Real Courts, Rule of Law Act of 2026
- Sponsor
- Sen. Gillibrand, Kirsten E. [D-NY]
- Committees
- Judiciary Committee (primary)
- Last action
- Jul 22, 2026
Bottom line
This bill fundamentally reforms the U.S. immigration adjudication system by moving immigration courts from the executive branch to an independent Article I judicial body, aiming to enhance judicial independence and due process.
What it actually does
This bill establishes the United States Immigration Courts as an independent Article I court of record, separate from the executive branch. It creates appellate, trial, and administrative divisions, outlines judicial appointments, terms, salaries, and retirement, and transfers jurisdiction from the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) to this new court system. It also mandates new procedural safeguards, including a right to counsel and qualified interpreters.
Proponents argue
Proponents argue that moving immigration courts out of the Department of Justice ensures judicial independence, free from political influence and shifting executive priorities, thereby strengthening due process rights for immigrants and enhancing the fairness and integrity of the system. They contend that this structural change will professionalize the judiciary, attract highly qualified judges, and improve public trust in immigration adjudications.
Opponents contend
Opponents might argue that creating a new Article I court system is an unnecessary and costly bureaucratic expansion that could slow down immigration proceedings, complicate enforcement efforts, and potentially lead to inconsistent legal interpretations. They may also contend that the current system, while imperfect, allows for greater executive control over immigration policy, which is essential for national security and border management.
The bill is substantial and requires careful reading to understand its structural and procedural changes, which may exceed the time typically allotted for legislative review.
Sec. 2, adding INA Sec. 601(a)
Establishment of Independent Article I Immigration Courts
This provision establishes the United States Immigration Courts as an independent court of record under Article I of the Constitution, explicitly stating it is not an agency of the executive branch. It divides the courts into appellate, trial, and administrative divisions, aiming to separate immigration adjudication from executive control.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue this is the core reform needed to ensure impartiality and protect due process, as judges will no longer be employees of the agency responsible for prosecuting immigration cases.
Critics contend
Critics may argue that this move complicates the executive branch's ability to manage immigration policy and enforcement, potentially leading to slower adjudications and less responsive policy implementation.
Tradeoffs
Balances judicial independence and due process concerns against executive branch control over immigration enforcement and policy.
Sec. 2, adding INA Sec. 601(b)(2), (c)(2) and Sec. 602
Presidential and Appellate Division Appointment of Judges with Fixed Terms
Immigration appeals judges are appointed by the President with Senate consent for 15-year terms, while trial judges are appointed by the appellate division for 15-year terms. Judges receive salaries comparable to federal district court judges and have specific qualifications, removal grounds (incapacity, misconduct, neglect of duty, practice of law), and retirement provisions.
Sec. 2, adding INA Sec. 604
Expanded Jurisdiction for Appellate and Trial Divisions
The appellate division gains jurisdiction over appeals from trial judges, certain DHS petition decisions, and disciplinary matters. The trial division receives original jurisdiction over removal proceedings, rescissions of LPR status, credible/reasonable fear reviews, asylum applications referred by DHS, bond/custody determinations, and review of unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed administrative actions.
Sec. 2, adding INA Subtitle B (Sec. 621-625)
Enhanced Procedural Rules, Right to Counsel, and Information Availability
Establishes rules for proceedings, including de novo review of constitutional claims, contempt authority for judges, and assistance from U.S. Marshals. It mandates rules for attorney representation, professional conduct, and disciplinary proceedings. It also requires a legal orientation program, qualified interpreters, and public access to precedent and non-precedent decisions (with confidentiality protections).
Sec. 6
Transition of Existing Immigration Judges and Cases
The bill outlines a transition period, redesignating existing EOIR immigration judges as "interim immigration trial judges" for up to 5 years. These interim judges can exercise full powers and their service counts for benefits. It also sets staggered terms for the first appellate judges and provides for the transfer of all pending cases from EOIR to the new courts.
Applies Section 455 of title 28, United States Code, which governs disqualification of federal judges, to all immigration judges and proceedings of the Immigration Courts.
Sec. 2, adding INA Sec. 621(f)
Why it matters:This is standard legislative practice to incorporate existing legal standards by reference rather than re-writing them in full.
Case for: Supporters would argue this ensures the highest ethical standards and impartiality for immigration judges, aligning them with Article III federal judges and preventing conflicts of interest.
Case against: No specific opposition is typically raised against applying standard judicial recusal rules, as it is a fundamental aspect of judicial ethics.
Estimated impact: Ensures fairness and integrity in all immigration court proceedings by requiring judges to recuse themselves in cases where their impartiality might be questioned.
The budget of the United States Immigration Courts shall be established by the Immigration Courts, without review or modification by the executive branch, and included in the President's budget submission to Congress.
Sec. 4(a)
Why it matters:This is a critical detail for true judicial independence, often placed in administrative sections. It's not necessarily "buried" to hide it, but its significance might be overlooked.
Case for: Proponents argue this is essential for genuine independence, preventing the executive branch from using budgetary leverage to influence judicial decisions or operations.
Case against: Critics might argue that it reduces executive accountability for overall immigration system costs and could lead to less coordinated resource allocation across government immigration functions.
Estimated impact: Provides the new courts with significant financial autonomy, reinforcing their separation from the executive branch.
Grants the trial division original jurisdiction to review whether administrative actions arising from applications or petitions filed by or on behalf of an alien, and pending during removal proceedings, have been unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed. Immigration judges are also compelled to act on such claims.
Sec. 2, adding INA Sec. 604(b)(1)(F) and Sec. 625(a)(2)
Why it matters:While important, it's a specific type of judicial review that fits within the broader jurisdictional framework rather than being a standalone, prominently featured section.
Case for: Supporters argue this is a crucial mechanism for accountability, allowing the courts to address systemic delays and inaction by executive agencies that can severely impact individuals' lives.
Case against: Critics might argue this could lead to increased litigation against DHS and other agencies, potentially further burdening the courts and diverting resources from core enforcement functions.
Estimated impact: Provides a new avenue for judicial oversight of administrative efficiency and timeliness in immigration matters, potentially reducing backlogs and improving responsiveness.