Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia Act of 2026
- Sponsor
- Sen. Graham, Darline [R-SC]
- Committees
- Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs Committee (primary)
- Last action
- Jul 16, 2026
Bottom line
The "Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia Act of 2026" aims to severely cripple Russia's economy and its ability to fund military operations by imposing sweeping financial, trade, and energy sanctions, with provisions for congressional oversight on termination.
What it actually does
This bill significantly expands and intensifies sanctions against the Russian Federation, its government officials, financial institutions, state-owned entities, and individuals supporting its defense industrial base or war efforts in Ukraine. It prohibits various financial transactions, investments, and energy exports involving Russia, and imposes duties on Russian imports and on countries that continue to purchase Russian oil/gas or facilitate sanctions evasion.
Proponents argue
Supporters argue that these comprehensive and stringent sanctions are essential to further isolate Russia, degrade its war-making capabilities, and compel it to cease hostilities against Ukraine. They believe the bill closes loopholes in existing sanctions, targets key revenue streams, and holds accountable those who enable Russian aggression, thereby strengthening global security and upholding international law.
Opponents contend
Critics might argue that such broad and aggressive sanctions could have unintended negative consequences, potentially destabilizing global markets, particularly in energy, and harming allied economies that still rely on some Russian resources. They might also contend that these measures could further entrench Russia's government, leading to increased geopolitical tensions without necessarily achieving the desired policy outcomes of ending the conflict in Ukraine.
The bill is moderately long and highly complex, requiring significant time for a thorough review, which may be challenging given typical legislative timelines.
Sec. 102, Title I
Sanctions on Russian Government Officials and Supporters
This section mandates sanctions every 180 days on a wide range of Russian government officials, foreign persons supporting Russia's defense industrial base, oligarchs not opposing the war, and those undermining Ukraine's stability or engaging in transnational crime for Russia. It also targets foreign vessels and their operators used to circumvent sanctions, particularly those transporting Russian energy products without adequate insurance or evading price caps.
Supporters argue
Proponents argue this provision is crucial for directly targeting the individuals and entities most responsible for and benefiting from Russia's aggression, as well as those enabling its war machine. They believe it closes existing loopholes and increases pressure on Russia by disrupting its supply chains and financial networks.
Critics contend
Opponents might argue that such broad targeting could lead to over-compliance, inadvertently harming legitimate businesses or humanitarian efforts, or that it risks escalating tensions without clear strategic benefits. Some may also question the effectiveness of secondary sanctions on foreign entities.
Tradeoffs
Balances the desire for comprehensive pressure on Russia against potential economic blowback on third parties and the administrative burden of extensive enforcement.
Sec. 103, Title I
Sanctions on Russian Financial Institutions
This section mandates sanctions on the Central Bank of Russia, Sberbank, VTB Bank, Gazprombank, and other state-owned Russian financial institutions, along with their subsidiaries. It also imposes secondary sanctions on foreign financial institutions engaging in significant transactions with these sanctioned entities. United States persons are prohibited from transacting with these institutions.
Sec. 104, Title I
Sanctions on State-Owned or Controlled Russian Entities
This section requires the President to review and impose asset-blocking sanctions on any entity where the Russian government has a controlling or majority ownership interest, or that is otherwise affiliated with the Russian government.
Sec. 105, Title I
Prohibition on Fund Transfers to/from Russian Government
This section prohibits U.S. depository institutions, brokers, and dealers from processing fund transfers to or from the Russian government (including state-owned entities) or for the direct/indirect benefit of Russian government officials, with an exception for transactions authorized by specific or general licenses.
Sec. 106, Title I
Delisting of Russian Entities from U.S. Exchanges
This section directs the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to prohibit the trading of securities issued by Russian government officials, affiliated individuals, or entities controlled by or affiliated with the Russian government on national securities exchanges.
Sec. 107, Title I
Ban on U.S. Investment in Russia
This section prohibits new investment in the Russian Federation by U.S. persons, the export of certain services to persons in Russia, and the approval, financing, facilitation, or guarantee by U.S. persons of transactions by foreign persons that would be prohibited if performed by a U.S. person.
Sec. 108, Title I
Ban on Energy Exports to and Investment in Russian Energy Sector
This section prohibits new U.S. investment in Russia's energy sector and the export/reexport of U.S.-produced energy products to Russia. It also mandates sanctions on foreign persons who knowingly facilitate the maintenance or expansion of Russian oil, uranium, natural gas, or coal production for sanctioned entities.
Sec. 109, Title I
Ban on U.S. Purchase of Russian Sovereign Debt
This section immediately prohibits any U.S. person, including financial institutions, from purchasing sovereign debt of the Russian Federation.
Sec. 110, Title I
Sanctions on Financial Messaging Systems Aiding Sanctions Evasion
This section mandates sanctions on entities providing global financial messaging services if they are knowingly used to circumvent sanctions imposed under this Act. It also allows for waivers if the entity is subject to a comparable foreign sanctions regime or provides significant services to U.S. financial institutions.
Sec. 111, Title I
Ban on Russian Uranium Imports and Sanctions on Rosatom
This section requires the President to implement existing prohibitions on uranium imports from Russia, including Rosatom. It also mandates sanctions on leaders, officials, and principal shareholders of Rosatom or its subsidiaries every 180 days, starting from a specific date in existing law.
Sec. 112, Title I
Increased Duties on Russian Imports
This section mandates an increase in the rate of duty for all goods imported into the U.S. from Russia, including energy products, to a rate of up to 500 percent ad valorem. These duties are in addition to any other applicable duties or charges.
Sec. 113, Title I
Duties on Countries Supporting Russian Energy or Sanctions Evasion
This section mandates duties of up to 100 percent ad valorem on goods imported from countries that are among the top 5 largest importers of Russian crude oil or natural gas, or among the top 5 countries facilitating Russian oil sanctions evasion. The USTR can adjust these rates based on a country's actions to increase or decrease Russian energy purchases. An exception exists for natural gas imports below a certain threshold if the country is reducing its reliance.
Sec. 114, Title I
Sanctions Exceptions
This section outlines several exceptions to the sanctions, including for humanitarian assistance (food, medicine, medical devices), intelligence and law enforcement activities, compliance with international obligations (e.g., UN Headquarters Agreement), civilian nuclear cooperation agreements, certain low-enriched uranium imports, official U.S. government/UN business, non-Russian oil transiting Russia, existing general licenses, winddown operations (for 270 days), and activities of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA).
Sec. 115, Title I
Presidential Waiver Authority
This section grants the President authority to waive the application of any sanction, restriction, or duty under this title, provided a written certification is submitted to Congress stating the waiver is in the national interests of the United States, along with a report explaining the basis.
Sec. 117, Title I
Sanctions Termination with Congressional Review
This section allows the President to terminate sanctions if Russia signs a peace agreement with Ukraine and ceases hostilities, or if other sanctioned foreign persons/countries cease their sanctionable activities and provide assurances. Any termination is subject to a 30-day (or 60-day during specific periods) congressional review period, during which Congress can pass a joint resolution of disapproval, requiring a three-fifths vote in both chambers to pass.
This definition expands the term "Armed Forces of the Russian Federation" to include not only traditional military branches but also the Federal Security Service (FSB), Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), cyber actors, and any successor entities or proxies.
Sec. 101(4)
Why it matters:Standard legislative practice to define terms upfront, but the breadth of this definition has significant operative impact on who is targeted by sanctions.
Case for: Proponents argue that modern warfare involves more than just traditional military units, and including intelligence services and cyber actors is essential to effectively target all facets of Russia's aggressive capabilities.
Case against: Critics might argue that such a broad definition could lead to overreach in sanctions, potentially targeting individuals or entities with tangential connections, and increasing the complexity of compliance.
Estimated impact: Significantly expands the universe of entities and individuals whose transactions with foreign persons could trigger secondary sanctions.
This subsection allows the President to use sanctions imposed by the UK, EU, G7, or Five Eyes intelligence alliance as "prima facie evidence" that a vessel is being used to circumvent Russian sanctions.
Sec. 102(c)
Why it matters:This is a tactical maneuver to streamline the U.S. sanctions process by leveraging the findings of allied nations, reducing the burden of independent investigation for the U.S.
Case for: Proponents argue this provision enhances efficiency and coordination with allies, allowing for quicker and more consistent enforcement of sanctions against Russia's shadow fleet.
Case against: Critics might argue that relying on allied determinations could potentially lead to U.S. sanctions being imposed based on criteria or evidence not fully vetted by U.S. authorities, raising due process concerns.
Estimated impact: Potentially accelerates and broadens the application of U.S. sanctions on vessels involved in Russian oil trade.
This rule of construction clarifies that U.S. or foreign financial institutions holding immobilized Russian sovereign assets are not required to return any interest earned on those assets to the Russian Federation, distinguishing it from interest earned on blocked assets of other persons.
Sec. 103(e)(1)
Why it matters:This provision subtly reinforces the policy of retaining interest on Russian sovereign assets, a politically sensitive topic with significant financial implications, without making it a standalone, explicit prohibition.
Case for: Proponents argue this ensures that Russia does not benefit from interest accrued on assets frozen due to its aggression, potentially paving the way for these funds to be used for Ukraine's reconstruction.
Case against: Critics might argue that this could set a precedent for the expropriation of sovereign assets, potentially undermining international law principles regarding sovereign immunity and the stability of the global financial system.
Estimated impact: Confirms the U.S. policy stance on the disposition of interest from billions in immobilized Russian sovereign assets.
This clause specifies that approval by the Senate of a joint resolution of disapproval (to block a presidential termination of sanctions) shall require the affirmative vote of three-fifths of Members of the Senate, duly chosen and sworn. A similar provision exists for the motion to proceed to consideration (Sec. 117(c)(4)(C)).
Sec. 117(c)(4)(F)
Why it matters:This is a tactical maneuver to make it significantly harder for Congress to block a presidential decision to lift sanctions. While appearing to grant Congress oversight, the supermajority threshold effectively empowers the President.
Case for: Proponents might argue that this threshold ensures that sanctions are only terminated when there is broad consensus, reflecting the gravity of the decision, and prevents a simple majority from easily overturning a presidential foreign policy decision.
Case against: Critics would argue that this supermajority requirement effectively neuters congressional oversight, making it nearly impossible for Congress to prevent a President from lifting sanctions, even if a majority of both chambers disagree.
Estimated impact: Significantly shifts the balance of power towards the executive branch regarding the termination of these sanctions.