Fourth Amendment Restoration and Protection Act of 2026
- Sponsor
- Sen. Paul, Rand [R-KY]
- Committees
- Judiciary Committee (primary)
- Last action
- Jul 15, 2026
Bottom line
The bill aims to drastically restrict government surveillance of United States persons under FISA and Executive Order 12333, preventing the use of such intelligence in domestic legal proceedings and reinforcing Fourth Amendment protections.
What it actually does
This bill significantly amends the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA) and limits surveillance activities conducted under Executive Order 12333. It prohibits federal officers from requesting or obtaining orders under FISA to surveil United States persons, conduct physical searches of their property, or use pen registers/trap and trace devices against them. Furthermore, it bans the querying of information collected under FISA Section 702 and Executive Order 12333 using search terms associated with United States persons and prohibits the use of any information concerning a United States person acquired or derived from such surveillance in any criminal, civil, or administrative proceeding or investigation against that person.
Proponents argue
Proponents argue that this bill is essential for restoring and protecting the Fourth Amendment rights of United States citizens against unwarranted government surveillance. They contend that current surveillance authorities, particularly Section 702 of FISA and Executive Order 12333, have been abused to collect and query data on Americans without a warrant, undermining fundamental civil liberties. Supporters believe this legislation would close loopholes that allow intelligence agencies to circumvent constitutional protections and ensure that any surveillance of U.S. persons adheres strictly to warrant requirements or established criminal procedure.
Opponents contend
Opponents typically argue that such broad restrictions would severely cripple the ability of intelligence agencies to gather critical foreign intelligence, counter terrorism, and prevent espionage. They contend that incidental collection of U.S. person data is often unavoidable when targeting foreign adversaries and that prohibiting its use, even if derived, creates dangerous 'walls' that could prevent law enforcement from acting on vital information. Critics suggest that these limitations could endanger national security by making it harder to connect the dots between foreign threats and domestic actors, potentially leaving the nation vulnerable.
The bill is concise and focused, making it accessible for an informed reader to understand its core provisions within a short timeframe.
Section 1
Short Title
This section establishes the official short title of the Act as the 'Fourth Amendment Restoration and Protection Act of 2026'. This title provides a concise and publicly recognizable name for the legislation, reflecting its primary intent to bolster constitutional protections against surveillance.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue that a clear and descriptive short title helps communicate the bill's purpose to the public and emphasizes its focus on constitutional rights.
Critics contend
No specific opposition is typically raised against the short title itself, though opponents of the bill's substance may criticize the title as misleading or overly broad.
Tradeoffs
None inherent in the short title itself, beyond framing the public perception of the bill.
Section 2(a)(1), new Section 901(b) of FISA
Prohibition on FISA Surveillance of United States Persons
This provision explicitly prohibits any officer of the United States from requesting, and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) from ordering, electronic surveillance, physical searches, pen registers, trap and trace devices, or the production of tangible things concerning a United States person under FISA. It also bans the targeting of a United States person for information acquisition. This means FISA authorities, designed for foreign intelligence, cannot be used against U.S. citizens or permanent residents.
Section 2(a)(1), new Section 901(c) of FISA
Prohibition on Queries of Section 702 Data Using United States Person Search Terms
This section prohibits officers of the United States from conducting queries of information collected under FISA Section 702(a) using search terms associated with a United States person. Section 702 allows for the collection of foreign intelligence information from non-U.S. persons located outside the United States, but often incidentally collects communications involving U.S. persons. This provision aims to prevent intelligence agencies from searching this incidentally collected data for information on Americans without a warrant.
Section 2(a)(1), new Section 901(d) of FISA
Limitation on Use of FISA-Acquired Information in Legal Proceedings
This provision generally prohibits the use of any information concerning a United States person, acquired or derived from an acquisition under FISA, as evidence against that person in any criminal, civil, or administrative proceeding or investigation. It includes a broad definition of 'derived' to cover information that would not have been originally possessed but for the acquisition, regardless of claims of attenuation or inevitable discovery. An exception allows an 'aggrieved person' (the target of surveillance) to use such information in their own defense.
Section 2(b)(2)
Exclusive Means for EO 12333 Surveillance of United States Persons
This section mandates that if the target of surveillance under Executive Order 12333 (which governs U.S. intelligence activities abroad) is a United States person, then any physical searches or acquisition of communications content, non-contents information, or business records must exclusively use authorities provided by statute or the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. This means EO 12333 cannot be used as an independent authority to surveil U.S. persons; instead, agencies must rely on domestic legal frameworks like warrants.
Section 2(b)(3)
Limitation on Use of EO 12333-Acquired Information in Legal Proceedings
Similar to the FISA provision, this section prohibits the use of any information concerning a United States person, acquired or derived from an acquisition under Executive Order 12333, as evidence against that person in any criminal, civil, or administrative proceeding or investigation. This extends the exclusionary rule to intelligence gathered under EO 12333, preventing its use in domestic legal contexts against U.S. persons, with an exception for aggrieved persons to use it in their own defense.
Section 2(c)
Rule of Construction Regarding Fourth Amendment Exceptions
This section clarifies that nothing in the bill or its amendments should be construed to abrogate (repeal or annul) existing Supreme Court jurisprudence related to exceptions to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement, including the exigent circumstances exception. This ensures that established legal principles allowing for warrantless searches in specific, urgent situations remain intact, even as the bill tightens surveillance rules.