NO PROFIT Act
- Sponsor
- Sen. Warner, Mark R. [D-VA]
- Committees
- Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs Committee (primary)
- Last action
- Aug 3, 2026
Bottom line
The NO PROFIT Act aims to prevent insider trading based on early access to information from government officials' social media, by penalizing both traders and social media platforms that facilitate such access.
What it actually does
This bill prohibits individuals from trading securities, commodities, or speculative market contracts while aware of nonpublic, material information obtained through 'prioritized access' to social media accounts controlled by government officials or their family members. It also makes it unlawful for social media platforms to knowingly offer or provide such prioritized access to communications from these accounts.
Proponents argue
Supporters argue this bill enhances market fairness and integrity by closing a potential loophole that allows privileged individuals to profit from early access to government-related information disseminated via social media. It ensures all investors have equal access to material information, preventing unfair advantages and restoring public trust in financial markets and government transparency.
Opponents contend
Opponents might argue that the bill's definitions of 'prioritized access' and 'covered social media account' are overly broad, potentially chilling legitimate communication or creating undue compliance burdens for social media platforms. Concerns could also be raised about the practical enforceability of determining 'awareness' of prioritized information and the potential for unintended consequences on public information dissemination.
The bill is relatively short and clearly structured, making it accessible for an informed reader to understand its core provisions within a reasonable timeframe.
Section 3(a)
Prohibition on Trading While Aware of Prioritized Covered Information
This section makes it illegal for any person to buy, sell, or engage in transactions involving securities, commodities, or contracts in speculative information markets if they are aware of material, nonpublic information obtained through 'prioritized access' to a government official's social media account, and this information is not yet generally available. It also prohibits directing others to make such transactions or communicating this information to someone likely to trade on it.
Supporters argue
Proponents argue this provision directly addresses the unfair advantage that can arise when certain individuals receive early access to market-moving information from government sources, thereby leveling the playing field for all investors.
Critics contend
Opponents might argue that proving 'awareness' of prioritized access and the 'materiality' of information could be challenging, leading to subjective enforcement and potentially chilling legitimate information gathering.
Tradeoffs
Balances the desire for market fairness and preventing insider trading against potential difficulties in enforcement and the risk of over-regulating information flow.
Section 3(c)
Breach of Duty Not Required for Violation
This subsection clarifies that a violation of the trading prohibition does not require proof that the prioritized covered information was obtained or communicated through a breach of a fiduciary duty or any other duty of trust or confidence. This significantly broadens the scope of what constitutes illegal trading compared to traditional insider trading laws.
Section 3(d) and 3(e)
Enforcement by SEC and CFTC
These subsections grant enforcement authority to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) for violations involving securities and security-based swaps, and to the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) for violations involving commodities, futures, options, and swaps, and speculative information market contracts. Violations are treated as violations of existing statutes (Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Commodity Exchange Act, respectively), allowing these agencies to use their established enforcement powers and remedies.
Section 4(a)(1)
Prohibition on Prioritized Access by Social Media Platforms
This provision makes it unlawful for social media platforms to knowingly offer, provide, sell, license, or otherwise make available 'prioritized access' to communications issued through 'covered social media accounts.' This directly targets platforms that might create or facilitate systems allowing certain users to receive government-related information before the general public.
Section 4(a)(2)
Exceptions to Prioritized Access Prohibition
This subsection outlines several exceptions to the prohibition on social media platforms providing prioritized access. These include algorithmic content ranking, content delivery based on user interest (at no additional cost), prioritized access for public health/safety emergencies (without third-party fees), and programmatic/API/data-licensing access, provided such access is non-discriminatory, does not make information available before general availability, and does not confer timing advantages conditioned on fees or restricted membership.
Section 4(b)
Civil Penalties for Social Media Platforms
A social media platform that violates the prohibition on offering prioritized access is subject to a civil penalty equal to the total revenue received by the platform for the prioritized access that caused the violation. The Attorney General is authorized to bring civil actions to recover these penalties.
Defines "prioritized access" as any service, arrangement, or functionality that allows a person to receive, access, view, or become aware of a communication from a covered social media account before it is generally available, or on materially different terms (timing, latency, delivery, format, etc.) than other users, unless for non-discriminatory accessibility accommodations.
Section 2(12) - Definition of "Prioritized Access"
Why it matters:Standard legislative practice to define terms upfront, but the specificity here means the core prohibition's reach is entirely dependent on this definition.
Case for: Supporters would argue that a precise and comprehensive definition is essential to prevent circumvention of the bill's intent, ensuring that all forms of preferential access are covered.
Case against: Critics might argue that the definition is overly broad or technically complex, potentially capturing legitimate data services or inadvertently restricting platform functionalities that are not intended to create unfair trading advantages.
Estimated impact: This definition directly determines the scope of both the trading prohibition and the platform prohibition, making it foundational to the bill's effectiveness.
Defines "covered government official" to include the President, Vice President, Members of Congress, congressional employees, executive branch employees, judicial officers, and judicial employees. Crucially, it also includes individuals from these categories for a 180-day period after they separate from their position.
Section 2(4) - Definition of "Covered Government Official"
Why it matters:Standard legislative practice, but the post-service extension is a substantive policy choice.
Case for: Proponents would argue that the 180-day post-service period is vital to prevent former officials from immediately leveraging previously established preferential access or information channels for personal financial gain, ensuring a cooling-off period.
Case against: Some might argue that extending the prohibition beyond active service could be seen as an overreach, potentially impacting former officials' ability to transition to private sector roles or engage in public discourse.
Estimated impact: Expands the scope of individuals whose social media accounts are subject to the bill's restrictions, and who are themselves subject to the trading prohibition post-service.
Defines "covered social media account" broadly to include accounts owned, operated, maintained, directed, or controlled by a covered government official, a covered family member, someone acting on their behalf, or a Federal agency. It also includes accounts used by or on behalf of these individuals/entities to communicate with the public.
Section 2(5) - Definition of "Covered Social Media Account"
Why it matters:Standard legislative practice, but the broad scope is a key policy decision.
Case for: Supporters would argue that this broad definition is necessary to prevent circumvention, ensuring that officials cannot use proxies or family members to create channels for prioritized information release.
Case against: Critics might argue that including "covered family members" or "on behalf of" clauses could create an overly burdensome or intrusive regulatory environment, potentially impacting private communications or requiring extensive monitoring.
Estimated impact: Significantly expands the universe of social media accounts subject to the bill's prohibitions, making it harder to evade the intent of the law.