A joint resolution proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United States requiring a balanced budget and establishing the requisite procedures.
- Sponsor
- Sen. Moody, Ashley [R-FL]
- Committees
- Judiciary Committee (primary)
- Last action
- Sep 30, 2026
Bottom line
The proposed amendment fundamentally alters federal budgeting by constitutionally requiring a balanced budget, establishing a stabilization fund, and granting the President line-item veto power, aiming to curb national debt.
What it actually does
This joint resolution proposes a constitutional amendment to mandate a balanced federal budget. It requires Congress to adopt a biannual appropriations process, ensure outlays do not exceed receipts based on a 3-year average of revenue, and establish a budget stabilization fund. It also grants the President line-item veto authority for appropriations bills if projected outlays exceed projected revenues.
Proponents argue
Proponents argue that a constitutional balanced budget amendment is essential to address the nation's unsustainable debt trajectory, enforce fiscal discipline, and prevent future generations from being burdened by excessive spending. They believe it will force Congress and the President to make tough but necessary choices to prioritize spending and ensure long-term economic stability.
Opponents contend
Opponents contend that a rigid balanced budget requirement could severely limit the government's ability to respond to economic crises, recessions, or national emergencies, potentially exacerbating downturns. They also argue that it could lead to drastic cuts in essential programs or significant tax increases, and that the specific mechanisms proposed might be unworkable or create unintended consequences.
The bill is short and relatively easy to read, but its implications are far-reaching, requiring significant consideration beyond a quick read.
Article--, Section 1.(a)
Mandate for Biannual Appropriations
This provision requires Congress to switch from an annual to a biannual (every two years) appropriations process. This means budget and spending decisions would be made for two fiscal years at a time, rather than one.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue that a biannual budget cycle would reduce the frequency of budget stalemates, allow agencies more time for planning and execution, and free up congressional time for oversight and other legislative priorities.
Critics contend
Critics suggest that a biannual process could reduce flexibility to respond to unforeseen economic changes or emergencies, potentially locking in spending levels that become inappropriate over a two-year period.
Tradeoffs
Balances the desire for increased stability and planning efficiency against the need for flexibility and responsiveness to changing circumstances.
Article--, Section 1.(b)
Transparency for Large Appropriations
This mandates that appropriation bills must specifically itemize any appropriation exceeding $100,000,000 (adjusted for inflation every four years starting FY2031). This aims to increase transparency for significant spending items.
Article--, Section 1.(c)
Public Review Period for Appropriation Bills
This requires that the full text of any appropriation bill must be made available to each Member of Congress and to the public at least 72 hours before either House considers it. This ensures adequate time for review before a vote.
Article--, Section 1.(d)
Constitutional Balanced Budget Mandate
This is the core balanced budget requirement, stating that Congress must enact a budget where outlays (spending) do not exceed receipts (revenue) based on the average of the previous three years of revenue. This means spending cannot exceed the average income from the last three years.
Article--, Section 1.(e)
Debt Reduction Commission
This establishes a "Taxation, Spending, and Budget Reform Commission" that must meet every 10 years until the national debt falls below 60% of GDP. If debt exceeds 60% at a meeting, the Commission must provide recommendations within a year, which must then be considered by both Houses of Congress.
Article--, Section 2.
Establishment and Management of a Budget Stabilization Fund
This section mandates the creation of a budget stabilization fund (a "rainy day fund"). It requires annual deposits of at least 1% of prior year's net revenue, aiming for 5% by the fifth fiscal year and 10% by the tenth. Criteria for withdrawals must be established by separate legislation, limited to revenue shortfalls or defined emergencies, and withdrawn funds must be replenished within 5 years.
Article--, Section 3.(a)-(b)
Presidential Role in Budget Planning
This designates the President as the "Chief Administrative Officer" responsible for planning and budgeting for the U.S. Government. It requires the President to submit a 2-year budget to Congress that is balanced and includes recommendations to achieve that balance.
Article--, Section 3.(c)-(d)
Presidential Line-Item Veto Authority
This grants the President the authority to veto specific provisions (line-items) within an appropriation bill if projected outlays exceed projected revenues. Congress can override such a veto with a three-fourths vote in both Houses.
The balanced budget requirement is based on "the average of the previous 3 years of revenue," not current year projections.
Article--, Section 1.(d)
Why it matters:This is standard legislative drafting to specify the exact mechanism, but its implications for economic responsiveness are significant.
Case for: Supporters argue this method provides a more stable and predictable revenue baseline, insulating the budget from short-term economic fluctuations and overly optimistic projections, thus promoting more realistic fiscal planning.
Case against: Critics contend that relying on past revenue averages can make the budget less responsive to current economic conditions, potentially forcing pro-cyclical cuts during a recession when current revenues are low, or allowing for excessive spending during a boom.
Estimated impact: Could significantly influence the government's fiscal response to economic cycles, potentially delaying or exacerbating reactions to recessions or booms.
Congress requires "not less than three-fourths of the Members of each House of Congress" to override a presidential line-item veto.
Article--, Section 3.(d)
Why it matters:This is a standard legislative detail for defining override thresholds, but its high bar makes it particularly consequential.
Case for: Proponents argue that such a high threshold ensures that only truly egregious or widely opposed presidential vetoes are overturned, giving the President significant power to enforce fiscal discipline and prevent pork-barrel spending.
Case against: Opponents argue that a three-fourths override is an exceptionally high bar, effectively granting the President near-absolute power over specific appropriations once a line-item veto is exercised, significantly eroding Congress's power of the purse and potentially leading to executive overreach.
Estimated impact: Dramatically shifts the balance of power between the executive and legislative branches regarding appropriations, making presidential line-item vetoes very difficult to overturn.