Taiwan's drone production capacity, evaluate opportunities for US-Taiwan public-private partnerships for UAS co-development, identify barriers to Taiwan's inclusion in Blue UAS programs, and recommend improvements. It also includes analyzing opportunities for Taiwan in the Defense Autonomous Warfare Group and incorporating lessons from the war in Ukraine.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue this working group is essential for a structured approach to integrating Taiwan into secure UAS supply chains, ensuring thorough assessment of capabilities and barriers, and leveraging expertise to achieve strategic goals. The inclusion of lessons from Ukraine is seen as a timely and critical update to ensure relevance and effectiveness.
Critics contend
No specific opposition is typically raised against the establishment of a working group for strategic assessment, though some might argue about the potential for bureaucratic inefficiencies or the pace of progress in achieving tangible outcomes.
Tradeoffs
This provision balances the need for comprehensive assessment and expert input with the urgency of strengthening Taiwan's defense capabilities and securing critical supply chains.
Section 4(b)
Working Group Reporting Requirements
This subsection requires the Blue UAS Working Group to submit an unclassified report, with a classified appendix as needed, to the appropriate congressional committees annually for three years, starting one year after the date of enactment. The report must detail the group's activities, findings, recommendations, timelines, resource needs, and potential funding mechanisms.
Section 5
Cooperative Framework with Allies
This section directs the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, to establish a cooperative framework. This framework, building on the Partnership for Indo-Pacific Industrial Resilience (PIPIR), will involve the United States, Taiwan, and regional allies and global partners. Its purpose is to promote secure, PRC-independent UAS supply chains and enhance interoperability. Key elements include supporting regional allies in acquiring Taiwanese Blue UAS components and fast-tracking Blue UAS certification for co-developed components.
Section 6
Fast-Track Blue UAS Certification for Taiwan
This section mandates the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, to develop a fast-track process for Blue UAS companies in Taiwan to obtain Blue UAS certification. This process will include expedited export control reviews and licensing for Taiwanese drone and component manufacturers, particularly those with no PRC-connected subcomponents, and reciprocal testing arrangements or recognition of equivalent Taiwan cybersecurity standards where appropriate.
Section 7
Rules of Construction Regarding US-Taiwan Policy
This section clarifies that nothing in the Act should be construed to alter existing United States policy towards Taiwan, specifically as codified in the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979. It also explicitly states that the Act does not alter the US commitment to the One China Policy, including commitments made in the Three United States-China Communiques and the Six Assurances to Taiwan, nor does it alter the US Government's position regarding Taiwan's international status.
This subsection changes the analysis of opportunities for Taiwan from 'Replicator programs' to 'the Defense Autonomous Warfare Group' within the Blue UAS Working Group's duties.
Section 4(a)(7) (amended text)
Why it matters:This is standard legislative practice for amendments, but the specific change in program name could reflect evolving defense priorities or a more precise targeting of relevant initiatives within the Department of Defense.
Case for: Supporters would argue that updating the reference to the 'Defense Autonomous Warfare Group' ensures the bill aligns with the most current and relevant Department of Defense initiatives for autonomous systems, making the collaboration more effective and impactful.
Case against: No specific opposition, but some might argue that the original 'Replicator programs' might have offered broader or different opportunities that are now being overlooked by this more specific focus.
Estimated impact: This change potentially shifts the focus of US-Taiwan collaboration on autonomous systems to a specific, potentially more advanced or integrated, DoD initiative, impacting the strategic direction of defense technology cooperation.
This new subsection adds a requirement for the Blue UAS Working Group to 'institute lessons learned from the war in Ukraine, in consultation with the United States European Command (EUCOM) and Ukrainian officials.'
Section 4(a)(9) (amended text)
Why it matters:This is a substantive addition that reflects current geopolitical realities and lessons from ongoing conflicts. Its placement at the end of a list of duties might make it less prominent than its strategic importance suggests.
Case for: Proponents would argue that incorporating real-world lessons from Ukraine's extensive use of drones is absolutely critical for developing effective and resilient UAS strategies for Taiwan, making the bill's recommendations more relevant and impactful.
Case against: No specific opposition, but some might argue that adding more consultation requirements could potentially slow down the working group's progress or divert resources from other core mandates.
Estimated impact: This significantly enhances the practical relevance and strategic foresight of the Blue UAS Working Group's recommendations for Taiwan's defense by integrating recent combat experience.
The amended bill renumbers the 'Rules of Construction' section and adds a third rule: 'to alter the United States commitment to the One China Policy, including commitments made in the Three United States-China Communiques and the Six Assurances to Taiwan'.
Section 7 (amended text) vs. DELETED Section 8 (original text)
Why it matters:While 'Rules of Construction' are often seen as boilerplate, the addition of specific diplomatic language here is a deliberate attempt to manage the political sensitivities around Taiwan. It's 'buried' in the sense that it's not an operative provision creating new programs, but a crucial clarifying statement of intent.
Case for: Supporters would argue this addition is crucial for diplomatic de-escalation, explicitly reaffirming long-standing US policy to avoid misinterpretation by Beijing and maintain regional stability, thereby preventing potential escalations.
Case against: Some might argue that explicitly reiterating the 'One China Policy' and 'Six Assurances' in the context of a bill strengthening Taiwan's defense could be seen as undermining the very support the bill intends to provide, or that it is an unnecessary boilerplate that doesn't change the PRC's perception.
Estimated impact: This provision reaffirms the diplomatic tightrope the US walks regarding Taiwan, potentially mitigating immediate PRC diplomatic backlash and clarifying the US foreign policy stance.