DEFEND IP Act
- Sponsor
- Sen. Tillis, Thomas [R-NC]
- Committees
- Judiciary Committee (primary)
- Last action
- Sep 24, 2026
Bottom line
This bill creates a judicial mechanism for U.S. intellectual property rights holders to compel U.S. internet service providers to block access to foreign websites found to be primarily engaged in digital piracy.
What it actually does
This bill establishes a new judicial process allowing intellectual property rights holders to petition a U.S. district court to designate foreign online locations as "foreign digital piracy sites." Once designated, rights holders can seek subsequent court orders directing U.S. broadband and public DNS service providers to take reasonable measures to prevent U.S. users from accessing these sites. The bill outlines requirements for these orders, service provider obligations, immunities, and cost recovery mechanisms.
Proponents argue
Supporters argue this bill provides a crucial tool for intellectual property rights holders to combat rampant online piracy originating from foreign jurisdictions, where U.S. legal remedies are often ineffective. They contend it protects American creators, industries, and jobs by disrupting the financial models of pirate sites and ensuring that U.S. service providers are not inadvertently facilitating illegal activity. The judicial oversight and service provider immunities are presented as safeguards.
Opponents contend
Critics might argue that this bill could lead to internet censorship, raise concerns about due process for foreign site operators, and potentially create a "splinternet" where access to information is fragmented. They may also contend that it places an undue burden on service providers and could lead to overblocking legitimate content, while sophisticated pirate sites may easily circumvent blocking measures.
The bill is moderately complex but manageable for an informed reader within a reasonable timeframe, allowing for a substantive evaluation of its provisions.
Section 2(a), inserting new 17 U.S.C. 502A(a)
Definitions for Foreign Digital Piracy Sites and Service Providers
This section defines key terms like "broadband provider" (over 50,000 subscribers), "foreign digital piracy site" (designated by court order), "foreign online location" (outside U.S., identifiable by IP/domain), "live event" (public performance, commercial purpose), "public domain name resolution services" (over $100M annual revenue), and "service provider" (broadband or public DNS provider, with specific exclusions like VPNs or coffee shops).
Supporters argue
Clear definitions are essential for the effective and fair implementation of the law, ensuring that only relevant entities are targeted and that the scope of the bill is well-understood.
Critics contend
Critics might argue that the definitions, particularly for "service provider," are too broad or too narrow, potentially capturing unintended entities or allowing significant loopholes.
Tradeoffs
Balancing the need for broad applicability to combat piracy with the desire to avoid over-regulating smaller entities or those not directly involved in facilitating access.
Section 2(a), inserting new 17 U.S.C. 502A(b)
Process for Court Designation of Piracy Sites
Allows IP rights holders to petition a U.S. district court to designate a foreign online location as a "foreign digital piracy site." The court must find that the petitioner's rights are likely violated, irreparable harm will occur, the petitioner attempted to notify the site operator, and the operator is outside the U.S. The site must also be primarily designed for, have no significant purpose other than, or be intentionally marketed for, IP infringement. The site operator has 20 days to contest, submit to U.S. jurisdiction, post a bond, and cease activity to avoid designation. Orders expire after 360 days or with subsequent orders.
Section 2(a), inserting new 17 U.S.C. 502A(c)
Orders Directing Service Providers to Block Access
After a site is designated, the petitioner can seek a second order directing identified service providers to take reasonable measures to prevent U.S. users from accessing the site. Courts consider burdens on service providers, harm to petitioners, technical feasibility, interference with legitimate content, public interest, and availability of less burdensome means. Orders last one year, require petitioners to verify site info, and allow service providers to contest inclusion. Service providers can also move for cost recovery.
Section 2(a), inserting new 17 U.S.C. 502A(d)
Requirements and Allowances for Service Providers
Service providers must take reasonable measures to prevent U.S. users from accessing designated sites. They may inform subscribers of denied access. They are not in violation if they temporarily suspend compliance for reasons like correcting interference with legitimate sites, maintaining network integrity, upgrading infrastructure, or responding to security threats.
Section 2(a), inserting new 17 U.S.C. 502A(e)
Protection for Service Providers Implementing Orders
Service providers are immune from liability for good faith actions (or inactions) taken to implement a court order or based on information provided by the petitioner. This immunity applies against claims from users, petitioners, site operators, or other third parties, even if the site was inaccurately identified. This does not limit a court's authority to compel compliance.
Section 2(a), inserting new 17 U.S.C. 502A(f) and (g)
Court Oversight and Adaptability of Blocking Orders
Service provider compliance is subject to court review, but providers are not required to conduct affirmative investigations into the accuracy of site information. If a service provider accidentally blocks a legitimate site, the operator of that site can move to modify or rescind the order. Courts can amend orders if a designated piracy site moves to a new domain/IP or uses circumvention techniques, and must provide notice of such amendments.
The definition of "service provider" explicitly excludes entities providing DNS resolution exclusively through encrypted DNS protocols, virtual private network (VPN) services, and premises operators (like coffee shops, libraries, universities) that provide internet access to patrons.
Section 2(a), new 17 U.S.C. 502A(a)(6)(B)
Why it matters:Standard legislative practice to define scope and exclusions precisely.
Case for: Proponents would argue these exclusions are crucial to avoid unintended consequences, such as forcing VPNs to compromise user privacy or burdening small businesses that merely offer Wi-Fi. It focuses the bill on the primary infrastructure providers.
Case against: Opponents might argue that excluding VPNs creates a significant loophole, as users could simply use VPNs to bypass blocking orders, rendering the entire system less effective. They might also contend that encrypted DNS providers could still facilitate access to piracy.
Estimated impact: Significantly narrows the scope of entities directly subject to blocking orders, potentially impacting the overall effectiveness of the bill if circumvention via excluded services becomes widespread.
An order directing service providers to block access must expressly require the petitioner (IP rights holder) to use reasonable, good-faith efforts to verify on an ongoing basis the accuracy of information regarding the foreign digital piracy site (e.g., domain names, IP addresses) and to provide updated information to the court and service providers if it materially changes.
Section 2(a), new 17 U.S.C. 502A(c)(5)(C)
Why it matters:This is a crucial operational detail that ensures the blocking orders remain accurate and do not inadvertently target legitimate sites, but it's not a headline provision.
Case for: Proponents would highlight this as a key safeguard, placing the responsibility for accuracy squarely on the party with the most to gain from the blocking order. This minimizes the risk of overblocking and protects service providers.
Case against: Critics might argue that "reasonable, good-faith efforts" is too vague and could still allow for insufficient diligence, especially given the service provider's immunity for relying on this information. The burden of ongoing monitoring could also be significant for petitioners.
Estimated impact: Shifts the primary responsibility for maintaining the accuracy of blocking targets from service providers to rights holders, potentially increasing costs for rights holders but reducing liability for service providers.