Unmanned System Command and Control Integration Assessment Act of 2026
- Sponsor
- Sen. McCormick, David [R-PA]
- Committees
- Armed Services Committee (primary)
- Last action
- Jun 24, 2026
Bottom line
This bill aims to modernize the Department of Defense's unmanned system command and control capabilities by leveraging proven open-architecture solutions from allies and partners, with a strong emphasis on cybersecurity, interoperability, and rapid adaptability.
What it actually does
This bill mandates the Secretary of Defense to conduct a comprehensive assessment of open-architecture, unmanned system command and control (C2) frameworks, specifically reviewing systems used by Ukraine and Israel. It requires a detailed report to Congress on the feasibility of incorporating such frameworks into Department of Defense (DoD) unmanned system operations, alongside an implementation roadmap and stringent cybersecurity standards. The assessment must also consider compatibility with existing DoD programs and the domestic small unmanned aircraft systems industrial base.
Proponents argue
Proponents argue this bill is crucial for maintaining a technological edge in unmanned systems, enhancing interoperability with allies, and improving the resilience and adaptability of DoD's C2 systems in contested environments. They emphasize the importance of learning from real-world conflicts and adopting flexible, open architectures to counter evolving threats and integrate new technologies rapidly, thereby ensuring U.S. military superiority.
Opponents contend
Potential opponents might express concerns about the cost and complexity of integrating new, potentially foreign-developed, open-architecture systems with existing classified DoD infrastructure, citing cybersecurity risks and potential intellectual property issues. They might also argue that existing DoD programs are already adequately addressing these needs or that a mandated assessment could divert resources from ongoing development efforts without clear benefits.
The bill is moderately technical but well-structured, allowing an informed reader to understand its core requirements and implications within a reasonable timeframe.
Section 2(a)
Mandated Comprehensive Assessment of Open-Architecture C2 Frameworks
This provision requires the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with various senior DoD officials and agencies, to commence a comprehensive assessment of open-architecture, unmanned system command and control frameworks that have demonstrated operational effectiveness. This assessment must begin within 180 days of the bill's enactment.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue this assessment is a critical first step to identify and adopt best practices for unmanned system C2, ensuring the DoD remains competitive and adaptable in modern warfare.
Critics contend
No specific opposition is typically raised against conducting an assessment, though concerns might arise regarding the scope or potential for bureaucratic delays in its execution.
Tradeoffs
Balancing the need for a thorough, comprehensive assessment with the urgency of modernizing C2 systems in a rapidly evolving threat landscape.
Section 2(b)
Review of Allied and Partner Country C2 Systems
The assessment must specifically review Ukraine's Delta battlefield management and unmanned aircraft systems coordination system, and Israel's Multiple Drone Operating System. For each, it requires analysis of technical architecture, operational effectiveness in contested environments, interoperability lessons, and cybersecurity resilience.
Section 2(c)(4)
Cybersecurity and Future-Proofing Requirements for Assessment
This provision mandates that the assessment include a detailed review of cybersecurity posture, resilience to electronic warfare, and recommendations for a robust cybersecurity standards framework. This framework must be based on NIST Cybersecurity Framework 2.0, incorporate supply chain risk management, data-centric security (including end-to-end encryption and cross-domain solutions), vulnerability disclosure, and Zero Trust Architecture. It also requires assessing how architectures can accommodate future unmanned systems technologies and recommending technology refresh cycles.
Section 3
Establishment of Independent Advisory Panel
This section requires the Secretary of Defense to establish an independent advisory panel, consisting of 10 to 15 members, within 60 days of enactment. The panel must include experts in unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) operations, open-architecture software, cybersecurity, and international UAS C2, to provide independent review and technical guidance to the assessment.
Section 5
Mandatory Cybersecurity Standards for Any Recommended Framework
This section mandates that any unmanned system command and control framework recommended or procured under this Act must employ a modular open systems architecture, apply a supply chain risk management framework, comply with NIST Cybersecurity Framework 2.0, include a vulnerability disclosure policy, and undergo biennial NSA-certified red team penetration testing. It also explicitly prohibits components from entities on the FCC Covered List or DoD Covered Foreign Entity list.
Section 6
Coordination with Existing DoD Programs and Domestic Industrial Base
This provision requires the assessment to ensure compatibility with all current DoD command and control modernization programs of record and to avoid duplication by assessing if existing programs can be extended or adapted. It also mandates that any recommended framework account for the domestic small unmanned aircraft systems industrial base remediation efforts.
Section 7
Information Sharing with the Federal Aviation Administration
This section requires the Secretary of Defense to transmit an unclassified summary of the assessment's findings and recommendations to the FAA Administrator within 30 days of the final report. The summary must focus on open architecture, cybersecurity standards, interoperability, and lessons learned from allied systems relevant to civil UAS traffic management. The FAA is then required to submit a response to Congress within 180 days.
Recommends cybersecurity standards that incorporate robust data-centric security controls, including end-to-end data encryption, data tagging for automated policy enforcement, and accredited cross-domain solutions to prevent compromise between classification levels and to enable secure data interoperability with mission partners.
Section 2(c)(4)(B)(iii)
Why it matters:While technically phrased, its importance for secure data handling across different classification levels and with partners is significant. Its placement is standard for detailed technical specifications within legislation.
Case for: Proponents argue that data-centric security is critical for protecting sensitive information in a distributed, open-architecture environment, especially when operating with allies or across different security domains. It ensures data remains protected regardless of network perimeter breaches.
Case against: Critics might argue that implementing such granular data-centric security, especially with automated policy enforcement and cross-domain solutions, is exceptionally complex and costly, potentially slowing down development and deployment.
Estimated impact: High impact on data security architecture, interoperability, and development costs for any future C2 framework, setting a high bar for data protection.
Prohibits the incorporation of any software, hardware, or service produced, provided, or operated by an entity on the Federal Communications Commission Covered List or the Department of Defense Covered Foreign Entity list into any unmanned system command and control framework developed, procured, or fielded pursuant to this Act.
Section 5(b)
Why it matters:This is a standard national security provision, often placed in technical sections to specify procurement restrictions. Its placement is not necessarily evasive but can be missed by a non-specialist.
Case for: Proponents argue this is essential for national security, preventing hostile foreign governments from embedding backdoors or vulnerabilities into critical defense systems. It strengthens supply chain integrity and reduces reliance on untrusted vendors.
Case against: Some might argue that such broad prohibitions could limit access to potentially superior or more cost-effective technologies from certain global markets, potentially slowing innovation or increasing costs for compliant components.
Estimated impact: Significant impact on the defense supply chain, potentially limiting vendor options and increasing costs for compliant components, but enhancing national security.
Requires the assessment to evaluate mechanisms within each framework reviewed that enable tactical-level operators and commanders to modify, adapt, or extend command and control functionality without depending on centralized software updates or acquisition processes, drawing on documented examples from the conflict in Ukraine where unmanned aircraft systems tactics evolved within weeks.
Section 2(c)(5)(A)
Why it matters:It is a technical requirement for the assessment, but its implications for military doctrine and operational agility are profound. Its placement is typical for detailed study parameters.
Case for: Proponents argue that empowering tactical units with field-level adaptability is vital for maintaining an edge in rapidly evolving combat environments, allowing for quick responses to adversary countermeasures and emergent needs without lengthy acquisition cycles.
Case against: Critics might raise concerns about maintaining security, standardization, and interoperability if tactical units can extensively modify C2 systems, potentially introducing vulnerabilities or creating incompatible variants.
Estimated impact: High impact on operational doctrine, training, and the design philosophy of future DoD C2 systems, promoting agility over rigid standardization.