A complete substitute amendment. v2 introduces a sunset clause for the entire Act and expands the strategy for post-conflict economic engagement. It also modifies conditions for foreign assistance, sanctions, and bill termination, while adding "residential buildings" to protected infrastructure and "trauma-informed care" to humanitarian protection measures.
PEACE in Sudan Act
- Sponsor
- Sen. Risch, James E. [R-ID]
- Committees
- Foreign Relations Committee (primary)
- Last action
- Jul 27, 2026
Bottom line
This bill mandates a robust U.S. diplomatic and economic response to the conflict in Sudan, focusing on accountability, humanitarian aid, and countering malign foreign influence.
What it actually does
The PEACE in Sudan Act of 2026 aims to promote stability and security in Sudan by imposing sanctions on individuals and entities involved in the conflict, requiring comprehensive reports on foreign interference and human rights abuses, and developing a strategy for a ceasefire and political settlement. It also restricts certain types of foreign assistance and engagement with international financial institutions concerning Sudan, and extends the mandate of the Special Envoy for Sudan.
Proponents argue
Supporters argue the bill is crucial for holding perpetrators of atrocities accountable, disrupting the war economy, and fostering a civilian-led government in Sudan. They believe it provides necessary tools to address the humanitarian crisis and counter destabilizing foreign interference, while also planning for post-conflict economic engagement.
Opponents contend
Critics might argue that broad sanctions and restrictions on international financial assistance could inadvertently harm the Sudanese people or complicate future engagement with a legitimate government. Some might also contend that the measures could be perceived as overreaching or ineffective without broader international consensus.
The bill is moderately detailed, and an informed reader would need about 40 minutes to fully grasp its provisions, which is a reasonable time investment given its policy implications.
Sec. 4, pages 6-10
Report on Activities of Certain Foreign Governments and Groups in Sudan
This provision requires the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Director of National Intelligence, to submit semi-annual reports detailing the involvement of foreign governments and malign actors in the Sudanese conflict. These reports must include information on arms transfers, combatant support, drone strikes, intelligence sharing, financial support, business interests, and violations of UN arms embargoes. It also covers the activities of specific non-state armed groups and private/commercial activities (e.g., gold, gum arabic, banking) that fuel the war economy.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue this provision is essential for transparency and understanding the complex web of foreign interference and economic drivers of the conflict, enabling more targeted and effective policy responses.
Critics contend
No specific opposition is typically raised against transparency and reporting requirements, though some foreign governments or actors implicated might view it as hostile.
Tradeoffs
Balances the need for intelligence gathering and public transparency with potential diplomatic sensitivities regarding named foreign governments.
Sec. 5, pages 10-11
Report on Atrocities and Gross Violations of Internationally Recognized Human Rights in Sudan
This section mandates semi-annual reports from the Secretary of State on atrocities and gross human rights violations committed in Sudan since April 15, 2023. The report must describe various abuses, including child soldier recruitment, the use of starvation and sexual violence as weapons of war, denial of humanitarian access, destruction of civilian infrastructure, summary executions, targeting of medical facilities and religious sites, and ethnically motivated violence. It also requires continued monitoring of the use of chemical weapons.
Sec. 6, pages 11-15
Comprehensive Strategy for Peace and Stability in Sudan
This provision requires the Secretary of State to develop a comprehensive strategy to secure a ceasefire and durable political settlement in Sudan. The strategy must include plans to end the conflict through diplomatic negotiations, cripple the war economy, counter foreign military support, promote stability and humanitarian access (including trauma-informed care and preventing human trafficking), engage with neighboring countries, and identify opportunities for U.S. economic engagement and investment in post-conflict Sudan.
Sec. 8, pages 16-20
Sanctions on Malign Actors in Sudan
This section authorizes the President to impose sanctions, including asset blocking, prohibitions on financial transactions, and visa denials or revocations, on foreign persons. These sanctions apply to individuals or entities determined to be responsible for, complicit in, or facilitating actions that threaten Sudan's peace and stability, supply arms, use child soldiers, direct foreign military forces, aid the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) or Rapid Support Forces (RSF), obstruct peace processes, commit atrocities, smuggle natural resources (like gold and gum arabic), violate arms embargoes, target civilians, obstruct humanitarian aid, operate private military companies contributing to violence, impede investigations, or obstruct civilian government formation. Exceptions are provided for compliance with the UN Headquarters Agreement, intelligence/law enforcement activities, humanitarian assistance, and the importation of goods.
Sec. 10, pages 20-21
Assistance to the Government of Sudan by International Financial Institutions
This provision instructs the U.S. Executive Director or appropriate head of international financial institutions (such as the IMF, World Bank, and African Development Bank) to use the U.S. voice and vote to oppose premature, new, long-term reconstruction or capacity-building support for Sudan that would benefit malign actors. It also requires working with other key donor countries to develop a coordinated lending policy for a post-conflict scenario, including firm benchmarks and preconditions for lending. Exceptions are made for national security waivers and for specific loans or financial assistance solely supporting lifesaving humanitarian projects.
Sec. 13, page 22
Prohibition on Certain U.S. Foreign Assistance to Sudan
This section prohibits the furnishing of certain types of United States assistance to Sudan. Specifically, it bans assistance that directly provides financial or capacity building support to Government of Sudan institutions, supports debt relief through the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative to restructure, reschedule, or cancel sovereign debt, or constitutes security assistance. A national security waiver is available, and an annual report detailing all U.S. foreign assistance to Sudan is required.
This section amends Section 7204(d) of the Department of State Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025 by striking '2 years' and inserting '5 years,' thereby extending the mandate of the Special Envoy for Sudan for an additional three years.
Sec. 9, page 20
Why it matters:This is standard legislative practice for amending existing statutes. It's not necessarily evasive but can be easily overlooked by a reader focused on new, standalone provisions.
Case for: Proponents would argue that extending the Special Envoy's mandate provides crucial continuity and long-term commitment to U.S. diplomatic efforts in Sudan, which is a complex and protracted crisis requiring sustained engagement.
Case against: No specific opposition is typically raised against extending a Special Envoy's term, assuming the role is deemed effective.
Estimated impact: Extends a key diplomatic position for an additional three years, ensuring sustained high-level focus on Sudan.
This section states that the entire Act shall cease to have any force or effect beginning on the date that is 5 years after the date of its enactment.
Sec. 17, page 23
Why it matters:Sunset clauses are common in legislation, especially for measures addressing specific crises or granting extraordinary powers, to ensure periodic review and prevent indefinite application. It's standard practice rather than evasive.
Case for: Proponents would argue that a sunset clause ensures that the Act's provisions, particularly sanctions and reporting requirements, are re-evaluated after five years to determine their continued necessity and effectiveness, preventing outdated policies from persisting indefinitely.
Case against: Critics might argue that a five-year sunset could create uncertainty for long-term policy planning or signal a lack of sustained commitment if the crisis in Sudan is not resolved within that timeframe.
Estimated impact: Limits the duration of all provisions of the Act to five years.