SEARCH Act of 2026
- Sponsor
- Sen. Klobuchar, Amy [D-MN]
- Committees
- Judiciary Committee (primary)
- Last action
- Jul 15, 2026
Bottom line
The SEARCH Act of 2026 seeks to fundamentally restructure competition in the digital search and advertising markets by imposing strict behavioral and structural remedies on dominant platforms.
What it actually does
This bill aims to curb anti-competitive practices by large online search and digital advertising platforms, termed "covered platforms." It prohibits self-preferencing, exclusive agreements, and conditional access to services. It mandates data sharing with qualified competitors, requires search and ad syndication at marginal cost, and implements user choice screens for default search engines. The bill also enhances advertiser transparency and establishes robust enforcement mechanisms, including significant civil penalties and annual compliance certifications.
Proponents argue
Supporters argue that the bill is essential to restore competition in online search and digital advertising, which they contend are currently dominated by a few large players engaging in anti-competitive practices. They believe it will foster innovation, provide consumers with more choice, and create a fairer playing field for smaller competitors by preventing self-preferencing and mandating data access and syndication. Proponents emphasize that without such intervention, dominant platforms will continue to stifle new entrants and harm consumers through reduced innovation and higher ad prices.
Opponents contend
Opponents might argue that the bill's extensive mandates, particularly regarding data sharing and syndication, could undermine proprietary technology, compromise user privacy, and force platforms to share valuable intellectual property with competitors, thereby disincentivizing innovation. They may also contend that the definition of "covered platform" is overly broad or unfairly targets specific companies, and that the penalties are disproportionately severe. Critics could also raise concerns about the practical challenges and costs of implementing such complex data sharing and choice screen requirements, potentially leading to a degraded user experience or security vulnerabilities.
The bill is moderately complex, requiring careful reading to understand the technical definitions and interconnected provisions. The estimated reading time is appropriate for a thorough review.
Section 3(a)
Ban on Preferential Treatment and Payments for Default Status
This provision prohibits covered platforms from offering payments or incentives to distributors, device makers, or browser developers in exchange for preferential treatment of their own search engines, AI search, or search access points. It also bans payments for making or maintaining their products as defaults, preventing competitor use, or pre-installing their services. This aims to prevent dominant platforms from buying their way into default positions.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue this provision directly addresses a core anti-competitive tactic used by dominant platforms to maintain their market power by buying default status, thereby stifling competition and consumer choice.
Critics contend
Opponents might argue that these payments are legitimate business expenses for distribution and marketing, and that prohibiting them interferes with contractual freedom and could reduce incentives for distributors to innovate.
Tradeoffs
Balances the desire to foster competition by leveling the playing field for distribution against concerns about restricting commercial agreements and potentially impacting revenue streams for device makers and browser developers.
Section 5(a)-(e)
Non-Discriminatory Access to Search Index, User-Side, and Ads Data
This section requires covered platforms to provide qualified competitors with non-discriminatory access to their search index, associated ranking signals, user-side data (with privacy safeguards), and all data used for selecting, ranking, and placing search ads. Data must be provided at marginal cost via API, in machine-readable format, updated weekly, and de-identified to protect individual privacy, ensuring no personally identifying information or ZIP code level location data is shared.
Section 6
Mandatory Licensing of Search Results and Ad Inventory to Competitors
Covered platforms are required to license their search results, ranking signals, and related features (including local, maps, video, images, knowledge panels) to qualified competitors at marginal cost for at least 10 years. Similarly, they must license search ad inventory on a non-discriminatory basis for renewable 1-year periods. This includes technical obligations for API access and protections for competitors regarding usage and data retention, ensuring they can integrate these components into their own products.
Section 8
Mandatory User Choice Screens and Easy Default Switching
This section mandates that covered platforms present users with a neutral choice screen for selecting a default general search engine at initial device setup or account creation, and annually thereafter. Competitors on the screen must be randomly ranked and selected by objective criteria. It also prohibits covered platforms from pre-installing their own search engine as default on new devices and requires easily accessible settings for users to switch defaults, ensuring the process is not materially more difficult than changing the covered platform's own product settings.
Section 3(e)
Mandatory Prior Approval for Mergers and Investments in Relevant Markets
Covered platforms must obtain prior written approval from the Federal Trade Commission for any acquisition, investment, or joint venture involving a competitor in general search, AI search, or search ads. This applies if the transaction exceeds the Clayton Act 7A(a)(2) threshold or, regardless of value, would confer control, material influence, or exclusive/preferential access to a competitor's resources. A 60-day advance notice to state attorneys general is also required for such transactions.
Section 9(f)-(g)
Substantial Civil Penalties and Mandatory Antitrust Training
Covered platforms found in violation of the Act face civil penalties of up to 15% of their United States annual revenue. Additionally, certain high-level employees (chief-level executives, legal department, general counsel/global affairs president, and employees on litigation hold) are required to complete annual 10-hour antitrust and compliance training, with personal civil penalties of up to 10% of their total annual compensation for failure to comply. These measures are intended to provide strong deterrence against anti-competitive behavior.
Defines a "covered platform" as an entity offering search/AI search/search ads in the US, offering through non-exclusively owned platforms, and having monthly active users equal to not less than 40% of the US population over the age of 12.
Section 2(7)
Why it matters:Standard legislative practice to define terms upfront, but the specific threshold determines which companies are subject to the Act.
Case for: Supporters argue this precise definition targets only truly dominant platforms whose market power necessitates intervention, avoiding undue burden on smaller companies.
Case against: Critics might argue the threshold is arbitrary or could capture companies not truly dominant, or that it could be easily gamed by platforms to avoid designation.
Estimated impact: Determines which specific tech giants (likely Google, potentially Microsoft) will be subject to the entire Act.
States that data sharing obligations (Sec. 5(a)-(e)) do not apply if the majority of a covered platform's monthly active users come from a platform, service, device, browser, or operating system not exclusively owned, operated, or controlled by the covered platform.
Section 5(f)
Why it matters:Could be a concession to address concerns about platforms that primarily rely on third-party distribution, or an attempt to narrow the scope of the most burdensome data sharing requirements.
Case for: Supporters might argue this exception prevents unintended consequences for platforms that are not vertically integrated across the entire ecosystem, focusing the data sharing on those with true end-to-end control.
Case against: Critics might argue this creates a loophole that dominant platforms could exploit by strategically shifting user acquisition or by divesting certain assets to fall under this exception, thereby avoiding data sharing.
Estimated impact: Could significantly alter the applicability of data sharing for certain covered platforms, potentially exempting some from the most impactful provisions.
Specifies that remedies for Section 2 of the Sherman Act violations must unfetter markets, terminate illegal monopolies, deny defendants the fruits of violations, and prevent future violations. It also states courts shall not consider effects on markets outside the relevant market of the violation.
Section 10
Why it matters:Standard legislative structure to place enforcement and remedies later, but its impact on judicial discretion in antitrust cases is profound.
Case for: Supporters argue this provision is crucial to ensure that antitrust enforcement leads to effective structural changes and genuinely restores competition, rather than merely imposing fines that do not alter market dynamics.
Case against: Critics might argue this provision unduly constrains judicial discretion, potentially leading to remedies that are overly punitive or have unforeseen negative consequences on broader economic activity.
Estimated impact: Could lead to more aggressive and structural remedies in future antitrust cases against dominant platforms, potentially including divestitures.