Electric Grid Supply Chain Security Act
- Sponsor
- Sen. Banks, Jim [R-IN]
- Committees
- Armed Services Committee (primary)
- Last action
- Sep 29, 2026
Bottom line
This bill aims to enhance national security by compelling the Department of Defense to actively counter foreign adversary influence in the U.S. electric grid's supply chain through a structured remediation plan.
What it actually does
This bill mandates the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with U.S. Northern Command and military departments, and in consultation with the Secretary of Energy, to develop and submit a plan within 180 days of enactment. The plan must identify, prioritize, and remediate covered equipment and computational facilities owned or controlled by foreign adversaries within the U.S. electric grid, with a focus on risks to military installations and defense critical electric infrastructure.
Proponents argue
Proponents argue that the bill is a critical national security measure, addressing a significant vulnerability in the nation's essential infrastructure. They emphasize the growing threat from foreign adversaries seeking to disrupt or compromise the electric grid, which could have catastrophic consequences for military operations, critical infrastructure, and civilian life. The bill's focus on DoD leadership ensures a military-centric approach to protecting defense assets.
Opponents contend
Opponents might argue that the bill oversteps DoD's traditional role into civilian infrastructure, potentially duplicating efforts by the Department of Energy and other agencies like CISA. Concerns could be raised about the cost and feasibility of a comprehensive remediation plan, potential disruptions to grid operations, and the broad definitions of "covered equipment" and "foreign adversary" which could lead to unintended consequences or overreach.
The bill is concise and relatively easy to read, allowing for a quick understanding of its core directives.
Section 1
Short Title
This section establishes the official short title of the Act as the "Electric Grid Supply Chain Security Act," providing a common and concise reference name for the legislation.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue that a clear and descriptive short title helps in easily identifying and discussing the bill's purpose, making legislative processes more efficient.
Critics contend
No specific opposition is typically raised against short title provisions as they are standard legislative practice.
Section 2(a)
Secretary of Defense Plan for Electric Grid Remediation
This provision mandates the Secretary of Defense to submit a plan within 180 days of enactment. The plan, developed in coordination with U.S. Northern Command and military departments, and in consultation with the Secretary of Energy, must outline how to identify, prioritize, and remediate foreign adversary-controlled equipment and computational facilities in the U.S. electric grid, adhering to specific defense standards.
Section 2(b)
Required Components of the Remediation Plan
This section details the specific requirements for the plan. It must include an assessment of risks to national defense (military installations, critical missions, bulk-power system), criteria for prioritizing remediation based on risk to military operations, and a remediation strategy. The strategy must cover removal/replacement of covered equipment, incorporation of secure alternatives, and minimizing disruption to grid operations, coordinated with State governments.
Section 2(d)
Annual Budget for Plan Execution
Starting in fiscal year 2028, and annually thereafter, the Commander of the United States Northern Command is required to submit an annual budget estimate to the Secretary of Defense and the congressional defense committees. This budget will detail the funding necessary to execute the remediation plan.
Section 2(e)
Definitions of "Covered Equipment" and "Covered Computational Facility"
This section defines key terms. "Covered equipment" includes any equipment that is capable of network connection, remotely accessible, or susceptible to unauthorized access, and is directly or indirectly connected to the grid or military installation electric systems. "Covered computational facility" means a facility operating computing equipment for continuous computational operations, with the Secretary of Defense mandated to issue and annually update guidance to further define this term.
Defines "covered computational facility" as a facility operating computing equipment in support of continuous, automated computational operations, with the Secretary of Defense required to issue and annually update guidance to further define it. "Covered equipment" is broadly defined to include any equipment that is capable of connecting to a network, is remotely updatable or accessible, is susceptible to unauthorized access, and is directly or indirectly connected to the grid or defense electric systems.
Section 2(e)(3) and (4)
Why it matters:While placing definitions at the end is standard legislative practice, the technical and broad nature of these definitions, coupled with the delegation of definitional authority to the Secretary of Defense, makes them particularly impactful yet easily missed. Their interpretation will significantly shape the bill's practical application.
Case for: Proponents would argue that broad definitions are necessary to ensure the bill can adapt to rapidly evolving cyber threats and technologies, preventing adversaries from exploiting loopholes. Delegating definitional authority to the Secretary of Defense allows for expert-driven, agile responses to new threats.
Case against: Opponents might contend that such broad and deferred definitions create regulatory uncertainty for industry and could lead to an expansive interpretation of DoD's authority, potentially encompassing a wider range of equipment and facilities than initially intended, leading to unforeseen compliance burdens and costs.
Estimated impact: Potentially affects a vast array of hardware and software across the entire U.S. electric grid and defense industrial base, with significant compliance and remediation costs that are currently unquantified.