Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2027

This section broadly authorizes funds to be appropriated for fiscal year 2027 for all intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the Federal Government. The specific amounts are detailed in a classified schedule, ensuring the necessary financial resources for the Intelligence Community's operations.

This section specifically authorizes $568,000,000 for the Intelligence Community Management Account (ICMA) for fiscal year 2027, with additional classified amounts. The ICMA funds the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) and other IC-wide initiatives, supporting oversight, integration, and management functions across the intelligence community.

This section authorizes $514,000,000 to be appropriated for the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund for fiscal year 2027. This funding ensures the solvency and continued operation of the retirement and disability system for CIA personnel.

This section redesignates the 'Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence' as the 'Deputy Director of National Intelligence' and eliminates other Deputy Director positions, establishing instead an 'Assistant Director of National Intelligence for Mission Integration' and an 'Assistant Director of National Intelligence for Policy and Capabilities.' These new Assistant Directors are appointed by the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), rather than the President with Senate consent.

This section repeals several existing positions, units, centers, councils, and offices within the Intelligence Community, including the Intelligence Community Chief Data Officer, the Intelligence Community Innovation Unit, the Climate Security Advisory Council, the Framework for Cross-Disciplinary Education and Training, the Foreign Languages Program, and the Joint Intelligence Community Council. These repeals aim to streamline the IC's structure and eliminate entities deemed redundant or ineffective.

This section mandates the transfer of the functions of the National Intelligence University (NIU) to the National Defense University (NDU) and repeals the subtitle of the National Security Act of 1947 that established NIU. This consolidates intelligence education under the broader defense education framework.

This provision amends the National Security Act of 1947 to clarify that the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) may only receive and retain intelligence pertaining to domestic terrorism to the extent necessary to enable its focus on international terrorism. It explicitly limits NCTC's domestic activities to supporting its international terrorism mission.

This section significantly modifies the responsibilities of the Department of Homeland Security's Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A). It reorients I&A's mission to focus solely on foreign threats to the homeland, explicitly prohibiting it from engaging in the collection of information or intelligence targeting any 'United States person' or any clandestine collection. It also streamlines I&A's liaison and information sharing functions.

This section establishes detailed, standardized procedures for all Intelligence Community elements to respond to 'unmasking requests' – requests to reveal the identity of a U.S. person whose information was minimized in an intelligence report. It mandates written justifications, specific approval levels, record retention, and congressional notification for requests involving transition teams, nominees, or federal office holders. It also includes an exception for exigent circumstances.

This section establishes comprehensive analytic standards for all-source intelligence products across the Intelligence Community. These standards cover objectivity, independence from political considerations, timeliness, reliance on all relevant information, and detailed analytic tradecraft (sourcing, uncertainty, distinguishing judgments from assumptions, analysis of alternatives, relevance, argumentation, analytic line, accuracy, and visuals). It also requires a dedicated section in most products explaining tradecraft and mandates metrics for tracking adherence to these standards.

This section directs the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) to establish an Intelligence Community Counterintelligence Office within the Department of Commerce. This office, led by a DNI-appointed Director and a Commerce-appointed Deputy Director, will advise the Secretary of Commerce on counterintelligence and intelligence information, identify and mitigate threats, and facilitate information sharing between Commerce and the IC. It aims to enhance the counterintelligence posture of the Department of Commerce.

This section prohibits elements of the Intelligence Community from procuring or operating covered unmanned ground vehicle systems (UGVs) manufactured or assembled by entities from covered foreign countries (China, Russia, Iran, North Korea). It includes exemptions for specific purposes like research, testing, counterterrorism, or if the UGV is modified to prevent data transfer to foreign entities and poses no cybersecurity risks. The prohibition on operation takes effect one year after enactment.

This section establishes the China-Taiwan Strategic Warning Task Force, co-chaired by the DNI and the Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security. Its objectives are to synchronize IC efforts for indications and warning of Chinese military aggression against Taiwan, coordinate analysis, and develop IT solutions for information access. The Task Force has specific membership from key IC elements and a sunset clause of 5 years.

This section mandates the DNI, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, to determine which U.S. agencies would benefit from anonymized biological data and intelligence, and to disseminate such information to them. It requires the establishment of standards for collection and data formats, minimizing collection of U.S. person biological data, and facilitating unified access to biological intelligence databases. The DNI must prioritize capabilities for early detection, characterization, and attribution of biological threats.

This section amends the Support for the Sovereignty, Integrity, Democracy, and Economic Stability of Ukraine Act of 2014 to explicitly state U.S. policy to assist Ukraine in maintaining a credible defense and deterrence capability, including through intelligence support. It mandates continued intelligence support to Ukraine until an armistice or settlement, with strict notification requirements for any pauses or downgrades. It also outlines requirements for adjusting support in the event of a settlement or resuming full support if a settlement is violated, including early warning notifications to Ukraine and NATO members.

This section establishes U.S. policy to strengthen intelligence sharing and analytic cooperation with Israel and Abraham Accords countries. It mandates the President to expand and enhance intelligence sharing on cybersecurity, terrorism, proliferation, and other threats, with limitations on reducing sharing except for specific national security concerns and requiring congressional notification for any changes. It also directs enhanced cooperation with Abraham Accords countries on shared security concerns, with safeguards for intelligence sources and methods.

This section establishes a 3-year pilot program, led by the NSA's Artificial Intelligence Security Center, to securely share intelligence and threat information with covered non-Federal persons (U.S. citizens/entities developing AI models or critical infrastructure for IC/DoD). The program aims to address the exploitation of U.S. AI systems by foreign adversaries for intelligence collection, IP theft, and malicious activities, with strict rules on participation, information handling, permissible use, and nondisclosure, while safeguarding privacy and civil liberties.

This section mandates the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) to review and assess IC policies, procedures, and workflows governing the use of artificial intelligence (AI) in producing or reviewing intelligence that informs targeting decisions with lethal effects. It requires an exploratory analysis of AI bias and errors, consultation with relevant IC heads, and the issuance of new policies and directives to improve risk mitigation. A report to Congress detailing these findings is also required.

This section mandates the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) to establish a policy requiring clear labeling of outputs from any artificial intelligence (AI) system used in developing intelligence that could inform lethal targeting decisions. The labels must indicate that AI was used, identify the specific AI system/model, describe how it was used, and provide a point of contact for questions. This label must remain prominent and visible to all subsequent users within the IC.

This section prohibits the acquisition or use of any 'covered application' (AI models confirmed to fail NIST AI Risk Management Framework standards for 'obscene, degrading, and/or abusive content,' or legally determined to have generated child pornography or non-consensual intimate images) on national security systems operated by the IC or its contractors. It mandates removal of such applications within 180 days, allows for additional safeguards, and includes a national security/research waiver with congressional notification.

This section requires covered officials (including the DNI, Treasury Secretary, OMB Director, and IC element heads) to use secure systems for all budget-related activities under the National Intelligence Program (NIP) by September 30, 2028. It allows for waivers if non-secure systems are appropriate and pose no significant counterintelligence risk. It also permits modification or omission of information in public reports to protect classified budget details and amends the Federal Funding Accountability and Transparency Act of 2006 to exempt classified NIP information from public disclosure.

This section amends Chapter 213 of title 18, United States Code, to establish that an indictment for a violation of section 794 (gathering or delivering defense information to aid foreign government) or a conspiracy to violate such section may be found or instituted at any time without limitation. This removes the statute of limitations for these specific espionage offenses.