FARMLAND Act of 2025
- Sponsor
- Sen. Ernst, Joni [R-IA]
- Committees
- Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry Committee (primary)
- Last action
- Mar 6, 2025
Bottom line
The FARMLAND Act of 2025 aims to fortify U.S. agricultural security and national defense by significantly tightening regulations and increasing scrutiny on foreign ownership and management of agricultural land, particularly from adversarial nations.
What it actually does
The bill, titled the FARMLAND Act of 2025, amends the Agricultural Foreign Investment Disclosure Act of 1978 (AFIDA) and the Defense Production Act of 1950 (DPA) to enhance federal oversight of foreign investment in U.S. agricultural land. It increases civil penalties for non-compliance with disclosure requirements, mandates public disclosure of non-compliant persons, establishes due diligence requirements for entities involved in land transfers, and creates a new Chief of Operations for Investigative Actions within USDA. It also expands the authority of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) to review certain real estate transactions by "foreign entities of concern" and prohibits foreign persons from participating in Farm Service Agency (FSA) programs.
Proponents argue
Proponents argue the bill is crucial for national security, protecting the U.S. food supply, preventing agricultural espionage and intellectual property theft, and countering the growing influence of strategic competitors like China in the U.S. agriculture sector. They emphasize the need to modernize existing laws and ensure the Federal Government fully exercises its oversight to mitigate unknown risks posed by foreign adversaries.
Opponents contend
Potential opponents might argue that the bill could deter legitimate foreign investment, create undue burdens on real estate transactions, and potentially lead to discrimination against certain foreign-born individuals or entities. Some might also raise concerns about the scope of "foreign entities of concern" and the potential for overreach in government surveillance of land ownership.
The bill is moderately complex due to its amendments to existing statutes and new definitions, requiring careful reading to understand its full implications.
Section 2(b) amending Section 3 of AFIDA (7 U.S.C. 3502)
Strengthened Civil Penalties for Disclosure Violations
This provision increases the civil penalties for failing to submit required reports on foreign agricultural land investments or for submitting false or misleading reports. It changes the penalty from "not exceed 25 percent" to "not less than 5 percent, but not more than 25 percent" of the fair market value of the interest in the agricultural land. It also makes collected penalties available to the Secretary without appropriation for enforcement.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue that stronger penalties are necessary to ensure compliance with disclosure laws, which are currently seen as insufficient to deter malign actors and ensure transparency in foreign land ownership.
Critics contend
Some might argue that significantly increasing penalties could disproportionately affect smaller foreign investors or those who make unintentional errors, potentially discouraging legitimate investment.
Tradeoffs
Balances the need for robust enforcement and transparency against potential burdens on foreign investors.
Section 2(c) amending Section 3 of AFIDA (7 U.S.C. 3502)
Public Disclosure of Noncompliant Foreign Investors
This provision mandates that the Secretary of Agriculture publicly disclose the names of all persons who pay a civil penalty for non-compliance with AFIDA, including after the completion of an appeal of a civil penalty.
Section 2(e) inserting new Section 5 into AFIDA
Mandatory Due Diligence in Agricultural Land Transfers
This provision requires any entity involved in the purchase or transfer of U.S. agricultural land (including buyers, sellers, real estate agents, brokers, and title companies) to conduct due diligence and certify to the Secretary of Agriculture that, to the best of their knowledge and belief, they are in compliance with all applicable provisions of AFIDA.
Section 3
Annual Report on National Security Risks of Foreign Agricultural Land Ownership
This section mandates an annual report from the Secretary of Agriculture (with support from the Secretary of Homeland Security and other agencies) to Congress. The report must detail national security risks posed by agricultural land purchases and management by "covered foreign persons" (from China, Russia, state sponsors of terrorism, or other identified countries). It requires analysis of acreage owned, threats to food security/biosecurity, cost of farm program support, industrial espionage, and proximity to critical infrastructure.
Section 4(a) amending Section 4 of AFIDA (7 U.S.C. 3503)
Creation of USDA Chief of Operations for Investigative Actions
This provision establishes a new position within the USDA, the Chief of Operations of Investigative Actions, to monitor AFIDA compliance, refer non-compliance, conduct investigations (in coordination with other federal agencies), audit a new database, and refer transactions of concern to CFIUS. The Chief reports to the Secretary of Agriculture or a delegated official.
Section 5(a) amending Section 721(a)(4) of the Defense Production Act of 1950 (50 U.S.C. 4565(a)(4))
CFIUS Review of Real Estate Purchases by Foreign Entities of Concern
This provision expands the jurisdiction of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) to include mandatory review of certain real estate purchases, leases, or concessions by "foreign entities of concern." These transactions are reviewable if they exceed $5 million in value (or cumulatively over 3 years) or 320 acres (or cumulatively over 3 years), and if the real estate is primarily used for agriculture, fossil fuel/natural gas/renewable energy extraction, or critical precursor materials for specific technology industries.
Section 5(d) amending Section 721(k)(2) of the Defense Production Act of 1950 (50 U.S.C. 4565(k)(2))
Adding USDA and FDA to CFIUS Membership
This provision adds the Secretary of Agriculture and the Commissioner of Food and Drugs to the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) as statutory members.
Section 6
Creation of a Public Database for Foreign Agricultural Land Ownership
This section mandates the Secretaries of Agriculture and Homeland Security to jointly develop a publicly available database of agricultural land owned by foreign persons, using existing data collected under AFIDA and from FSA-153 forms. The database must be audited annually by the Chief of Operations for Investigative Actions.
Section 7
Exclusion of Foreign Persons from Farm Service Agency Programs
This section prohibits any operator or owner who is a "foreign person" from participating in Farm Service Agency (FSA) programs. It requires certification of non-foreign status for participation and imposes civil penalties (up to 125% of benefits received) for violations, with collected penalties used for enforcement.
The bill incorporates the definition of "foreign entity of concern" from Section 9901 of the William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (15 U.S.C. 4651) into both AFIDA and the DPA. This definition is crucial as it dictates which foreign entities trigger enhanced scrutiny and prohibitions under the bill.
Section 4(b) amending Section 9 of AFIDA (7 U.S.C. 3508) and Section 5(b) amending Section 721(a) of DPA (50 U.S.C. 4565(a))
Why it matters:Standard legislative practice to avoid reprinting lengthy definitions, but it places a burden on the reader to understand the full implications.
Case for: Using an existing, established definition ensures consistency across federal law and leverages prior legislative debate on what constitutes a "foreign entity of concern."
Case against: The complexity of the referenced definition (which itself has multiple sub-clauses and criteria) means the full scope of entities targeted by this bill is not immediately clear to a reader of S. 886 alone.
Estimated impact: This definition is foundational to the bill's most significant new restrictions and oversight mechanisms, impacting a wide range of foreign investors from specific countries.
The bill defines "malign effort" as "any hostile effort undertaken by, at the direction of, on behalf of, or with the substantial support of the government of a foreign entity of concern." This definition guides the investigative actions of the new Chief of Operations.
Section 4(b) amending Section 9 of AFIDA (7 U.S.C. 3508)
Why it matters:Standard legislative practice for defining terms used throughout the bill.
Case for: Provides clear guidance for the new investigative office on the scope of activities it should target, focusing on hostile actions by adversarial governments.
Case against: The term "hostile effort" could be subject to broad interpretation, potentially leading to investigations that some might consider overreaching or politically motivated.
Estimated impact: This definition shapes the investigative priorities and actions of the new Chief of Operations, influencing how federal resources are directed to counter specific foreign activities.
This section requires the Secretary of the Treasury, in coordination with the Secretaries of State and Homeland Security, to submit a report to Congress assessing the feasibility of requiring retroactive divestment of real estate owned by foreign entities of concern.
Section 5(f)
Why it matters:This is a study requirement, often placed at the end of sections, but its subject matter (retroactive divestment) is highly consequential and politically charged, making it easy to overlook as a mere "report."
Case for: Supporters would argue that understanding the feasibility of retroactive divestment is crucial for addressing existing national security risks posed by current foreign ownership, not just future acquisitions.
Case against: Critics might argue that even studying retroactive divestment could send a negative signal to all foreign investors, create significant legal and economic uncertainty, and potentially violate property rights or international agreements.
Estimated impact: While not an immediate divestment mandate, this report could lay the groundwork for future, highly impactful policy changes regarding existing foreign land ownership.