What changed between these versions
A fundamental restructuring of the bill. v3 significantly narrows the scope of sanctions and enforcement mechanisms related to illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing and forced labor, removing direct import prohibitions and asset blocking. It also introduces new procedural safeguards for vessel owners and reduces authorized appropriations for key programs.
Overview
Extensive changes are present throughout the bill, encompassing significant rewrites of core sections and the introduction of entirely new provisions. · v3 fundamentally restructures the approach to combating IUU fishing and forced labor by significantly narrowing the scope of enforcement tools, particularly by removing broad economic sanctions and direct import prohibitions. It also introduces new procedural protections for affected parties and adjusts the scope of international cooperation and authorized funding.
v3 represents a fundamental restructuring of the bill's approach to combating illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing and forced labor. The most significant change is the complete overhaul of Section 5, which in v3 restricts sanctions solely to visa ineligibility for beneficial owners of listed vessels, eliminating the broad asset blocking and import prohibitions present in v2. Additionally, Section 4's 'Black List' is renamed 'IUU Vessel List,' and its direct consequences, including port access and servicing prohibitions, are removed, replaced by a general reference to prior law. v3 also introduces new procedural safeguards for vessel owners, narrows the scope of international cooperation, and reduces authorized appropriations for several key initiatives, while adding new general exceptions and rules of construction.
Major additions
This new provision grants beneficial owners of vessels placed on the IUU vessel list the right to request a hearing on the evidence. During this hearing, owners may present new evidence to the Interagency Working Group on IUU Fishing, which will then vote on whether the vessel should remain on the list.
This addition introduces a significant due process mechanism for vessel owners, providing an avenue to challenge their inclusion on the IUU vessel list. It shifts the process from a purely administrative review to one involving a formal hearing and a vote by the Interagency Working Group, potentially making it more difficult to list or keep vessels on the list.
This new exception specifies that visa sanctions will not apply to a person if they were listed as the owner of a vessel through the use of force, threats of force, fraud, or coercion.
This addition provides a critical protection for individuals who may be exploited or coerced into nominal ownership roles, ensuring they are not unfairly subjected to visa sanctions. It acknowledges the potential for human trafficking and other exploitative practices within the fishing industry.
This new section clarifies that the Act and its amendments do not authorize or require the imposition of sanctions on the importation of goods or related to such sanctions. It also defines 'good' for this purpose.
This addition explicitly limits the bill's scope, ensuring that no provision can be interpreted to impose import sanctions. This is a significant narrowing of potential enforcement tools, particularly in light of v2's explicit import prohibitions in Section 4(d)(3).
This new section states that nothing in the Act shall be construed to limit the authority under, or otherwise affect, any provision of law in effect on the date of enactment that is not amended by this Act.
This is a standard rule of construction intended to prevent unintended repeal or modification of existing laws. Its inclusion clarifies the relationship between this Act and other federal statutes, ensuring that only explicitly amended laws are affected.
Deletions
v2 included 'fishing that involves the use of forced labor' as a direct criterion for inclusion on the IUU vessel list, explicitly referencing withhold release orders (WROs) or findings by U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), Global Magnitsky Act sanctions, or other U.S. Government forced labor prevention actions.
The deletion of 'fishing that involves the use of forced labor' as a direct criterion for listing a vessel on the IUU list significantly narrows the scope of the list. It removes a key mechanism for directly targeting vessels and beneficial owners involved in forced labor practices through the IUU vessel listing process, shifting the focus primarily back to traditional IUU fishing activities.
v2 included as a criterion for IUU vessel list inclusion foreign vessels or beneficial owners subject to economic sanctions administered by the Department of the Treasury Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) for transnational criminal activity associated with IUU fishing, including under Executive Order 13581 or the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act.
The deletion of this criterion removes a direct link between existing OFAC sanctions for transnational criminal activity (which often includes IUU fishing and related crimes) and automatic inclusion on the IUU vessel list. This reduces the automatic enforcement leverage derived from broader economic sanctions programs.
v2's Section 4(d), titled 'Consequences of Being on Black List (IUU Vessel List),' explicitly prohibited listed foreign vessels from accessing United States ports and services, traveling through U.S. territorial seas (unless innocent passage), and delivering or receiving supplies or transshipment in U.S. waters. It also prohibited U.S. vessels from servicing listed foreign vessels and prohibited the import of seafood caught, processed, or transported by listed vessels.
This is a major deletion of direct, operative consequences for vessels on the IUU list. The removal of explicit prohibitions on port access, servicing, and seafood imports fundamentally alters the enforcement mechanism of the IUU vessel list, replacing specific, actionable measures with a general reference to prior law's actions, which may be less comprehensive or direct.
v2 included a provision for automatic removal of a foreign vessel from the IUU vessel list if it was added due to a U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) withhold release order (WRO) or finding, and that WRO was subsequently revoked.
The deletion of this provision removes a specific, clear pathway for removal from the IUU vessel list for vessels initially listed due to CBP forced labor actions. This means that even if a WRO is revoked, the vessel would still need to apply for removal under the more general and potentially more stringent application process, or rely on IFMO action.
v2 specified that standards for removal from the IUU vessel list must include a determination that the foreign vessel or owner has not engaged in IUU fishing or fishing that involves the use of forced labor during the 5-year period preceding the application date, and that sufficient corrective action has been taken to remediate violations.
The deletion of these specific standards for removal makes the removal process less prescriptive. While the Secretary must still set standards, the explicit requirement for a 5-year clean record regarding IUU fishing and forced labor, and a determination of corrective action, is removed. This could potentially allow for more flexible, but also less transparent or stringent, removal criteria.
v2 included 'Forced labor' as a defined term within Section 4, referencing section 307 of the Tariff Act of 1930.
The deletion of the 'Forced labor' definition from Section 4 reflects the broader shift in v3 to de-emphasize forced labor as a direct criterion for IUU vessel listing and its immediate consequences within this specific section. While forced labor is still mentioned elsewhere in the bill, its direct linkage to the IUU vessel list's operational mechanics is reduced.
v2 authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to impose economic sanctions (asset blocking) and visa sanctions on a broad range of foreign persons and entities involved in IUU fishing, endangered species trade, or supporting such activities.
This is a major deletion of the broad authority to impose sanctions on a wide range of actors involved in IUU fishing and endangered species trade. v3 replaces this with a much narrower scope, focusing only on visa sanctions for beneficial owners of vessels on the IUU list, thereby removing the ability to sanction a broader network of facilitators and participants.
v2 authorized the blocking and prohibition of all transactions in property and interests in property of sanctioned foreign persons or entities under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA).
This is a critical deletion, removing the primary economic sanction tool (asset blocking) from the bill. This significantly weakens the punitive measures available against foreign persons and entities engaged in IUU fishing or related activities, shifting the focus away from financial deterrence.
v2 included provisions for the President to exercise IEEPA authorities to carry out Section 5 and specified that violators would be subject to IEEPA penalties.
The deletion of these implementation and penalty provisions is a direct consequence of removing the IEEPA-based economic sanctions. Without the authority to block property, the specific IEEPA implementation and penalty mechanisms are no longer relevant to this section, further indicating a shift away from broad economic enforcement.
v2 authorized the President to promulgate rules and regulations necessary to carry out Section 5, including regulatory exceptions, and included a rule of construction stating that Section 5 does not limit IEEPA authority.
The deletion of this rulemaking authority and rule of construction is consistent with the narrowing of Section 5's scope. As the section now only addresses visa sanctions, the broad regulatory powers associated with IEEPA implementation are no longer necessary or appropriate for this section.
v2 explicitly listed the UN Fish Stocks Agreement among treaties that the Federal Government should encourage other nations to ratify.
The removal of the UN Fish Stocks Agreement from the list of treaties to encourage ratification slightly narrows the specific international legal instruments the U.S. government prioritizes in its diplomatic efforts to combat IUU fishing. This could indicate a shift in diplomatic focus or priorities.
v2 explicitly listed 'the practice of transshipment, flags of convenience vessels, and government subsidies of the distant water fishing industry' as underlying drivers of IUU fishing and forced labor that bilateral and multilateral initiatives should address.
The deletion of these specific underlying drivers makes the policy guidance less prescriptive regarding the focus of international initiatives. While the initiatives are still to address 'underlying drivers,' removing these concrete examples could allow for broader interpretation or a less direct focus on these specific issues.
v2 specified that the Commandant of the Coast Guard should strive to increase observation and boarding of suspected IUU vessels 'in accordance with the UN Fish Stocks Agreement.'
The removal of the explicit reference to the UN Fish Stocks Agreement in relation to Coast Guard boarding efforts removes a specific international legal framework guiding these operations. While other international laws and agreements would still apply, this deletion removes a direct legislative mandate to operate under that specific agreement for high seas boardings.
v2 encouraged the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the Millennium Challenge Corporation, and multilateral institutions such as the World Bank to increase support for programs providing technical assistance, institutional capacity, and investment to nations' fisheries sectors.
The deletion of USAID, the Millennium Challenge Corporation, and multilateral institutions from the list of entities encouraged to provide support narrows the range of U.S. government and international partners explicitly tasked with increasing investment and technical assistance in foreign fisheries sectors. This could concentrate efforts within fewer agencies or reduce the overall scale of such support.
v2 included the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) as a supporting agency for the study on Russian and Chinese fishing industries' influence.
The removal of USTR from the supporting agencies for this study may reduce the focus on trade-specific aspects or implications of the Russian and Chinese fishing industries' influence, potentially shifting the emphasis more towards diplomatic and commercial aspects handled by the Departments of State and Commerce.
Modifications
This is a technical correction to align the definition with the precise wording of the International Plan of Action, ensuring accuracy. It does not alter the substantive scope of what constitutes IUU fishing.
Before
v2 defined 'IUU fishing' as activities described as illegal fishing, unreported fishing, or unregulated fishing in paragraph 3 of the International Plan of Action (IPOA).
After
v3 defines 'IUU fishing' as activities described as illegal fishing, unreported fishing, and unregulated fishing in paragraph 3 of the International Plan of Action (IPOA).
This change broadens the interagency coordination for developing the IUU vessel list by replacing the specific mention of the CBP Commissioner with a more general reference to 'heads of other relevant agencies.' This allows for flexibility in agency involvement but removes a direct mandate for CBP's participation in the list's development.
Before
v2 stated that the Secretary, in coordination with the Secretary of State, the Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection, and the Secretary of Labor, shall develop and maintain the IUU vessel list.
After
v3 states that the Secretary, in coordination with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Labor, and the heads of other relevant agencies, shall develop and maintain the IUU vessel list.
The addition of 'knowingly' introduces a higher evidentiary standard for including a vessel on the IUU list under this criterion. This means that intent or knowledge of undermining IFMO measures must be demonstrated, potentially making it more challenging to list vessels for these actions.
Before
v2 included foreign vessels taking part in fishing that undermines the effectiveness of an international fishery management organization's (IFMO) conservation and management measures as a criterion for IUU list inclusion.
After
v3 specifies that foreign vessels *knowingly* taking part in fishing that undermines the effectiveness of an IFMO's conservation and management measures are a criterion for IUU list inclusion.
Similar to Section 4(c)(2)(B), the addition of 'knowingly' raises the evidentiary bar for listing vessels that provide support services to already listed IUU vessels. This requires demonstrating that the service provider was aware the recipient vessel was on the IUU list, potentially reducing the number of support vessels that can be listed.
Before
v2 included foreign vessels that provide services to a foreign vessel on the IUU vessel list as a criterion for inclusion.
After
v3 specifies that foreign vessels that *knowingly* provide services (excluding emergency or enforcement services) to a foreign vessel on the IUU vessel list are a criterion for inclusion.
This modification fundamentally alters the enforcement teeth of the IUU vessel list. Instead of new, explicit prohibitions, v3 refers back to actions authorized under previous law. This could potentially narrow the scope of consequences or make them less direct, depending on the specific 'actions described in subsection (c)(2)' of the prior law, which are not detailed in v3.
Before
v2's Section 4(d) explicitly detailed specific prohibitions and consequences for vessels on the IUU list, including denial of port access, servicing, and import of associated seafood.
After
v3's Section 4(d) states that 'The Secretary may take the action described in subsection (c)(2) of this section in effect on the day before the date of enactment of the Fighting Foreign Illegal Seafood Harvests Act of 2025 against a vessel on the IUU vessel list, the owner of such vessel, and the operator of such vessel.'
This modification shifts the authoritative definition of IUU fishing from a specific international document (IPOA) to U.S. domestic implementing regulations. This could allow for greater flexibility in how IUU fishing is defined and applied within the U.S. context, potentially leading to differences from the international standard if regulations diverge.
Before
v2 defined 'IUU fishing' within Section 4 by referencing paragraph 3 of the International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing.
After
v3 defines 'IUU fishing' within Section 4 as having 'the meaning given the term 'illegal, unreported, or unregulated fishing' in the implementing regulations or any subsequent regulations issued pursuant to section 609(e).'
This modification halves the authorized funding for establishing, maintaining, and implementing the IUU vessel list. This reduction in appropriations could impact the scale, effectiveness, and speed of the program's operations, potentially limiting its capacity to combat IUU fishing.
Before
v2 authorized $20,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2025 through 2030 to carry out Section 4.
After
v3 authorizes $10,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2025 through 2030 to carry out Section 4.
This is a fundamental change. v3 drastically narrows the applicability of sanctions, limiting them exclusively to visa sanctions for direct owners or beneficial owners of vessels on the IUU list. This removes the ability to impose economic sanctions on a wider array of actors (e.g., those involved in endangered species trade, or providing material support) and eliminates asset blocking as a tool, significantly reducing the punitive reach of this section.
Before
v2 authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to impose economic sanctions (asset blocking) and visa sanctions on a broad range of foreign persons and entities involved in IUU fishing, endangered species trade, or supporting such activities.
After
v3's Section 5(a) now describes 'Foreign Persons Described' as only 'the owner or beneficial owner of a vessel on the IUU vessel list developed under section 608(c) of the High Seas Driftnet Fishing Moratorium Protection Act (16 U.S.C. 1826i(c)).'
This modification removes 'entity' from the scope of the national interest waiver, meaning only individual foreign persons, not corporate or organizational entities, can be granted a waiver from visa sanctions. This could limit flexibility in diplomatic or economic considerations involving sanctioned entities.
Before
v2 allowed the President to waive the imposition of sanctions under this section with respect to a foreign person or entity.
After
v3 allows the President to waive the imposition of sanctions under this section with respect to a foreign person if doing so is in the national interest of the United States.
This modification introduces a significant qualifier to the President's mandate for considering IUU fishing and forced labor in international agreements. It explicitly allows other 'higher priority national interests' to take precedence, potentially reducing the emphasis on combating IUU fishing and forced labor in certain negotiations.
Before
v2 encouraged the President to consider the impacts on IUU fishing and forced labor in negotiating agreements and to strive to ensure agreements strengthen efforts to combat these issues.
After
v3 includes the same encouragement, but adds the condition 'as long as such considerations do not come at the expense of higher priority national interests of the United States.'
This modification adds a new condition for pursuing international initiatives, requiring 'clear burden sharing arrangements.' This could introduce a new hurdle or prerequisite for engaging in or expanding multilateral efforts to combat IUU fishing and forced labor, potentially slowing down or limiting such initiatives if burden-sharing cannot be agreed upon.
Before
v2 encouraged the Federal Government to pursue bilateral and multilateral initiatives to raise international ambition to combat IUU fishing, including in various international bodies, and to address underlying drivers.
After
v3 includes the same encouragement, but adds the condition 'as long as clear burden sharing arrangements with partner nations are determined.'
This modification removes explicit legislative guidance for the Interagency Working Group to focus on 'import control and assessment programs' when developing strategies against forced labor and illegal labor practices. While 'relevant enforcement' is still encouraged, the specific emphasis on import-related programs is diminished, potentially affecting the direction of IWG efforts.
Before
v2's IWG strategy for associated abuses included 'increasing enforcement and other actions across relevant import control and assessment programs.'
After
v3's IWG strategy for associated abuses includes 'increasing relevant enforcement,' removing the specific mention of 'and other actions across relevant import control and assessment programs.'
This is a technical update to the statutory citation for the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act. It does not change the operative impact or the substance of the IWG's mandate, merely ensuring accuracy in legal referencing.
Before
v2 referenced 'reports submitted under the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act of 2020 (22 U.S.C. 6901 note)' as a resource for the IWG strategy.
After
v3 references 'reports submitted under the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act of 2020 (Public Law 116-145)' as a resource for the IWG strategy.
This is a minor wording change, shifting the focus from 'entering United States commerce' to 'negatively affecting United States commerce.' The intent to avoid increasing burdens on legitimate seafood trade remains, but the phrasing is slightly less direct regarding the point of entry.
Before
v2 stated the Working Group shall identify information and resources to prevent fish and fish products from IUU fishing and fishing that involves the use of forced labor from entering United States commerce 'without increasing burden or trade barriers on seafood not produced from IUU fishing.'
After
v3 states the Working Group shall identify information and resources to prevent fish and fish products from IUU fishing and fishing that involves the use of forced labor from 'negatively affecting United States commerce without increasing burdens on seafood not produced from IUU fishing.'
This modification broadens the recommendation for enhancing capacity by removing the specific mention of CBP and NOAA. While these agencies are likely still involved, the change allows for a more general approach to capacity building for field investigations and enforcement, potentially involving a wider range of federal or state entities without explicit legislative direction.
Before
v2 recommended enhancing capacity for 'United States Customs and Border Protection and National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration' to conduct more effective field investigations.
After
v3 recommends enhancing capacity 'to conduct more effective field investigations and enforcement efforts with U.S. state enforcement officials,' removing specific agency names.
This modification removes the explicit reference to specific U.S. trade data systems. This allows for greater flexibility in how data collection and risk-targeting are improved, not limiting efforts to particular existing systems, but also removes a specific directive to integrate improvements into those systems.
Before
v2 recommended improving data collection and automated risk-targeting of seafood imports 'within the United States International Trade Data System and Automated Commercial Environment.'
After
v3 recommends improving data collection and automated risk-targeting of seafood, removing the specific mention of 'within the United States International Trade Data System and Automated Commercial Environment.'
This is a minor wording change, shifting from 'trade in seafood...is not impeded' to 'seafood...is not affected.' The core intent to protect legitimate seafood from negative impacts remains, but the phrasing is slightly broader.
Before
v2 recommended measures for ensuring that 'trade in seafood not linked to IUU fishing and forced labor is not impeded.'
After
v3 recommends measures for ensuring that 'seafood not linked to IUU fishing and fishing that involves the use of forced labor is not affected.'
This modification shifts the lead responsibility for developing and publishing the strategy to identify forced labor seafood from the CBP Commissioner to the Secretary of Commerce. It also broadens the coordination partners from 'the Secretary' (of Commerce) to 'heads of other relevant agencies,' potentially distributing responsibility more widely but centralizing the lead under Commerce.
Before
v2 tasked the Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection, in coordination with the Secretary, to develop and publish a strategy.
After
v3 tasks the Secretary, in coordination with the heads of other relevant agencies, to develop and publish a strategy.
This modification broadens the required publication location from the specific CBP website to any 'publicly accessible website.' This offers more flexibility in dissemination but removes the specific mandate for CBP to host the information, consistent with the shift in lead agency.
Before
v2 required publishing information regarding the strategy on the website of U.S. Customs and Border Protection.
After
v3 requires publishing information regarding the strategy on a publicly accessible website.
This modification broadens the focus of the study on Russian and Chinese fishing industries from specific economic impacts on U.S. seafood sectors to a more general 'impact on United States interests.' This allows for a wider range of considerations (e.g., national security, geopolitical, environmental) beyond purely commercial ones, but also makes the focus less specific.
Before
v2 specified that the study on Russian and Chinese fishing industries' influence should assess its 'impact on United States seafood importers, processors, and consumers.'
After
v3 specifies that the study should assess its 'impact on United States interests.'
This modification halves the authorized funding for the comprehensive National Academies study. This reduction could limit the scope, depth, or duration of the study, potentially affecting the thoroughness of its analysis on the occurrence, costs, and effectiveness of response strategies for IUU fishing and forced labor.
Before
v2 authorized $4,000,000 to carry out the National Academies study on the impacts of IUU fishing and forced labor.
After
v3 authorizes $2,000,000 to carry out the National Academies study on the impacts of IUU fishing and forced labor.
This is a significant change in how the National Sea Grant College Program Act's appropriations are authorized. v2 specified a concrete amount ($105.7M) for FY2026-2031. v3, however, removes a specific fiscal year (2025) and replaces it with a range (2025-2031) *without specifying an amount*. This means v3's amendment, as written, would authorize appropriations for a longer period but without a set dollar figure, potentially leaving the amount to be determined annually through the appropriations process, whereas v2 set a specific authorization level.
Before
v2 proposed to amend 33 U.S.C. 1131(a)(1) by striking 'this title' and all that follows and inserting 'this title $105,700,000 for each of fiscal years 2026 through 2031.'
After
v3 proposes to amend 33 U.S.C. 1131(a)(1) by striking 'for fiscal year 2025' and inserting 'for each of fiscal years 2025 through 2031.'
Scope
Fundamental restructuring — The changes are scattered throughout the bill, affecting definitions, the core IUU vessel listing mechanism, sanctions, international agreements, enforcement provisions, data strategies, investment, and reporting requirements. — v3 represents a meaningful change in policy direction. It shifts from a more aggressive, comprehensive enforcement approach that included broad economic sanctions and direct import prohibitions to a narrower focus primarily on visa sanctions and procedural safeguards for listed entities. The emphasis on forced labor as a direct trigger for IUU listing and its consequences is also significantly reduced. — The changes significantly interact with and modify existing provisions, particularly by altering the enforcement mechanisms of the High Seas Driftnet Fishing Moratorium Protection Act and the Maritime SAFE Act. The removal of direct import prohibitions and asset blocking fundamentally changes how the bill's objectives would be achieved, impacting various federal agencies and their authorities.
Impact analysis
Foreign vessel owners and beneficial owners suspected of IUU fishing or related activities
Procedural gain and reduced likelihood of listing. These changes provide greater due process protections and make it potentially more difficult for vessels to be listed, or to remain listed, without clear evidence of intent.
v3 introduces a new right to a hearing before the Interagency Working Group if their vessel is placed on the IUU list, allowing them to present new evidence. Additionally, the criteria for inclusion on the IUU list now require 'knowingly' engaging in certain undermining activities, raising the evidentiary bar.
Foreign vessels and beneficial owners engaged in forced labor practices
Reduced direct enforcement risk. The removal of forced labor as a direct criterion for IUU listing means that vessels primarily engaged in forced labor, without necessarily violating traditional IUU fishing rules, may no longer be directly targeted by the IUU vessel list's mechanisms. This could reduce the immediate punitive consequences for such practices under this specific Act.
v2 explicitly included forced labor as a direct criterion for inclusion on the IUU vessel list and referenced specific U.S. government forced labor enforcement actions (like CBP WROs) as triggers. v3 removes these direct forced labor criteria from the IUU vessel list inclusion and removal processes.
Foreign persons and entities involved in IUU fishing or endangered species trade
Reduced punitive risk. This group faces a substantially reduced risk of economic sanctions and a much narrower scope of visa sanctions, as the asset blocking authority is removed and the criteria for visa sanctions are significantly tightened.
v2 authorized broad economic sanctions (asset blocking) and visa sanctions against a wide range of actors. v3 eliminates the authority for economic sanctions and restricts sanctions solely to visa ineligibility, and only for beneficial owners of vessels on the IUU list.
Importers of seafood into the United States
Reduced trade barriers and compliance burden. Importers no longer face a direct statutory prohibition on importing seafood from IUU-listed vessels under this Act, potentially reducing their compliance burden and risk of forfeiture related to this specific legislation.
v2 explicitly prohibited the import of seafood caught, processed, or transported by vessels on the IUU list. v3 removes this direct import prohibition and adds a new section clarifying that the Act does not authorize or require import sanctions.
U.S. federal agencies involved in combating IUU fishing and forced labor (e.g., CBP, NOAA, USAID)
Reduced specific mandates, shifted responsibilities, and reduced funding. These changes could lead to a reallocation of resources and responsibilities among agencies, potentially reducing the specific enforcement tools and funding available for certain initiatives, and requiring new interagency coordination frameworks.
v3 removes specific mandates for CBP and NOAA in certain data collection and enforcement recommendations, removes USAID from the list of agencies encouraged to provide international assistance, and shifts lead responsibility for a forced labor seafood strategy from CBP to the Secretary of Commerce. Additionally, the authorized appropriations for Section 4 and the National Academies study are halved.
International partners and organizations involved in combating IUU fishing
Increased conditions and potentially narrowed focus for cooperation. These changes introduce new prerequisites for U.S. engagement in international efforts, potentially making U.S. participation more conditional or less comprehensive in certain areas, and reducing the explicit focus on specific international agreements or drivers.
v3 adds conditions to U.S. presidential negotiations (prioritizing national interests) and federal government encouragement of international initiatives (requiring clear burden sharing). It also removes the UN Fish Stocks Agreement from the list of treaties to encourage ratification and specific underlying drivers of IUU fishing from policy guidance.