COLLUDE Act
- Sponsor
- Sen. Schmitt, Eric [R-MO]
- Committees
- Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee (primary)
- Last action
- Jan 9, 2025
Bottom line
The bill aims to prevent government-induced censorship on online platforms by removing Section 230 liability protections when platforms moderate political speech at the behest of government entities, while preserving exceptions for legitimate law enforcement and national security communications.
What it actually does
This bill amends Section 230 of the Communications Act of 1934 to remove liability protections for interactive computer service providers that restrict access to or availability of material appearing to suppress legitimate political speech, if such action results from communications by governmental entities or non-governmental entities acting at the government's behest. It also shifts the burden of proof for Section 230(c)(1) protection and defines exceptions for legitimate law enforcement and national security purposes.
Proponents argue
Proponents argue the bill is necessary to combat perceived governmental overreach and censorship on online platforms, ensuring that interactive computer services do not suppress legitimate political speech under government pressure. They contend it protects free speech online and prevents platforms from acting as proxies for government censorship, thereby safeguarding democratic discourse.
Opponents contend
Opponents might argue that the bill could inadvertently force platforms to host harmful or illegal content by making them hesitant to moderate, even in cases not involving government coercion, to avoid losing Section 230 protections. They may also contend that defining 'legitimate political speech' could be problematic and lead to increased litigation and a less safe online environment.
The bill is short and relatively straightforward to read, but its implications for existing legal frameworks and online content moderation are significant and require careful consideration.
Section 2(1)(A)(ii) and (B)
Shift Burden of Proof for Publisher/Speaker Liability
This provision amends Section 230(c)(1) to require that in any criminal or civil action treating an interactive computer service provider or user as a publisher or speaker of information, they must prove they are not an 'information content provider' with respect to that information to retain their liability protection. This reverses the implicit assumption that they are not publishers unless proven otherwise.
Supporters argue
Supporters might argue this clarifies the intent of Section 230, ensuring platforms are held accountable if they actively participate in content creation rather than merely hosting it, and prevents them from claiming blanket immunity when they act more like publishers.
Critics contend
Critics may contend this creates an undue burden on platforms, potentially leading to more litigation and making it harder for platforms to operate, especially smaller ones, by requiring them to constantly prove their non-publisher status.
Tradeoffs
This provision balances the desire to hold platforms accountable for content they might influence against the risk of stifling online services by increasing their legal exposure and compliance costs.
Section 2(1)(C)
Removal of Section 230 Immunity for Government-Induced Content Moderation
This provision stipulates that Section 230 liability protections will not apply to an interactive computer service provider if they restrict access to or availability of material in a way that appears to suppress legitimate political speech, and this action is a result of a communication from a governmental entity or a non-governmental entity acting at the government's request, sent only to that specific provider.
Section 2(1)(C)(B) and Section 2(2)
Carve-outs for Law Enforcement and National Security Communications
This provision creates an exception to the loss of Section 230 protection, stating that communications for a 'legitimate law enforcement purpose' or a 'national security purpose' will not trigger the loss of immunity. It then defines these terms: 'legitimate law enforcement purpose' means investigating a criminal offense within lawful authority, and 'national security purpose' relates to intelligence, cryptologic activities, command and control of Armed Forces, weapon systems, or direct fulfillment of military/intelligence missions.
This clause defines the type of content moderation that, if influenced by government, would lead to a loss of Section 230 protection: actions that 'reasonably appear to express, promote, limit the visibility of, or suppress legitimate political speech, including a discernible viewpoint.'
Section 2(1)(C)(i)
Why it matters:This is standard legislative drafting, placing a key qualifier within a larger sentence. However, the inherent ambiguity of terms like 'legitimate political speech' means its full implications are not immediately obvious to a casual reader.
Case for: Proponents would argue this language is necessary to precisely target specific types of speech suppression while avoiding unintended consequences for other content moderation. It aims to protect a core category of speech vital to democratic discourse.
Case against: Opponents might argue that the subjective nature of 'reasonably appears' and 'legitimate political speech' creates a vague standard that could lead to inconsistent application, increased litigation, and significant uncertainty for platforms regarding their moderation policies.
Estimated impact: This phrasing will be central to any legal challenge or enforcement action related to the bill, determining the precise scope of content moderation activities that could lead to loss of Section 230 immunity and shaping future online speech policies.