Let Kids Play Act
- Sponsor
- Sen. Murphy, Christopher [D-CT]
- Committees
- Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs Committee (primary)
- Last action
- May 13, 2026
Bottom line
The "Let Kids Play Act" aims to curb private equity influence and predatory practices in youth sports through outright prohibitions, mandatory divestitures, and significant penalties, seeking to protect youth sports from financial exploitation and ensure accessibility.
What it actually does
This bill prohibits "vulture investors" (defined as private equity funds engaging in "vulture practices" or having a history of acquired entities becoming insolvent) from investing in youth sports entities. It also broadly prohibits all "covered firms" (private equity funds or companies owned by them) from engaging in specific "vulture practices" in youth sports, such as consolidating control, creating integrated networks, imposing junk fees, or restrictive terms. The bill mandates divestiture for non-compliant investors and establishes a Youth Sports Fund for disgorged profits and penalties.
Proponents argue
Proponents argue that private equity firms, driven by profit maximization, have exploited the youth sports sector by imposing excessive fees, consolidating control, and degrading the quality and accessibility of programs. They contend that this bill is necessary to protect children and families from predatory financial practices, restore community-focused values to youth sports, and ensure that participation remains affordable and equitable. They believe the current market structure harms competition and consumer choice.
Opponents contend
Opponents might argue that the bill's broad definitions of "vulture investor" and "vulture practice" are overly restrictive and could stifle legitimate investment and innovation in youth sports. They may contend that private equity investment brings necessary capital for facility improvements, technology, and expansion, which ultimately benefits participants. Critics could also argue that the divestiture requirements and penalties are punitive and could lead to market instability or reduce the availability of youth sports programs by forcing out existing investors.
The bill is moderately complex due to its legal definitions and enforcement mechanisms, requiring a dedicated reading to fully grasp its implications.
Section 1
Short Title
This section establishes the official short title of the bill as the "Let Kids Play Act," providing a common and easily recognizable name for the legislation.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue that a clear and evocative short title helps communicate the bill's purpose and galvanize public support for protecting youth sports.
Critics contend
No specific opposition is typically raised against short titles, as they are primarily for identification.
Tradeoffs
None apparent.
Section 2
Key Definitions
This section provides extensive definitions for critical terms used throughout the Act, such as "acquired entity," "covered firm" (private equity fund or its controlled company), "vulture investor," "vulture practice," "youth sports," and "youth sports entity." These definitions are crucial for determining who and what falls under the bill's prohibitions and regulations.
Section 3
Vulture Investment and Practice Prohibitions
This section makes it unlawful for any "vulture investor" to invest in a "youth sports entity." It also prohibits any "covered firm" from engaging in specific "vulture practices" in youth sports, including consolidating control through roll-up strategies, creating integrated networks that force participation, conditioning eligibility on specific travel services, imposing "junk fees," or implementing restrictive terms like exclusivity or multi-year non-cancelable commitments. It also prohibits claiming intellectual property rights over athlete data or performance metrics.
Section 4
Automatic and Presumptive Vulture Investor Designation
This section outlines how a covered firm is designated as a "vulture investor." Firms already invested in youth sports at the bill's enactment are presumed to be vulture investors and automatically designated after 91 days unless certified. Firms seeking new investments must be certified before investing. Certification requires a sworn statement under penalty of perjury that the firm has never engaged in vulture practices, has a limited history of acquired entity insolvencies, and will not engage in vulture practices. Denied certifications are deemed denied after 31 days, and certifications can be terminated by the Commission or Assistant Attorney General. False certifications carry severe civil and criminal penalties.
Section 5
Mandatory Divestiture and Comprehensive Remedies
Vulture investors must divest all ownership stakes, unwind agreements, return assets (including intellectual property and data), and remove installed management within two years of designation. The Commission will issue divestment milestones, and non-compliance leads to 10% of revenue being escrowed monthly. Divestitures are subject to antitrust review, and the Commission/Assistant Attorney General can block harmful divestitures or appoint a trustee if deadlines are missed. Remedies include disgorgement of profits, refunding junk fees, forgiving debts, funding scholarships, and transferring necessary technology and data back to the youth sports entity. Jurisdiction is retained for at least one year post-divestiture.
Section 6
Enforcement Mechanisms and Private Right of Action
The FTC and Assistant Attorney General can enforce the Act through administrative authorities or civil actions. Violations are considered unfair methods of competition or deceptive practices under the FTC Act. State Attorneys General can bring parens patriae actions. Crucially, the bill creates a private right of action for individuals or classes adversely affected, allowing them to sue for treble damages, restitution, attorney's fees, and other relief. It also invalidates pre-dispute arbitration agreements and joint action waivers for disputes under this Act, ensuring access to courts and class actions.
Section 7
Joint and Several Liability for Vulture Investors
This section mandates that a vulture investor, including any control person or affiliate, shall be held jointly and severally liable with the youth sports entity for all liabilities incurred by the youth sports entity during the period of the vulture investor's control. This includes debt obligations, legal judgments, pension-related obligations, and legal, regulatory, or safety infractions (e.g., child safety, labor violations, facility code failures).
Section 8
Establishment of Youth Sports Fund
This section establishes a "Youth Sports Fund" to receive any money disgorged under the Act without a specified recipient. The Commission will set terms for its distribution, with the purpose of serving the youth sports needs of harmed communities. This includes reducing participation costs, supporting free community access to facilities, increasing financial aid or scholarships, or providing necessary funding for divested youth sports entities to operate safely and effectively.
Section 9
Regulatory Authority for Implementation
Grants the Commission (FTC) the authority to issue orders, requirements, guidance, rules, processes, or procedures necessary to implement the Act. This authority can be exercised without regard to the standard rulemaking requirements under section 553 of title 5, United States Code, allowing for faster regulatory action.
Section 10
Non-Preemption of Stronger State and Local Laws
This section clarifies that the Act does not restrict or preempt any State or local law that provides greater protection against vulture practices, imposes greater civil or criminal sanctions, or creates additional public or private rights of action related to vulture practices or covered firms.
Section 11
Anti-Evasion Measures
This section makes it unlawful to structure or arrange transactions to evade the Act's requirements. It directs the Commission and Assistant Attorney General to disregard the form of any transaction and consider its substance for compliance purposes. Any entity created or reorganized to avoid designation as a covered firm will still be deemed a covered firm.
Section 3(b)(8) allows the Commission or Assistant Attorney General to designate additional "vulture practices" and publish notice without regard to Section 553 of Title 5, U.S. Code (Administrative Procedure Act rulemaking requirements). Section 9 grants the Commission broad authority to issue orders, rules, etc., necessary to implement the Act, also "without regard to the provisions under section 553 of title 5, United States Code."
Section 3(b)(8) and Section 9
Why it matters:While often used for urgent or technical rule changes, waiving APA Section 553 for such broad authorities (defining new "vulture practices" and general implementation) is a significant procedural shortcut. It could be seen as an intentional way to expedite regulatory action and avoid public comment periods that might slow down or alter the implementation of the Act.
Case for: Proponents argue that this expedited process is necessary to quickly adapt to evolving financial practices and close potential loopholes that vulture investors might exploit, ensuring the Act remains effective without lengthy bureaucratic delays.
Case against: Critics contend that bypassing standard public notice and comment periods (Section 553) undermines transparency, due process, and public participation in significant regulatory decisions. They argue it could lead to arbitrary or ill-considered rules without sufficient stakeholder input.
Estimated impact: Grants significant power to regulators to define and enforce the Act's scope without traditional public review, potentially impacting all covered firms and youth sports entities.
This subsection states that the civil penalty for a false certification (not less than $1,000,000 per certification) shall be imposed jointly and severally on the covered firm and each individual who executes such certification, including general partners, "without right of indemnification, reimbursement, insurance, or contribution from any covered firm, affiliate, or other person, and any agreement to the contrary shall be void as against public policy."
Section 4(c)(1)(B)
Why it matters:This is a highly significant provision that places direct, unshielded personal financial risk on individuals. While its intent is to ensure accountability and deter false statements, its placement and technical language might obscure the severity of this personal liability from a casual reader. It's a deliberate legislative choice to make individuals directly accountable.
Case for: Proponents argue that this provision is essential to ensure the integrity of the certification process, as it creates a powerful personal incentive for individuals with management authority to be truthful and diligent, preventing firms from using corporate structures to shield individuals from accountability.
Case against: Opponents would likely argue that this provision is excessively punitive and could deter qualified individuals from serving in management roles in private equity, given the extreme personal financial risk for any material misstatement or omission, even if unintentional. They might contend it goes against standard corporate liability protections.
Estimated impact: Creates substantial personal financial risk for general partners and managers of private equity funds, potentially altering governance structures and risk assessment within these firms.