What changed between these versions
A complete substitute amendment. v2 introduces a sunset clause for the entire Act and expands the strategy for post-conflict economic engagement. It also modifies conditions for foreign assistance, sanctions, and bill termination, while adding "residential buildings" to protected infrastructure and "trauma-informed care" to humanitarian protection measures.
Overview
Extensive changes throughout the bill, despite maintaining most section numbers. · v2 fundamentally restructures the bill by replacing the entire text, while also expanding certain policy areas (strategy, UN engagement) and narrowing or clarifying others (sanctions, foreign assistance).
v2 is a complete substitute amendment, replacing the entire operative text of v1. Key changes include the addition of a sunset clause, a new focus on post-conflict economic engagement in the strategy section, and an expanded mandate for UN engagement to include assessing the need to broaden the arms embargo. Modifications also affect the conditions for sanctions, international financial assistance, and the termination of the Act, alongside minor updates to protected infrastructure and humanitarian measures.
Major additions
This new paragraph requires the Secretary of State to develop plans for identifying potential opportunities for United States economic engagement and investment in a post-conflict Sudan and the broader region. This includes assessing private sector investment, mechanisms for U.S. Government support, opportunities to deepen trade and investment with neighboring countries, and how economic engagement can support peace and a transparent economic order.
This addition introduces a forward-looking economic dimension to the U.S. strategy for Sudan, shifting beyond immediate conflict resolution to long-term stability and recovery. It outlines new areas of focus for U.S. diplomatic and development agencies.
This new paragraph requires the United States Mission to the United Nations to assess the need to work with other UN Security Council members to expand the United Nations arms embargo for Sudan.
This addition directs U.S. diplomatic efforts at the UN towards a specific action to strengthen the arms embargo, potentially increasing pressure on parties to the conflict by limiting arms flows.
This new section introduces a sunset clause, stating that the entire Act shall cease to have any force or effect beginning on the date that is 5 years after the date of its enactment.
This is a significant operational change as it places a definitive time limit on the enforceability and requirements of all provisions within the Act, ensuring a review or reauthorization would be necessary after five years.
Deletions
This provision prohibited United States assistance to Sudan if such assistance was 'nonhumanitarian development assistance'.
The deletion removes a restriction on the types of foreign assistance that can be furnished to Sudan. This could allow for the provision of nonhumanitarian development assistance, which was previously prohibited, potentially broadening the scope of U.S. aid in certain circumstances, subject to other remaining prohibitions.
Modifications
This modification explicitly adds 'residential buildings' to the list of civilian infrastructure whose looting, occupation, or destruction constitutes an atrocity or gross human rights violation. This provides more specific criteria for reporting on such violations and highlights the protection of homes.
Before
v1 described atrocities and gross violations of human rights to include 'looting, occupation, or destruction of civilian infrastructure, including religious sites, health facilities, and schools;'.
After
v2 expands this description to include 'looting, occupation, or destruction of civilian infrastructure, including religious sites, health facilities, residential buildings, and schools;'.
This modification adds 'measures to provide trauma-informed care' as a specific component of protection measures within the U.S. strategy. This emphasizes a more comprehensive approach to addressing the humanitarian impact of the conflict, particularly for victims of violence.
Before
v1's strategy for promoting stability and alleviating human suffering included 'securing guarantees for unrestricted humanitarian access to vulnerable populations and the implementation of protection measures, including measures to prevent human trafficking, sexual violence, and the recruitment of child soldiers;'.
After
v2 modifies this to include 'securing guarantees for unrestricted humanitarian access to vulnerable populations and the implementation of protection measures, including measures to provide trauma-informed care and prevent human trafficking, sexual violence, and the recruitment of child soldiers;'.
This modification narrows the conditions under which sanctions can be imposed for the presence of foreign military forces or non-state armed groups. In v2, their presence must also be linked to actions that threaten Sudan's peace, security, stability, or territorial integrity, potentially reducing the number of entities subject to sanctions under this specific criterion.
Before
v1 allowed for sanctions against foreign persons determined to have 'directing, leading, or enabling the presence of foreign military forces or non-state armed groups in Sudan;'.
After
v2 modifies this criterion to 'directing, leading, or enabling the presence of foreign military forces or non-state armed groups in Sudan that have engaged in actions that threaten the peace, security, stability, or territorial integrity of Sudan;'.
This modification expands the types of support that can trigger sanctions to include 'material support' in addition to financial support. This broadens the applicability of sanctions to a wider range of activities that aid the Sudanese Armed Forces or Rapid Support Forces.
Before
v1 allowed for sanctions against foreign persons determined to be 'aiding or abetting Sudanese Armed Forces or Rapid Support Forces by-- (i) providing financial support or a safe haven;'.
After
v2 modifies this criterion to 'aiding or abetting Sudanese Armed Forces or Rapid Support Forces by-- (i) providing financial or material support or a safe haven;'.
This modification refines the types of assistance to be opposed, focusing on 'premature, new, long-term reconstruction or capacity-building support' and explicitly linking opposition to support that would benefit sanctioned entities. This provides more specific guidance for U.S. engagement with international financial institutions, potentially allowing for other forms of assistance not deemed 'premature' or beneficial to malign actors.
Before
v1 instructed the U.S. Executive Director to oppose 'any loan or extension of financial or technical assistance for debt relief and long-term development and reconstruction efforts to the Government of Sudan;'.
After
v2 modifies this instruction to oppose 'any premature, new, long-term reconstruction or capacity-building support for Sudan, including support that would benefit a foreign person or entity described in section 8(a);'.
This modification adds the word 'directly' to the prohibition, meaning that indirect financial or capacity building support to Government of Sudan institutions may now be permissible. This slightly loosens the restriction on foreign assistance.
Before
v1 prohibited United States assistance to Sudan if such assistance 'provides financial or capacity building support to Government of Sudan institutions;'.
After
v2 modifies this prohibition to 'provides financial or capacity building support directly to Government of Sudan institutions;'.
This modification explicitly adds the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) to the list of entities whose cessation of atrocities is required for the termination of certain reporting and assistance requirements of the Act. This broadens the conditions that must be met for the Act's provisions to terminate, placing additional accountability on the RSF.
Before
v1 stated that termination of certain requirements would occur when 'the Sudanese Armed Forces or any other body or institution of the Government of Sudan is no longer committing atrocities.'.
After
v2 modifies this condition to 'the Rapid Support Forces, the Sudanese Armed Forces, and any other body or institution of the Government of Sudan are no longer committing atrocities.'.
Scope
Complete substitute — Changes are scattered throughout the bill, affecting strategy, sanctions, foreign assistance, UN engagement, and the overall duration of the Act. — v2 represents a meaningful expansion in some areas (post-conflict economic strategy, UN arms embargo expansion) and a slight narrowing in others (foreign assistance prohibition), while also introducing a fundamental time limit on the Act's effect. — The addition of the sunset clause in Section 17 interacts with all other provisions of the Act by setting a definitive end date for their enforceability. The modification to Section 10(a)(1) links international financial institution assistance to sanctioned entities under Section 8(a), creating an explicit interaction between these sections.
Impact analysis
Civilians in Sudan, particularly those affected by conflict and humanitarian crises
Gains more explicit protections and support.
v2 explicitly adds "residential buildings" to the list of protected civilian infrastructure in Section 5(b)(1)(D) and "trauma-informed care" to humanitarian protection measures in Section 6(b)(5)(A).
Foreign military forces or non-state armed groups present in Sudan
Potentially less likely to face sanctions if their presence does not directly threaten peace/security.
Section 8(a)(1)(D) in v2 narrows the sanction trigger, requiring that their presence must "have engaged in actions that threaten the peace, security, stability, or territorial integrity of Sudan" for sanctions to apply.
Foreign persons aiding or abetting Sudanese Armed Forces or Rapid Support Forces
Potentially more likely to face sanctions for non-financial forms of support.
Section 8(a)(1)(E)(i) in v2 expands the sanction trigger to include "material support" in addition to financial support or safe haven.
Government of Sudan institutions
Gains more potential avenues for foreign assistance, albeit with the "directly" qualifier.
Section 13(a)(1) in v2 modifies the prohibition on foreign assistance to specify "directly to Government of Sudan institutions," potentially allowing indirect capacity building support. Also, Section 13(a)(2) in v1, which prohibited "nonhumanitarian development assistance," is deleted in v2, removing this restriction.
International financial institutions providing assistance to Sudan
Procedural clarification; may influence the types of projects considered for opposition.
Section 10(a)(1) in v2 refines the instruction to the U.S. Executive Director to oppose "premature, new, long-term reconstruction or capacity-building support for Sudan, including support that would benefit a foreign person or entity described in section 8(a)," rather than the broader "debt relief and long-term development and reconstruction efforts."
The Rapid Support Forces (RSF)
Increased accountability and pressure to cease atrocities for the Act's termination.
Section 15(2) in v2 explicitly adds the Rapid Support Forces to the entities whose cessation of atrocities is required for the termination of certain reporting and assistance requirements of the Act.
All entities and individuals subject to the Act's provisions
All provisions of the Act will cease to have effect after 5 years, creating a definitive end date for its mandates and restrictions.
v2 adds Section 17, a sunset clause, which terminates the entire Act 5 years after its enactment.
United States government agencies involved in Sudan policy and economic engagement
Increased workload and expanded scope of responsibilities related to long-term economic strategy and international arms embargo.
Section 6(b)(7) in v2 adds a new requirement for the Secretary of State to develop plans for identifying opportunities for U.S. economic engagement and investment in post-conflict Sudan and the broader region. Section 12(3) adds a new assessment for the U.S. Mission to the UN regarding expanding the arms embargo.