BOASBERG Act
- Sponsor
- Sen. Schmitt, Eric [R-MO]
- Committees
- Judiciary Committee (primary)
- Last action
- Jul 28, 2026
Bottom line
The BOASBERG Act aims to eliminate 'judge shopping' and enhance judicial impartiality by enforcing rigorous random case assignment across federal courts, with a novel mechanism for Supreme Court-mandated reassignments.
What it actually does
This bill mandates strict random assignment procedures for all civil cases in federal district courts, for judges to panels and panels to cases in circuit courts, and for judges to three-judge district courts. It prohibits judges from declining assignments and limits reassignment exceptions to specific circumstances like recusal or judicial efficiency. Crucially, it introduces a new provision requiring case reassignment in district courts if the Supreme Court vacates or reverses certain lower court judgments or orders.
Proponents argue
Proponents argue that the bill is essential to restore public confidence in the impartiality of the federal judiciary by preventing any perception or reality of 'judge shopping' or undue influence in case assignments. They contend that strict randomization ensures fairness and that the Supreme Court intervention mechanism provides a necessary check on lower court rulings that are repeatedly overturned or deemed erroneous.
Opponents contend
Opponents might argue that while the intent to promote impartiality is laudable, the bill's strictures could unduly limit judicial discretion necessary for efficient court administration, particularly in complex cases or those requiring specialized expertise. Concerns could also be raised about the administrative burden of implementing and reporting on these new rules, and the potential for the Supreme Court intervention clause to create new avenues for procedural litigation.
The bill is relatively short and clearly structured, making it accessible for an informed reader to understand its core provisions within a reasonable timeframe.
Section 3, amending 28 U.S.C. 137(c)
Mandatory Random Assignment in District Courts
This provision requires all federal district courts to adopt rules mandating the random assignment of all civil cases. It explicitly states that no party, attorney, or judge (including a chief judge) may select, direct, or influence case assignments. It also prohibits judges from declining assigned cases and sets strict rules for chief judges regarding self-assignment.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue this provision is crucial for preventing 'judge shopping' and ensuring that all litigants receive an impartial hearing, thereby bolstering public trust in the judiciary. It standardizes a practice that is often assumed but not always strictly enforced.
Critics contend
Some might argue that while random assignment is generally good, overly rigid rules could hinder judicial efficiency, especially in districts where certain judges specialize in particular types of complex litigation or where consolidation of related cases is beneficial.
Tradeoffs
The provision balances the goal of absolute impartiality through randomization against the administrative flexibility courts might need for efficient docket management and specialized case handling.
Section 3, amending 28 U.S.C. 137(d)
Supreme Court-Mandated Reassignment for Erroneous Rulings
This section introduces a novel requirement: if the Supreme Court takes specific actions, such as vacating or reversing a district court's judgment or injunction, issuing an extraordinary writ, or granting a stay or injunction that the district court declined, the case must be randomly reassigned to a different district judge. If no judge is available in the same district, it moves to another judge within the circuit.
Section 4, amending 28 U.S.C. 46(b)
Randomized Panel and Case Assignments in Circuit Courts
This section extends the principle of random assignment to federal circuit courts. It requires rules for the random assignment of judges to appellate panels and for panels to specific cases or controversies. Similar to district courts, it prohibits influence over assignments, limits reassignment exceptions, and mandates transparency through public posting of rules and annual statistical reports.
Section 5, amending 28 U.S.C. Chapter 155 (2284, 2285)
Random Assignment for Three-Judge District Courts
This section mandates random assignment procedures for judges designated to serve on three-judge district courts, which are typically convened for specific types of cases like those challenging the constitutionality of state or federal laws. It mirrors the rules for single-judge district courts and circuit courts, including exceptions for reassignment, rules for chief judges, and transparency requirements.
This subsection mandates the random reassignment of a case from its original district judge if the Supreme Court takes specific actions, such as vacating or reversing a judgment or injunction, issuing an extraordinary writ, or granting a stay or injunction that the district court had declined. The reassignment occurs within the district or, if necessary, within the circuit.
Section 3, amending 28 U.S.C. 137(d)
Why it matters:The detailed list of Supreme Court actions is necessary for legal precision, but its placement within a broader section on district court assignments means its significant implications for judicial accountability and Supreme Court power might not immediately stand out.
Case for: Proponents argue this is a vital mechanism for judicial accountability, ensuring that judges whose decisions are repeatedly found to be erroneous by the Supreme Court do not continue to preside over the same case, thereby preventing perceived bias or judicial overreach.
Case against: Critics might argue this provision could be seen as an unprecedented intrusion into lower court administration by the Supreme Court, potentially undermining judicial independence. It could also incentivize litigants to pursue appeals primarily to trigger a reassignment rather than for substantive legal reasons, increasing the Supreme Court's workload.
Estimated impact: This provision introduces a significant new procedural consequence for specific Supreme Court appellate actions, potentially altering litigation strategies and the relationship between the Supreme Court and lower federal courts.
These subparagraphs prohibit district and circuit courts from publicly posting or disclosing any rules, orders, policies, or plans regarding the identity of the judge or panel on-call for emergencies. This is an exception to the general transparency requirement for case assignment rules.
Section 3, amending 28 U.S.C. 137(c)(5)(C) and Section 4, amending 28 U.S.C. 46(b)(8)(C)
Why it matters:The purpose of this specific prohibition is stated as 'To prevent circumvention of random case assignment.' It's a technical detail designed to close a potential loophole, which is a common reason for such provisions to be placed within detailed procedural rules.
Case for: Proponents argue that this specific non-disclosure is essential to prevent sophisticated litigants or attorneys from attempting to 'game the system' by timing their emergency filings to coincide with a known 'on-call' judge or panel, thereby undermining the randomized assignment principle.
Case against: Critics might argue that any non-disclosure, even for a stated purpose, reduces overall transparency in judicial administration. While the intent is to prevent circumvention, it could be perceived as creating a less open system for emergency assignments.
Estimated impact: This provision aims to prevent a specific type of 'judge shopping' related to emergency filings, thereby reinforcing the integrity of the random assignment system for a subset of cases.