Blocking CCP Spy Tech Act of 2026
- Sponsor
- Sen. Scott, Rick [R-FL]
- Committees
- Intelligence (Select) Committee (primary)
- Last action
- May 20, 2026
Bottom line
This bill mandates a national security review of specific Chinese tech companies and their products, with potential consequences including placement on a restricted list and identification as Chinese military companies, aiming to mitigate perceived threats to U.S. national security.
What it actually does
This bill mandates that appropriate national security agencies determine within one year if communications equipment and services from six specifically named Chinese entities, and their affiliates, pose an unacceptable risk to U.S. national security. If a risk is found, or if no determination is made, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) must add these items to its 'covered list,' restricting their use in U.S. networks. Additionally, the bill requires the Secretary of Defense to assess if these entities should be designated as Chinese military companies.
Proponents argue
Proponents argue this bill is a critical step to safeguard U.S. national security and protect American persons from potential espionage and data theft by entities linked to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). They emphasize the need for proactive measures to counter foreign adversaries' technological influence and ensure the integrity of U.S. communications infrastructure, especially concerning advanced technologies like AI and robotics.
Opponents contend
Opponents might argue that singling out specific companies could be seen as protectionist or discriminatory, potentially escalating trade tensions or limiting market competition without sufficient public evidence of direct harm. They might also raise concerns about the precedent of mandating specific reviews for named entities, suggesting a broader, more evidence-based process might be more appropriate to avoid politicizing national security assessments.
The bill is concise and straightforward, making it accessible for a quick read to understand its core directives and implications.
Section 2(a) and (b)
Mandated National Security Risk Review of Specific Entities
This provision requires an 'appropriate national security agency' to determine within one year whether communications equipment and services from seven specifically named Chinese entities (Game Science Interactive Co., Ltd.; Hangzhou DeepSeek Artificial Intelligence Basic Technology Research Co., Ltd. (DeepSeek); Hangzhou Yushu Technology Co., Ltd. (Unitree Robotics); Hangzhou Yunshenchu Technology Co., Ltd. (DEEP Robotics); BrainCo, Inc.; Manycore Tech, Inc.) and their subsidiaries, affiliates, partners, or licensees, pose an unacceptable risk to U.S. national security or the safety of U.S. persons.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue that these specific entities, due to their origin or nature of technology (e.g., AI, robotics), may pose unique national security risks that warrant immediate and focused review, preventing potential vulnerabilities before they are exploited.
Critics contend
Critics might contend that singling out specific companies without publicly disclosed evidence could be perceived as arbitrary or politically motivated, potentially inviting retaliatory actions from foreign governments.
Tradeoffs
This provision balances the need for proactive national security protection against concerns about targeted economic actions and potential international trade implications.
Section 2(c)
Automatic or Mandated Placement on FCC's Covered List
This provision outlines the consequences of the national security review. If an appropriate national security agency fails to make a determination within one year, or if it affirmatively determines a risk, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) must add the communications equipment or services to the 'covered list.' This list restricts the use of such equipment in U.S. communications networks. If an agency determines no risk, it must report to Congress, and other national security agencies must review that determination.
Section 3
Secretary of Defense Review for Chinese Military Company Designation
This provision requires the Secretary of Defense to determine, as part of the annual review mandated under Section 1260H(a) of the William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021, whether any of the entities listed in Section 2(b) of this bill should be identified as a 'Chinese military company' operating directly or indirectly in the United States. Such a designation carries significant implications, including potential investment restrictions.