Visual Protection of Strategic Assets Act
- Sponsor
- Sen. Cotton, Tom [R-AR]
- Committees
- Judiciary Committee (primary)
- Last action
- Apr 30, 2026
Bottom line
The bill significantly enhances legal tools to prosecute espionage and unauthorized surveillance of critical U.S. defense assets, with a particular focus on deterring foreign adversaries.
What it actually does
This bill strengthens federal espionage laws by expanding the definition of prohibited surveillance activities to include video and AI-enhanced visual depictions, particularly targeting individuals from designated 'countries of concern'. It establishes a rebuttable presumption of intent to injure the United States for such individuals who photograph, video, or track high-value military assets or tier-1 installations. The bill also increases penalties for violations, adds provisions for device forfeiture and civil penalties, and mandates visa revocation and removal proceedings for convicted foreign nationals from countries of concern.
Proponents argue
Supporters argue that the bill is a critical update to outdated espionage laws, necessary to counter modern intelligence threats from adversarial nations. They contend that the rebuttable presumption and increased penalties will provide law enforcement and intelligence agencies with stronger tools to protect sensitive military installations and assets, thereby safeguarding national security in an era of advanced surveillance technology and persistent foreign espionage efforts.
Opponents contend
Critics may argue that the bill's provisions, particularly the rebuttable presumption of intent and the broad definition of 'covered person,' could infringe on civil liberties, lead to racial profiling, or create diplomatic tensions. Concerns might also be raised about the potential for overreach, the chilling effect on legitimate journalistic or research activities, and the practical challenges of enforcing such broad prohibitions without impacting innocent individuals.
The bill is short and relatively straightforward, allowing for a quick read to grasp its core changes and implications.
Section 2(a), adding 18 U.S.C. 793(i)(1)
Definitions of Countries of Concern, Covered Persons, and High-Value Assets
This provision defines key terms for the new espionage prohibitions. It lists the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, People's Republic of China, Russian Federation, and Islamic Republic of Iran as 'countries of concern.' A 'covered person' is defined as a citizen or national of one of these countries, or someone acting on their behalf. 'High-value assets' are specific military aircraft (E-4B, RC-135, B-2, B-1) and any nuclear command platform, with 'tier-1 installations' being military bases housing these assets or critical to national strategic missions.
Supporters argue
Proponents argue that clearly defining these terms and identifying specific threats and assets is crucial for modernizing espionage laws and focusing enforcement efforts where the risk is highest.
Critics contend
Opponents might argue that singling out specific countries and their nationals could lead to discriminatory enforcement and exacerbate geopolitical tensions, potentially impacting legitimate activities.
Tradeoffs
The provision balances the need for clear legal definitions to protect national security with concerns about potential profiling or broad application to individuals based on nationality.
Section 2(a), adding 18 U.S.C. 793(i)(2)
Rebuttable Presumption of Espionage Intent
This provision creates a legal presumption: if a 'covered person' (a national or agent of a country of concern) photographs, videos, or tracks a 'high-value asset' or 'tier-1 installation,' it is presumed they did so with intent to injure the U.S. or advantage a foreign nation. This presumption can be rebutted if the person demonstrates, by clear and convincing evidence, that they had prior approval from the Secretary of Defense.
Section 2(a), adding 18 U.S.C. 793(i)(3)-(5)
DoD Responsibilities for Asset Identification and Public Awareness
The bill mandates that the Secretary of Defense maintain and annually update a public list of 'high-value assets' (including specific aircraft and nuclear command platforms) and 'tier-1 installations' (bases housing these assets or critical to national missions). Furthermore, the Secretary must install signs and markers at these locations to identify them and explicitly state that photography and other surveillance are strictly prohibited.
Section 2(b)(1)(A), amending 18 U.S.C. 795(a)
Modernizing Prohibited Surveillance Methods
This amendment expands the scope of prohibited actions under 18 U.S.C. 795, which previously focused on 'photographing' and 'sketching' defense installations. The updated language now explicitly includes 'digital photograph,' 'video' (including live streaming), and 'visual depiction enhanced using artificial intelligence' (as defined in the National Artificial Intelligence Initiative Act of 2020).
Section 2(b)(1)(B), amending 18 U.S.C. 795(b)
Tiered Penalties for Surveillance Violations
This amendment establishes a tiered penalty structure for violations of 18 U.S.C. 795. A general violation carries a fine and/or up to 1 year imprisonment. If the violation involves a 'high-value asset' or 'tier-1 installation,' the penalty increases to a fine and/or up to 7 years imprisonment. The most severe penalty, a fine and 5 to 10 years imprisonment, applies if the defendant is a citizen or national of a 'country of concern.'
Section 2(b)(1)(B), adding 18 U.S.C. 795(c)
Forfeiture of Devices and Civil Penalties
This new subsection mandates that any person who violates 18 U.S.C. 795 (prohibiting unauthorized surveillance of defense installations) shall forfeit any electronic or other device used in the commission of the violation to the United States. Additionally, violators will be subject to a civil penalty of not more than $100,000.
Section 2(b)(2)
Visa Revocation and Removal for Convicted Foreign Nationals
This provision mandates that any citizen or national of a 'country of concern' who is convicted of a violation under the amended 18 U.S.C. 795 shall have their visa revoked. Following visa revocation, these individuals will be placed into removal (deportation) proceedings in accordance with existing immigration law.
The specific list of 'countries of concern' includes the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the People's Republic of China, the Russian Federation, and the Islamic Republic of Iran.
Section 2(a), adding 18 U.S.C. 793(i)(1)(A)
Why it matters:This is standard legislative practice for defining terms, but its implications for 'covered persons' are profound and could be overlooked by a casual reader focusing on the broader policy changes.
Case for: Proponents would argue that explicitly naming these countries provides clarity and focus for national security efforts, targeting known state actors engaged in espionage against the U.S.
Case against: Critics might argue that explicitly naming countries could be seen as escalatory or discriminatory, potentially leading to profiling of individuals from these nations.
Estimated impact: Directly impacts the legal standing and potential criminal liability of citizens and nationals of these four countries when interacting with U.S. defense assets.
The definition of 'covered person' includes not only a citizen or national of a country of concern but also 'a person acting on behalf of a citizen or national of a country of concern.'
Section 2(a), adding 18 U.S.C. 793(i)(1)(B)
Why it matters:While definitions are typically placed here, this particular phrasing significantly broadens the scope of individuals who could be subject to the rebuttable presumption, extending beyond direct nationals to anyone acting on their behalf, which could include U.S. citizens or other foreign nationals.
Case for: Supporters would argue this is essential to prevent evasion, as foreign adversaries often use proxies or agents who are not direct nationals to conduct intelligence gathering.
Case against: Opponents might argue that 'acting on behalf of' is vague and could be broadly interpreted, potentially ensnaring individuals with indirect or innocent connections, or creating a chilling effect on legitimate interactions.
Estimated impact: Significantly expands the potential pool of individuals subject to the rebuttable presumption of espionage intent, including non-nationals who might be perceived as acting for a country of concern.
The expansion of prohibited actions to include 'visual depiction enhanced using artificial intelligence (as defined in section 5002 of the National Artificial Intelligence Initiative Act of 2020 (15 U.S.C. 9401)).'
Section 2(b)(1)(A), amending 18 U.S.C. 795(a)
Why it matters:This is a technical update to keep pace with technology, but its specific inclusion and reference to another statute might be missed, despite its significant implications for future surveillance methods.
Case for: Proponents would highlight this as a forward-thinking measure to address emerging threats, ensuring that advanced AI capabilities used for reconnaissance or intelligence gathering are explicitly covered by espionage prohibitions.
Case against: Critics might argue that the definition of 'visual depiction enhanced using artificial intelligence' could be overly broad or subject to rapid technological change, potentially criminalizing unforeseen or innocuous uses of AI-powered imaging.
Estimated impact: Future-proofs the statute against advanced AI-driven surveillance techniques, potentially criminalizing new methods of intelligence gathering.