A joint resolution to direct the removal of United States Armed Forces from hostilities within or against the Islamic Republic of Iran that have not been authorized by Congress.
- Sponsor
- Sen. Kelly, Mark [D-AZ]
- Committees
- Foreign Relations Committee (primary)
- Last action
- Apr 13, 2026
Bottom line
This resolution aims to reassert Congress's constitutional authority over military engagements by requiring the withdrawal of U.S. forces from unauthorized hostilities with Iran, while preserving defensive capabilities.
What it actually does
This joint resolution directs the President to remove United States Armed Forces from any hostilities within or against the Islamic Republic of Iran that have not been explicitly authorized by a congressional declaration of war or a specific statutory authorization for the use of military force. It clarifies that this directive does not prevent the U.S. from defending itself or its personnel, sharing intelligence, or assisting partner countries in intercepting attacks or providing defensive materiel support against Iran or its proxies.
Proponents argue
Proponents argue that this resolution upholds the constitutional power of Congress to declare war, preventing unauthorized military escalation and reducing the risk of a broader, costly regional conflict in the Middle East. They contend it ensures that any decision to engage in sustained military action against Iran is made through proper democratic processes, reflecting the will of the American people.
Opponents contend
Opponents might argue that such a resolution could unduly restrict the President's ability to respond swiftly and decisively to threats against U.S. interests, personnel, or allies, potentially emboldening adversaries like Iran. They may assert that current U.S. actions are defensive in nature or fall within existing executive authorities, and that a forced withdrawal could create a dangerous power vacuum or undermine regional stability.
The bill is concise and clearly written, making it highly accessible for a reader to understand its core intent and provisions within the estimated reading time.
Section 1
Congressional Findings on War Powers and Iran Hostilities
This section lays out Congress's constitutional authority to declare war, acknowledges the President's responsibility to defend the nation, and states that Congress has not authorized military force against Iran. It asserts that U.S. Armed Forces have initiated unauthorized hostilities against Iran, increasing regional conflict risks, and that these actions fall under the War Powers Resolution, triggering expedited congressional procedures.
Supporters argue
Proponents argue these findings are crucial for establishing the legal and constitutional basis for the resolution, reminding both the Executive Branch and the public of Congress's exclusive power to declare war and the dangers of unauthorized military engagements.
Critics contend
Opponents might argue that these findings mischaracterize the nature of U.S. military actions, which they may view as defensive or within existing authorities, and that such a framing could undermine the President's ability to conduct foreign policy effectively.
Tradeoffs
This section highlights the fundamental tension between the Executive's role as Commander-in-Chief and Congress's constitutional authority to declare war, a long-standing debate in U.S. foreign policy.
Section 2(a)
Directive for Removal of U.S. Armed Forces from Iran Hostilities
This is the core operative provision, directing the President to remove U.S. Armed Forces from any hostilities within or against the Islamic Republic of Iran. This removal is mandated unless Congress explicitly authorizes such actions through a formal declaration of war or a specific Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) against Iran. The directive is issued pursuant to specific expedited procedures under existing law.
Section 2(b)
Rule of Construction: Permitted Actions
This subsection clarifies that the resolution's directive to remove forces does not prevent the U.S. from undertaking certain actions. Specifically, it allows for defending against attacks on the U.S. or its personnel/facilities, collecting and sharing intelligence related to Iranian threats, and assisting partner countries (specifically those attacked by Iran since February 28, 2026) in intercepting retaliatory attacks or providing defensive materiel support.
The bill explicitly invokes Section 4(a) of the War Powers Resolution (50 U.S.C. 1543(a)) and Section 1013 of the Department of State Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1984 and 1985 (50 U.S.C. 1546a), along with Section 601(b) of the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976 (Public Law 94-329; 90 Stat. 765) to trigger expedited legislative procedures for its consideration.
Section 1(7) and Section 2(a)
Why it matters:This is standard legislative practice for War Powers Resolutions, as these specific statutes provide the legal framework for their expedited consideration, ensuring they receive a vote without being stalled by procedural maneuvers.
Case for: Supporters argue that invoking these specific statutes is essential to ensure the resolution receives timely consideration and a vote, preventing it from being sidelined and upholding the intent of the War Powers Resolution to allow Congress to act on unauthorized hostilities.
Case against: No specific case against the procedural mechanism itself is typically raised, though opponents of the resolution might view the expedited procedures as limiting debate or fast-tracking a potentially problematic policy.
Estimated impact: This procedural mechanism significantly increases the likelihood of the resolution coming to a vote in both chambers, bypassing typical legislative bottlenecks.
The bill specifies that the U.S. can continue assisting 'partner countries who have been attacked by the Islamic Republic of Iran since February 28, 2026' with intelligence sharing, intercepting attacks, or providing defensive materiel support.
Section 2(b)(2) and (3)
Why it matters:The inclusion of a specific date is likely a legislative compromise or a response to recent events, aiming to define the scope of permissible assistance to allies based on a recent period of Iranian aggression, rather than a deliberate attempt to obscure.
Case for: Proponents would argue this specific date provides a clear, actionable timeframe for identifying eligible partners and ensures that the U.S. can continue to support allies who have recently faced direct aggression from Iran, without being seen as engaging in offensive hostilities.
Case against: Critics might argue that such a specific date could be arbitrary or limit flexibility, potentially excluding allies who faced significant attacks just before this date or creating a precedent for future date-specific limitations on aid.
Estimated impact: This date defines the scope of U.S. defensive assistance to allies, potentially impacting which partners receive aid and for what timeframe, based on recent events.